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HigHligHts
Regional Economic Update
● Despite a still weak external environment, most 
of developing Asia will likely see their economies 
improve on increased domestic demand and a 
modest recovery in export growth; GDP is forecast to 
rise 6.6% in 2013 from 6.0% last year. 
● The economic outlook for developing Asia is subject 
to three major risks: (i) an economic slowdown in 
the US from missed fiscal deadlines; (ii) a worsening 
eurozone debt crisis; and (iii) destabilizing 
capital flows.
● Given the evolving global economic landscape, 
developing Asia’s policymakers should not let short-
term adjustments interfere with the longer-term 
goal of a more balanced, sustainable, inclusive, and 
integrated economy. 
Progress in Regional Cooperation 
and Integration 
● Regional integration progressed as the 2008/09 global 
financial and eurozone debt crises brought greater 
cooperation to Asia; yet, deepening cooperation will 
likely be more challenging. 
● As advanced economies are readjusting, Asia 
continues to deepen initiatives and explore new ways 
to enhance regional cooperation, collaboration and 
coordination.
● Despite a shift in direction of Asia’s exports, the share 
of intraregional exports has remained unchanged 
at around 56% in 2011. 
● Trade in services is increasingly important to Asia, 
though its growth remains below trade in goods; Asia 
should prioritize service exports as a new growth 
channel—particularly modern services.
● The 2008/09 global financial crisis accelerated 
financial integration, with intraregional asset holdings 
rising and Asian investors increasing bond purchases 
from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan.
● Since 2008, Asia’s equity returns have converged in 
response to global shocks; co-movements in bond 
yields, however, have not changed much since 2000, 
as they are mostly affected by local events.
● Examining the correlation between consumption and 
output growth in Asia shows risk sharing to be quite 
small, even if there has been some increase over time.
● Intraregional remittances within Asia are rising 
rapidly, indicating growing intraregional labor 
mobility; as intra-Asian migration grows, better 
management to avoid conflict is an essential 
challenge to future cooperation.
● While regional connectivity is improving, demand 
continues to rise faster than supply, widening the 
infrastructure gap.
● As tariffs decline globally, transport and trade 
transaction costs, along with other non-tariff 
barriers, are becoming more important; cross-border 
procedures need to be simplified, harmonized, and 
use international best practices.
● Increasing interdependence underlines the 
importance of regional public goods in addressing 
both global and regional issues—such as climate 
change and the environment, epidemics, disaster 
preparedness, good governance, and cross-border 
crime.
● Financing and the delivery of regional public goods 
remain challenges to regional cooperation; as do 
institutional design and the standards used to deliver 
regional public goods.
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● Currency swap arrangements have been used widely 
since the 2008/09 global financial crisis and have 
become a major form of central bank coordination; 
the PRC is expanding its network of swap agreements 
to promote trade settlement in local currencies—
facilitating bilateral trade and investment and the 
internationalization of its currency.
Special Chapter: Multilateralizing Asian 
Regionalism—Approaches to Unraveling 
the Asian Noodle Bowl 
● The proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) 
has been greatest in Asia; the global multilateral 
impasse has helped create an Asian noodle bowl, with 
more than 100 ratified FTAs involving at least one 
Asian economy.
● Two key proposals have been advanced to 
disentangle the Asian noodle bowl: consolidation—
which creates a regional FTA to harmonize bilateral 
FTAs; and multilateralization—which grants 
nondiscriminatory preferences to nonmembers, 
eliminating preference discrepancies.
● The ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership could pave the way for consolidating 
ASEAN FTAs under a single regional agreement, 
although it is still too early to tell.
● Multilateralization can proceed from a 
consolidated regional FTA, or economies can seek 
multilateralization independently; but they both must 
overcome competing interests that lose from the 
dilution of preferences.
● Although consolidation and multilateralization are 
not mutually exclusive—consolidation is a means; 
multilateralization is the end—history shows that 
unilateral actions (of which multilateralization is a 
special case) are not only feasible but account for 
most trade liberalization to date.
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regional economic update
External Economic Environment
Despite some improvement, the external 
environment for developing Asia will likely 
remain weak in 2013.1
While financial markets stabilized last year, real economic 
activity in the G3 (eurozone, Japan, and the United 
States [US]) was mixed. The US economy did better than 
expected, while the eurozone’s continued to contract, 
and the Japanese economy weakened in the second 
half (Figure 1). For 2013, the eurozone economy should 
remain subdued as authorities confront daunting 
structural challenges amid record high unemployment. 
In Japan, it is unclear how far recent expansionary 
policies and a depreciating yen will boost the economy. 
US economic growth is expected 
to remain below trend in 2013.
Gross domestic product (GDP) grew modestly at 2.2% 
in 2012, with positive contributions from private 
consumption and fixed investment (including residential 
and nonresidential). However, the recovery’s momentum 
stalled in the fourth quarter as GDP contracted 0.1%—
on a quarter-on-quarter seasonally adjusted annualized 
rate (q-o-q, saar)—largely due to a significant decline 
in private inventories, government spending, and 
exports. While the fiscal cliff was narrowly averted 
in early January, it nonetheless continues to slow 
the US recovery. There are still too few new jobs and 
unemployment—at 7.8%—remains stubbornly high 
(Figure 2). Moreover, consumer and business confidence 
has fallen recently. Therefore, US economic growth will 
likely remain below trend, with GDP expected to grow 
2.1% in 2013.
The eurozone economy will likely 
continue to stagnate in 2013 with high 
unemployment and a concern of stalled 
policy implementation.
The eurozone economy contracted 0.5% in 2012—
falling 2.3% (saar) in the last quarter of 2012 compared 
with 0.3% in the third quarter. Domestic demand 
1Developing Asia refers to the 44 developing member countries of the Asian 
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Figure 1: GDP Growth—G3 (saar, q-o-q, %)
q-o-q = quarter-on-quarter, saar = seasonally adjusted annualized rate.  
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eurozone Japan United States
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate—G3 
(seasonally adjusted, % of labor force)
Note: Data for eurozone until November 2012.
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, European Central Bank, and CEIC.
weakened significantly and led to imports growing 
slower than exports, resulting in an expanded trade 
surplus. Unemployment continued to creep up, 
reaching a record high of 11.7% in December. While 
plans for fiscal consolidation have been set for many 
peripheral countries, uncertainties remain on how to 
achieve fiscal targets and address the delicate balance 
between growth and debt reduction. The dangerous 
link between sovereign debt and bank stress in weaker 
economies continues, and needed structural reforms 
have only barely begun to be implemented. In sum, GDP 
is expected to stagnate in 2013.
Japan’s new fiscal stimulus and rapidly 
changing monetary regime is designed to 
spur growth; whether it can kick-start the 
economy remains uncertain. 
While growing 1.9% last year, the economy contracted 
q-o-q in the last 3 quarters of 2012 as the trade 
deficit deepened and business investment slumped. 
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Expansionary macroeconomic policies adopted by 
the newly elected government late in the year have 
energized financial markets and resulted in rapid yen 
depreciation. In less than 4 months, the yen fell from 
¥77.5 to the US dollar to about ¥95, a depreciation 
of over 20%—it was over ¥120 per US dollar in mid-
2007 (Figure 3). The depreciation began with the new 
government’s strong commitment to ease monetary 
policy and deepening trade and current account deficits 
in recent months. The parliament recently approved the 
government’s supplemental budget, which includes 
fresh stimulus. To battle stubborn deflation, the Bank of 
Japan adopted an inflation target of 2% and announced 
a policy of unlimited asset purchases on 22 January. 
These expansionary policies, yen depreciation, and 
consumers’ advance purchases in anticipation of a 
consumption tax increase—from 5% to 8% in April 
2014—should spur economic growth. However, previous 
demand stimulus over two “lost” decades neither cured 
deflation nor led to sustained growth. Given that it is 
too early to assess the latest round of macroeconomic 
stimulus, GDP is forecast to grow 1.4% in 2013. 
Regional Economic Outlook
After moderating in 2012, growth across 
most of developing Asia is expected to 
improve this year on increased domestic 
demand and modest recovery in 
export growth. 
Last year saw a slowdown in growth in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and the more open export-
oriented economies in East Asia (Figure 4, Table 1). 
India’s economy also moderated as growth in private 
consumption and investment slowed. However, the 
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Figure 3: Exchange Rate Indexes and Trade Balance—Japan
LHS = left-hand scale, NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, RHS = right-hand scale.
Note: For exchange rate and NEER indexes, an increase means appreciation while decrease 
means depreciation.
Source: ADB calculations using data from the Bank for International Settlements, Reuters, 
and CEIC.
Asia continued. With the PRC’s growth improving and 
robust domestic demand continuing, growth across 
most of developing Asia is likely to pick up this year. The 
only subregion forecast to slow is the Pacific. Overall, 
however, growth in developing Asia is forecast to 
accelerate to 6.6% in 2013 after growing 6.0% in 2012.
The growth slowdown in the PRC has 
bottomed out as the government 
loosened monetary policy and resumed 
fiscal stimulus. 
The PRC economy expanded 7.8% in 2012 with growth 
accelerating in the second half. Strong fiscal spending 
likely contributed to the recovery, offsetting some of 
the effects of weaker external demand. The government 
accelerated approvals for infrastructure projects in 
major cities—giving momentum to the recovery. The 
economy also benefitted from a more accommodative 
monetary stance as the central bank began reducing 
the 1-year benchmark lending rate in June and July. 
The moderation in industrial production and retail sales 
growth appears to have run its course and export growth 
recovered to 25.0% in January. Consumer confidence 
also rose slightly during 2012 (Figure 5). The Purchasing 
Managers’ Index for January stood at 50.4, signaling 
modest growth (Figure 6). Overall, GDP is expected to 
expand 8.1% in 2013.
After slumping in 2012 due to a weak 
external environment, the highly-open East 
Asian economies should recover this year. 
Weak global demand significantly slowed economic 
growth across the rest of East Asia. In 2012, growth 
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Developing Asia Central Asia East Asia
South Asia Southeast Asia
Figure 4: GDP Growth—Asia (y-o-y, %)
Note: Developing Asia includes Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The 
Pacific is excluded as quarterly data unavailable. Central Asia includes Armenia, Georgia, 
and Kazakhstan. East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the 
Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. South Asia includes India and Sri Lanka. Data 
up to 2012Q3 except for Southeast Asia.
Source: ADB calculations using data from CEIC. 
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Figure 5: Consumer Confidence Index—East Asia 
(Jan 2007 = 100)
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg and CEIC.
Figure 6: Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI)1—
East Asia
1A manufacturing puchasing managers’ index reading above 50 points indicates an expansion 
in the manufacturing sector while below 50 points indicates a contraction.  Composite PMI for 
Hong Kong, China. 
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Likely revision to 
2013 forecast
Developing Asia 6.1 9.2 7.2 6.0 6.6 ▬
Central Asia4 3.2 6.8 6.5 5.4 5.7 ▲
East Asia5 6.8 9.8 8.1 6.4 7.0 ▲
     People’s Republic of China 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 8.1 ▲
South Asia6 7.7 8.5 6.0 5.0 6.2 ▼
     India 8.6 9.3 6.2 5.0 6.5 ▼
Southeast Asia7 1.4 7.9 4.7 5.5 5.5 ▼
The Pacific8 4.3 5.5 8.1 6.8 4.2 ▲
Major Industrialized Economies
     eurozone -4.4 2.0 1.4 -0.5 0.0
     Japan -5.5 4.7 -0.6 1.9 1.4
     United States -3.1 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.1
1Aggregates are weighted according to gross national income levels (Atlas method, current $) from World Development Indicators, World Bank.
2ADB estimates, except for eurozone, India, and the United States (advanced official estimates); actual figures for the People’s Republic of China and Japan.
3ADB forecasts from Asian Development Outlook Supplement, December 2012. The new forecasts for 2013 and 2014 will be released in Asian Development 
Outlook 2013 to be published in April.
4Includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
5Includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China.
6Includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Data for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are recorded on a 
fiscal-year basis. For India, the fiscal year spans the current year’s April through the next year’s March. For Bangladesh and Pakistan, the fiscal year spans the 
previous year’s July through the current year’s June.
7Includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
Excludes Myanmar as weights unavailable.
8Includes the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-
Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Excludes Nauru as weights unavailable.
Source: ADB calculations using data from various issues of the Asian Development Outlook, Asian Development Bank; and CEIC.
to 2.0% (from 3.6% in 2011) and 1.3% (from 4.1%), 
respectively. Exports and investment started to show 
signs of recovery in Taipei,China toward the end of 
2012. In Hong Kong, China, GDP expanded 1.3% in the 
third quarter, up marginally from 1.2% in the second 
quarter—the slowdown in the PRC likely had a major 
influence. Including Mongolia, which grew 10.6% in 
the fourth quarter, East Asia GDP (including the PRC) is 
forecast to grow 7.0% in 2013, up from last year’s 6.4%.
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India’s growth remained sluggish in the first 
half of fiscal year 2012, but recent monetary 
easing and a revival of reform momentum 
may provide some impetus.2
In the second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2012, India’s 
GDP growth dipped to 5.3%, dragged by a continued 
decline in private consumption and weak investment. 
In addition, last year’s low monsoon rainfall will likely 
hurt agricultural output in the remainder of FY2012, 
which will likely constrain consumption growth and 
push inflation higher. Early indicators also show that 
consumption and investment remained weak over the 
past few months (Figure 7). The Reserve Bank of India 
cut policy rates by 0.25 percentage points to 7.75% 
in January to stimulate domestic demand. But the 
high budget deficit, coupled with elevated inflation, 
limits its ability to cut rates further. The government 
has announced a series of economic reform measures, 
including fiscal consolidation and opening markets to 
foreign investors, which may help the economy regain 
momentum in the coming years. India’s economy is 
expected to recover to 6.5% growth in FY2013, after 
slowing to 5.0% in FY2012.
Elevated inflation dampens South Asia’s 
economic prospects. 
While falling in some economies, overall, inflation 
remains elevated in South Asia (Figure 8). In Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, inflation fell from 10.6% and 11.0% in 
FY2012 to 7.4% and 8.1% in January 2013, respectively, 
while it remained about 10% in India and Sri Lanka. 
Several central banks in the region, including India, Sri 
Lanka, and Pakistan, have eased monetary policy as 
inflation fell in recent months, which will likely boost 
2FY2012 for India refers to April 2011 to March 2012.
output this year. Tight monetary policies through most 
of 2012 slowed growth. Sri Lanka’s GDP expansion 
continued to fall in the third quarter of 2012. However, 
industrial production in Pakistan started to pick up in 
the second quarter of FY2013, and Bangladesh also 
saw some recovery in industrial production in the first 
quarter of FY2013.3 With India expected to recover, South 
Asia’s economic growth will likely reach 6.2% in 2013—
after moderating to 5.0% in 2012.
Strong domestic demand in Southeast 
Asia is expected to help sustain robust 
economic growth. 
Despite falling export demand, Southeast Asian 
countries maintained growth momentum by relying 
more on domestic demand (Figure 9). The Philippines’ 
GDP growth jumped to 6.6% in 2012 from 3.9% in 
2011 on strong investment and government spending. 
Supported by domestic demand, Indonesia maintained 
growth momentum with GDP expanding 6.2% in 2012 
from 6.5% in 2011. Thailand’s GDP growth accelerated 
to 6.4% from 0.1% in 2011 on reconstruction efforts 
following massive flooding, and Malaysia’s output 
expanded 5.6%, after 5.1% in 2011. However, last year’s 
weak external environment hurt Singapore’s highly open 
economy, which, as exports contracted, grew just 1.3% 
in 2012, significantly down from 5.2% in 2011. Robust 
domestic demand is expected to continue across most 
economies, while consumer confidence remains high 
in Indonesia and the Philippines (Figure 10). Together, 
Southeast Asia’s economies are expected to retain 
growth at 5.5% in 2013. The five largest economies 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand) are forecast to expand 5.8% in 2013, after 
growing 5.6% in 2012.
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Figure 7: Growth of Leading Indicators for Domestic Demand1—
India (y-o-y, %)
IPI = Industrial Production Index.
13-month moving average. Data for IPI until Dec 2012. 
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Figure 8: Headline Inflation1—South Asia (y-o-y, %)
1Refers to consumer price index (CPI). 
Source: ADB calculations using data from CEIC and Haver Analytics.
 Regional Economic Update   |   March 2013 7
Growth in Central Asia has weakened, 
mainly due to slower natural resource 
output and domestic issues in its two largest 
economies—Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan’s GDP grew 5.3% in the first 9 months of 
2012, compared with 7.2% over the same period in 2011. 
Mining output has been hurt by the drop in global metal 
prices, and agricultural output was also down. Delays 
in major investment projects are also contributing 
to weaker growth. In Azerbaijan, the growth outlook 
remains weak on falling oil production and a delayed 
rollout of salary increases for civil servants. Nonetheless, 
with a somewhat improving external environment, 
Central Asia’s economies are forecast to grow 5.7% in 
2013, slightly above the 5.4% growth in 2012.
Economic growth in the Pacific is expected 
to slow in 2013 on the lagged impact of last 
year’s weaker global economy. 
Due mainly to the winding down of major infrastructure 
spending in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Timor-Leste 
(two of the largest economies in the Pacific subregion), 
growth is expected to slow from an estimated average 
of 6.8% in 2012 to 4.2% in 2013. However, this masks 
improved growth prospects in nearly half of the 
countries of the subregion. Tourism in the Cook Islands, 
Fiji, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu remained robust 
in 2012 and this should continue in 2013. Resource 
exports and expenditures on  major infrastructure 
projects, especially in PNG and Timor-Leste, remain the 
primary drivers of regional economic growth over the 
medium term. While lower regional growth is expected 
in 2013, if PNG and Timor-Leste are able to execute their 
governments’ ambitious infrastructure spending plans 
more effectively than in recent years, this would raise 
growth prospects in the Pacific. 
Risks to the Outlook 
and Policy Issues
The 2013 economic outlook for developing 
Asia is subject to three major risks: (i) an 
economic slowdown in the US from 
missed fiscal deadlines; (ii) a worsening 
eurozone debt crisis, and (iii) destabilizing 
capital flows. 
Downside risks to the outlook are less severe than 
just a few months ago, as the US averted its “fiscal 
cliff” and the risk of a eurozone breakup has receded. 
But there remain significant risks nonetheless. First, 
looming fiscal deadlines in the US threaten to derail 
the fragile recovery and could push the economy 
back into recession. While the US congress delayed its 
fiscal reckoning, there remains the 1 March spending 
sequestration and the debt ceiling deadline to confront. 
Government operations could be disrupted with a huge 
contractionary impact. Also, the eurozone debt crisis 
remains unresolved and could worsen. Recession in 
periphery countries continues, while it could spread to 
the eurozone core of Germany, France, and Italy. Also, 
banking losses in the periphery countries may worsen. 
Progress toward a banking and fiscal union is slow and 
discontent over hardships from austerity measures is 
growing. Finally, uncertainty in the global economy and 
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Figure 9: Contributions to GDP Growth—Southeast Asia1 
(percentage points2)
1Includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
2Based on year-on-year (y-o-y) changes. 
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Figure 10: Consumer Confidence Index—Southeast Asia
(Jan 2007 = 100)
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg and CEIC.
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could bring large and volatile capital flows into 
developing Asia. This could drive excessive credit growth 
and currency appreciation, and exposes the region to 
sudden shifts in risk aversion.
While preparing counter-cyclical measures 
in case the short-term global outlook 
worsens, policymakers in developing Asia 
should target polices for a better balanced, 
sustainable, inclusive, and integrated future 
economy in the region. 
As the external environment will remain weak in 2013—
despite some positive developments in the US and 
eurozone over the past several months—developing 
Asia’s policymakers should remain vigilant and ready 
to implement measures to safeguard the region’s 
robust growth. Moreover, as advanced economies 
face a prolonged period of structural weakness, global 
growth will likely be lower than in recent decades. 
The region needs to transform its economies to adapt 
to this new global economic landscape. The 2008/09 
global financial and eurozone debt crises showed that 
while day-to-day “firefighting” is needed in the short-
term, policymakers should also take time to invest 
more capital in developing sound medium- and long-
term policy options. Short-term fixes cannot solve 
structural problems.
Policymakers in the region should remain 
cautious and prudent, and be prepared to 
respond quickly to any deterioration in the 
global economy. 
Global economic conditions and prospects for future 
recovery remain uncertain. Policymakers must be 
prepared to use available macroeconomic tools to 
safeguard economic growth while making growth more 
inclusive. Several developing economies in Asia have 
been loosening monetary policy or introduced new 
fiscal stimulus to offset some of the impact of the weaker 
global environment. Subdued inflationary pressures 
offer further scope to support growth. In addition, 
policymakers should stand ready to ensure financial 
systems in the region are liquid and well-capitalized. 
Governments must ensure that adequate social 
protection mechanisms are in place to support the poor 
and most vulnerable in case of falling employment or 
price shocks.
Financial sector development and 
macroprudential policy remain key to 
managing capital flows more effectively and 
ensuring long-term financial stability. 
Developing deeper, more broad-based, and transparent 
financial markets can help economies allocate financial 
resources more efficiently for productive use and apply 
large pools of savings more effectively—thus better 
managing volatile capital flows. While economies in 
the region have made progress, policymakers need to 
keep up with the fast-changing financial environment 
and remain in step with financial globalization 
and innovation. Authorities can also curb financial 
excess stemming from capital inflows by providing 
macroprudential supervision and regulation to prevent 
systemic crises. Monetary policy must be augmented 
by macroprudential tools, such as capital requirements, 
additional capital buffers for banks, guidance on 
leverage ratios, and liquidity management to build a 
firewall against financial excess.
Developing Asia should continue to 
promote economic transformation to adjust 
to the new global economic landscape. 
In the medium to long term, advanced economies 
face an extended period of structural weakness while 
repairing balance sheets. The region must confront the 
difficult task of adjustment—diversifying sources of 
growth, allocating financial resources more effectively 
and efficiently toward productive and socially equitable 
investment, and bolstering domestic and regional 
demand. Given the sluggish growth in advanced 
economies, developing Asia should further expand 
trade—particularly within the region, across its 
subregions, and with other emerging markets such as 
Latin America and Africa. Just as important, the region 
must ensure future growth is not merely sustainable 
but increasingly inclusive. Policies should be designed 
to improve people’s welfare and the environment. Key 
features of public policy could include developing and 
broadening human capital, creating more productive 
jobs, building inclusive financial systems, narrowing 
infrastructure deficits, investing in environmentally 
sustainable development, and providing effective social 
safety nets. Progress will increasingly be determined by 
the quality of growth rather than simply its level.
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2012. Intra-Asian labor mobility is also expanding with 
remittance inflows consistently rising. Boosting physical 
connectivity across the region is now a major priority. 
ASEAN+3—ASEAN, the PRC, Japan, and the Republic 
of Korea—also expanded their regional financial safety 
net, established an independent surveillance unit, and 
continued work on deepening local currency bond 
markets across the region. India has offered to finance a 
financial safety net for South Asia, while several countries 
have expanded bilateral currency swap arrangements 
to step up financial cooperation and promote trade 
settlement in local currencies. All these initiatives bolster 
Asian economic integration.
progress in regional cooperation and integration
Introduction
When economic and financial crises 
force countries to collaborate, recovery 
runs smoother and crisis prevention is 
strengthened. 
A key lesson from past crises—whether Latin American 
debt crisis, Europe’s 1992 currency crisis, and the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis—is that when countries work 
together to address some of the root causes of economic 
and financial crises, they recover from the crisis much 
more quickly. Crises help promote regionalism, which 
in turn builds greater resilience against future crises.4 
For Asia in particular, the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis 
led governments to cooperate to monitor the region’s 
crisis impact, pursue needed financial reforms, build 
regional safety nets, and thus helped the region to better 
manage the impact of the 2008/09 global financial 
crisis (Table 2). Closer cooperation further promoted 
market-led integration across Asia—as supply chains 
and production networks accelerated trade, investment, 
and finance—both intraregionally and increasingly 
inter-regionally via “South-South” trade. And without 
global cooperation—in response to the 2008/09 liquidity 
crunch—the impact would likely have been much worse.
The 2008/09 global financial and eurozone 
debt crises also triggered further 
cooperation in Asia, helping build resilience 
to future shocks.
As external demand from advanced economies slowed 
following the 2008/09 global financial crisis, regional 
trade—including trade in services—picked up the slack. 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) continue to proliferate 
and support for regional trade agreements has grown—
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
plus Australia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand 
(ASEAN+6) launching Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in November 
4Crises have been described in studies as “triggers”,  “catalysts”,  “turning points”, 
“critical junctures”, and “historical episodes” that create intense pressure to act 
quickly and forge a collective response to a common threat. They can either 
help or hinder the development of regionalism, defined here as government-led 
policy initiatives that focus on regional cooperation, which in turn tends to bring 
about greater integration.
Table 2: Country Coverage1
Central Asia
Armenia Kazakhstan Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan Kyrgyz Republic Uzbekistan
Georgia Tajikistan
East Asia
People’s Republic of China Japan Mongolia
Hong Kong, China Republic of Korea Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan India Pakistan
Bangladesh Maldives Sri Lanka
Bhutan Nepal
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam Malaysia Thailand
Cambodia Myanmar Viet Nam
Indonesia Philippines
Lao People’s Democratic 
   Republic
Singapore
The Pacific
Cook Islands Nauru Timor-Leste
Fiji Palau Tonga
Kiribati Papua New Guinea Tuvalu
Marshall Islands Samoa Vanuatu
Federated States of 




Asia = Central Asia + East Asia + South Asia + Southeast Asia + 
the Pacific + Oceania.
1Applies to this chapter of the Asian Economic Integration Monitor, unless otherwise stated.
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However, as Asia’s policymakers digest the 
ongoing eurozone debt crisis and costs 
of contagion, they may have a reduced 
appetite for deeper cooperation.
The link between Europe’s monetary integration and 
sovereign debt crisis raised several issues underlying the 
very raison d’etre of regional cooperation and integration. 
The contagion across Europe was a vivid reminder 
of the risk of a highly integrated system. This could 
give pause to policymakers behind Asia’s cooperation 
efforts. At the same time, increasing global and regional 
interdependence implies that economic and financial 
shocks from advanced economies channel across the 
region more quickly. This was true after the 2008/09 
global financial and eurozone debt crises, when financial 
markets and currencies in the region tumbled despite 
their relative strength. This is a key weakness of the 
global financial system, which Asia must reassess and 
rethink. Moreover, integration, while helping low-income 
countries grow faster than higher-income economies, 
appears to have contributed to increasing inequality 
within countries. Thus, in Asia, both the costs and 
benefits of integration are increasingly being debated.5
Work on future cooperation will likely 
become more challenging as well.
Regional economic integration has progressed rapidly 
in Asia, with the easy and more straightforward benefits 
from regional cooperation and integration having 
been realized. The remaining areas of cooperation 
and integration—and deepening existing ones—are 
much more complex. For instance, while trade tariffs 
are generally low, other barriers—such as quantitative 
restrictions, border administration and even closures—
along with behind-the-border barriers affecting 
logistics, transport, infrastructure, and weak institutions 
significantly constrain further integration. Trade in 
services is often restricted through domestic regulations. 
The impact of regional trade blocs remains unclear—for 
example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
RCEP could result in either debilitating competition or 
supporting global trade agreement. Financial integration 
is limited and cooperation on macroeconomic 
policy has barely begun. Furthermore, the degree of 
integration varies significantly across subregions and 
economies within subregions. Therefore, integration and 
cooperation benefit some economies more than others, 
widening disparities. Diversity is a blessing, but also a 
5See, for example, ADB. 2012. Regional Integration: A Balanced View. Asian 
Economic Integration Monitor July 2012. Manila.
challenge in prioritizing initiatives that lead to regional 
convergence. Further cooperation in these key areas is 
likely to be much more difficult and challenging than 
before.
Progress of Regional Cooperation 
and Integration in Asia
The first issue of the Asian Economic Integration Monitor 
(AEIM) used five indicators to track the progress of 
regional integration in Asia during the pre-Asian 
financial crisis (1990–1996), post-Asian financial crisis 
(2000–2007) and global crises (2008–2011, covering 
the 2008/09 global financial and eurozone debt 
crises) periods. These indicators included the shares of 
intraregional flows in foreign direct investment (FDI), 
tourism, and total trade; intraregional holdings of 
equities and debt securities, and output correlations 
between economies in the region (Figure 11). The 
progress of integration in Asia was most evident through 
trade, tourism, capital markets, and macroeconomic 
links, with output correlations during the global crises 
most likely reflecting the impact of the global shock as 
it hit the region. The only exception was intraregional 
FDI flows, which remained below its pre-Asian financial 
crisis share.6
These indicators have several limitations. They are not 
exhaustive and do not cover other important areas 
of cooperation and integration, such as infrastructure 
connectivity and institutional development, among 
others. They also hold different benchmarks for 
measuring the progress of integration; and it is quite 
difficult to judge—by merely comparing values—
whether the level of integration in trade is, say, 
greater than the level of integration in tourism or 
capital markets.7
This issue of the AEIM examines integration indicators 
differently (Box 1). To help compare changes across 
indicators and assess areas of interdependence that 
have strengthened the most, the five indicators are 
“normalized” to assess the changes of these indicators 
6This could be due to the quality of FDI data, which are patchy, released with a  
long lag, and prone to large revisions.
7Another problem is how to apply these indicators to Asia’s various subregions, 
which are quite diverse and unique. While these indicators may be suitable for 
East and Southeast Asia—where trade and capital flows are essential—they 
may not reflect levels of integration in other subregions, such as Central Asia, 
which is more integrated from the perspective of physical connectivity. Quite 
the opposite, for example, from the perspective of the widely dispersed Pacific 
island countries.
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relative to a benchmark of typical economy-to-economy 
variations in the region. In general, normalizing an 
indicator shows how far the indicator has changed from 
its long-term, region-wide average—expressed in terms 
of units of standard deviation. The normalized indicators 
were then converted into indexes to show how they 
have changed over time. To measure the overall level 
of integration in the region, a composite index is 
constructed from the average indexes of the normalized 
indicators for Asia from 2001 to 2011—period where 
the five indicators are available. It is clear from the 
composite index that integration has progressed in Asia 
during this period—more sharply after 2006—although 
the progress has tapered off in 2011 reflecting less 
synchronized output growth in the region due to effects 
of domestic shocks such as the Japanese earthquake and 
Thailand floods (Figure 12). 
Figure 11: Advancing Integration: Regional Indicators—Asia
(Pre-AFC, post-AFC, and global crises)
AFC = Asian financial crisis. Unless otherwise stated, pre-AFC = 1990–1997, post-AFC = 
1998–2007, and global crises = 2008–2011 (covering 2008/09 global financial and eurozone 
debt crises).
Foreign direct investment: Average share of the intraregional foreign direct investment 
inflows. Data unavailable for Afghanistan; Bhutan; the Cook Islands; Kiribati; the Maldives; the 
Marshall Islands; the Federated States of Micronesia; Mongolia; Nauru; Nepal; Palau; Samoa; 
Solomon Islands; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Timor-Leste; Tonga; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; 
Uzbekistan; and Viet Nam. Value for 2011 assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Capital markets: Average share of intraregional debt and equity investment based on 
investments from Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; the Republic of 
Korea; Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Vanuatu. Post-AFC = 
2001–2007. Data available from 2001. Does not include Oceania. Recipient data unavailable 
for Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Turkmenistan, 
and Tuvalu. 
Output correlations: Based on simple averages of 3-year rolling bilateral correlations of annual 
growth rates (difference of natural logarithms) of real GDP series (2005 base year). Pre-AFC = 
1996–1997; global crises = 2008–2012. Data unavailable for Afghanistan, the Cook Islands, the 
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste, and 
Tuvalu. Does not include Oceania.
Trade: Average share of intraregional trade. Reporter data unavailable for Bhutan, Kiribati, 
Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Reporter and partner data unavailable for the Cook 
Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
Tourism: Average share of intraregional tourist flows. Pre-AFC = 1995–1997.  Does not include 
Oceania. Value for 2011 assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg; CEIC; Asia Regional Integration Center, 
Asian Development Bank; Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International Monetary 
Fund; Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund; World Economic Outlook 
Database October 2012, International Monetary Fund; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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To assess the progress of integration over a longer 
period, the normalized indicators and their averages 
are also calculated for three periods: before and after 
the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, and during the global 
crises (Figure 13). The averages of the normalized 
indicators show that regional integration has advanced 
since the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and after the 
global crises. This seemed to suggest that financial crises 
could have spurred regional cooperation and integration 
in the past two decades, with the progress of integration 
evident in the areas of trade, tourism, capital markets, 
and macroeconomic links. 
Regional integration in Asia has progressed 
in two stages: trade and tourism links 
improved prior to closer capital market and 
macroeconomic links.
In the first stage, which occurred after the 1997/98 
Asian financial crisis, trade and tourism links rose 
significantly—by as much as 0.5–2.0 standard deviations 
Figure 12: Composite Integration Index1—Asia (2001=100)
1Average of five standardized indicators: foreign direct investment, capital markets, output 
correlations, trade, and tourism. Standardization involves transforming each observation using 
the following formula: x*ijt = (xijt – Ai)/si, where xijt is the value of indicator i in region j at time t, 
Ai is the average of the ith indicator over all j and t, and si is the standard deviation of the ith 
indicator over all j and t. 
2Uses estimates for foreign direct investment and tourism.
Foreign direct investment: Average share of the intraregional foreign direct investment 
inflows. Data unavailable for Afghanistan; Bhutan; the Cook Islands; Kiribati; the Maldives; the 
Marshall Islands; the Federated States of Micronesia; Mongolia; Nauru; Nepal; Palau; Samoa; 
Solomon Islands; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Timor-Leste; Tonga; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; 
Uzbekistan; and Viet Nam. Value for 2011 assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Capital markets: Average share of intraregional debt and equity investment based on 
investments from Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; the Republic of 
Korea; Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Vanuatu. Does not include 
Oceania. Recipient data unavailable for Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Turkmenistan, and Tuvalu. 
Output correlations: Based on the median of 3-year rolling bilateral correlations of annual 
growth rates (difference of natural logarithms) of real GDP series (2005 base year). Data 
unavailable for Afghanistan, the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Does not include Oceania.
Trade: Share of intraregional trade. Reporter data unavailable for Bhutan, Kiribati, Nauru, 
Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Reporter and partner data unavailable for the Cook Islands, the 
Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
Tourism: Share of intraregional tourist flows. Does not include Oceania. Value for 2011 
assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg; CEIC; Asia Regional Integration Center, 
Asian Development Bank; Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International Monetary 
Fund; Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund; World Economic Outlook 
Database October 2012, International Monetary Fund; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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Box 1: An Asian Economic Integration Monitor Roadmap
The Asian Economic Integration Monitor (AEIM) tracks the 
progress of regional economic cooperation and integration 
across Asia and its subregions. It examines and analyzes 
new regional cooperation and integration developments, 
continuing—on a regular basis—the work of a trilogy of 
studies conducted jointly by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and ADB Institute: (i) Emerging Asian Regionalism: A 
Partnership for Shared Prosperity (2008); (ii) Infrastructure 
for a Seamless Asia (2009); and (iii) Institutions for Regional 
Integration: Toward an Asian Economic Community (2010). 
By monitoring the region’s progress, the AEIM can help 
assess how the region balances the benefits and costs of 
integration.
Each issue of the AEIM will hone in on specific aspects of 
integration—some are discussed based on available data 
and general trends, while others will be analyzed from a 
more technical, empirical perspective.
The inaugural issue of AEIM—published in July 2012—
analyzed developments in regional cooperation and 
integration since the publication of the trilogy, mainly 
covering progress since the global financial crisis in 2008. 
It examined in depth stylized facts for each area of regional 
integration in Asia and its subregions.
The depth of trade integration varies across subregions, 
with the primacy of intermediate goods trade reflecting 
deepening regional production networks. Cooperation in 
trade policy has developed most effectively in Asia through a 
combination of unilateral liberalization and a plethora of free 
trade agreements. Asia’s financial integration lags behind 
trade integration, with the region’s financial markets more 
integrated through global markets than among themselves. 
But there are signs since the 2008/09 global financial 
crisis that financial integration is accelerating. The crisis 
provided further impetus to regional macroeconomic and 
financial cooperation in Asia—through dialogue processes, 
regional financial safety nets, and developing bond markets. 
Internationalizing the renminbi will likely boost regional 
cooperation and integration, particularly in East and 
Southeast Asia.
Regional labor mobility remains low, even if migrant stock 
data showed mobility increased between 2000 and 2010—
migrants increasingly favor countries outside Asia. However, 
surging remittance inflows suggest labor mobility within 
Asia increased significantly over the past decade. 
Closer trade, investment, financial, and labor links are 
making the region’s economies more interdependent. 
Correlations of output and inflation rose sharply in recent 
years, largely due to the impact of the common shocks 
from the 2008/09 global financial crisis and the rise in 
world commodity prices in 2006–2008. As Asia’s economies 
integrate, income disparity across the region has declined 
as low-income countries grew faster than higher-income 
economies. Strong growth in the People’s Republic of China 
and India were major factors in the reduction in income 
disparity between Asian economies.
Asia’s infrastructure gap remains huge, requiring far greater 
cross-border connectivity to strengthen intraregional trade 
and regional demand. In addition to physical infrastructure, 
Asia needs to strengthen its “soft” infrastructure—policy, 
legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks, along with 
the systems and procedures for moving goods and services 
across borders.
The inaugural July 2012 issue also included a special chapter, 
“Regional Integration: A Balanced View.” Examining various 
facets of regional integration, its main premise was that both 
benefits and costs should be carefully gauged in evaluating 
proposals for regional integration. The overall aim of 
regional cooperation and integration, like any development 
agenda, is to boost people’s welfare—reducing poverty 
and narrowing inequality. Small and large economies alike 
should equally benefit from regional integration. Greater 
cooperation is needed to better and carefully manage 
market processes to reap benefits of integration while 
minimizing its potential costs.
This second issue of the AEIM continues to track the 
progress of regional cooperation and integration—and also 
discusses new issues not covered in the July 2012 issue. 
The trade section delves into trade in services, while the 
financial integration section examines whether variations 
in returns and yields in the region’s financial markets are 
driven by global or regional shocks. The macroeconomic 
interdependence section examines risk sharing in Asia by 
analyzing the behavior of consumption and output. The 
labor mobility part looks closely at remittance data and its 
implications for labor mobility in Asia. 
The infrastructure connectivity section explains in 
detail several subregional cross-border infrastructure 
projects—information communication and technology, 
transport, and energy. The macroeconomic and financial 
cooperation section tracks recent progress through global 
and regional policy forums. It also discusses currency swap 
arrangements—a major form of central bank coordination 
used widely since the 2008/09 global financial crisis.
This issue also discusses the provision of regional public 
goods.
The special chapter—“Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism: 
Approaches to Unraveling the Asian Noodle Bowl”—
critiques various options for further trade cooperation 
in Asia.
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from their long-run averages. During this period, 
however, FDI flows within the region actually weakened. 
In the second stage, beginning with the global financial 
crisis in 2008, however, regional integration deepened 
more in terms of FDI flows, capital markets, and output 
correlations—between 0.75 and 2.5 standard deviations 
above their long-run averages (Figure 14).
The progress of integration in trade and tourism, 
however, appears to have plateaued or slowed during 
the global crises, while output correlations and 
integration in capital markets and FDI strengthened. 
There are three possible explanations for this. First, 
the global crises, still ongoing, was relatively short 
compared with the other two periods, such that the crisis 
impact on both trade and travel dominated. Second, 
the slowdown in trade integration reflected the strong 
global orientation of PRC trade and the relative fall of its 
trade with its neighbors. The PRC’s share of intraregional 
trade has been falling in recent years, as it vastly 
expanded trade links with Latin America and Africa. On 
the contrary, the global crises not only increased risks, 
but also lowered returns of real and financial assets in 
advanced economies—mostly outside of Asia—and 
thus FDI and portfolio investment increasingly flowed 
within Asia. In addition, the shocks from the global crises 
affected all economies simultaneously and therefore 
boosted output correlations between Asian economies.
Figure 14: Average Change in Integration Indicators1—Asia
(Pre-AFC, post-AFC, and global crises)
AFC = Asian financial crisis. Unless otherwise stated, pre-AFC = 1996–1997, post-AFC = 
1998–2007, and global crises = 2008–2011 (covering 2008/09 global financial and eurozone 
debt crises).
1Change in the average of standardized indicators from pre- to post-AFC and post-AFC to 
global crises. Standardization involves transforming each observation using the following 
formula: x*ijt = (xijt – Ai)/si, where xijt is the value of indicator i in region j at time t, Ai is the 
average of the ith indicator over all j and t, and si is the standard deviation of the ith indicator 
over all j and t. The average of each indicator’s standardized observations is taken for each 
period specified, then the difference between the averages is calculated.
2Average of foreign direct investment, output correlations, trade, and tourism only. Capital 
markets do not have a pre-1997 benchmark as data unavailable.
Foreign direct investment: Average share of intraregional foreign direct investment inflows. 
Data unavailable for Afghanistan; Bhutan; the Cook Islands; Kiribati; the Maldives; the Marshall 
Islands; the Federated States of Micronesia; Mongolia; Nauru; Nepal; Palau; Samoa; Solomon 
Islands; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Timor-Leste; Tonga; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Uzbekistan; 
and Viet Nam. Value for 2011 assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Capital markets: Average share of intraregional debt and equity investment based on 
investments from Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; the Republic of 
Korea; Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Vanuatu. Post-AFC = 
2001–2007. Data available from 2001. Does not include Oceania. Recipient data unavailable 
for Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Turkmenistan, 
and Tuvalu.
Output correlations: Based on the median of 3-year rolling bilateral correlations of annual 
growth rates (difference of natural logarithms) of real GDP series (2005 base year). Data 
unavailable for Afghanistan, the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Does not include Oceania.
Trade: Average share of intraregional trade. Reporter data unavailable for Bhutan, Kiribati, 
Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Reporter and partner data unavailable for the Cook 
Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
Tourism: Average share of intraregional tourist flows. Does not include Oceania. Value for 2011 
assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg; CEIC; Asia Regional Integration Center, 
Asian Development Bank; Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International Monetary 
Fund; Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund; World Economic Outlook 
Database October 2012, International Monetary Fund; United Nations Conference on Trade and 























Figure 13: Progress of Integration in Asia1 
(Pre-AFC, post-AFC, and global crises)
AFC = Asian financial crisis. Unless otherwise stated, pre-AFC = 1996–1997, post-AFC = 
1998–2007, and global crises = 2008–2011 (covering 2008/09 global financial and eurozone 
debt crises). 
1Indicators are standardized for comparability. Standardization involves transforming each 
observation using the following formula: x*ijt = (xijt – Ai)/si, where xijt is the value of indicator i 
in region j at time t, Ai is the average of the ith indicator over all j and t, and si is the standard 
deviation of the ith indicator over all j and t. The average of each indicator’s standardized 
observations is taken for each period specified.
2Average of foreign direct investment, output correlations, trade, and tourism only. Capital 
markets do not have a pre-1997 benchmark as data unavailable.
Foreign direct investment: Average share of intraregional foreign direct investment inflows. 
Data unavailable for Afghanistan; Bhutan; the Cook Islands; Kiribati; the Maldives; the Marshall 
Islands; the Federated States of Micronesia; Mongolia; Nauru; Nepal; Palau; Samoa; Solomon 
Islands; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Timor-Leste; Tonga; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Uzbekistan; 
and Viet Nam. Value for 2011 assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Capital markets: Average share of intraregional debt and equity investment based on 
investments from Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; the Republic of 
Korea; Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Vanuatu. Post-AFC = 
2001–2007. Data available from 2001. Does not include Oceania. Recipient data unavailable 
for Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Turkmenistan, 
and Tuvalu.
Output correlations: Based on the median of 3-year rolling bilateral correlations of annual 
growth rates (difference of natural logarithms) of real GDP series (2005 base year). Data 
unavailable for Afghanistan, the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Does not include Oceania.
Trade: Average share of intraregional trade. Reporter data unavailable for Bhutan, Kiribati, 
Nauru, Palau, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu. Reporter and partner data unavailable for the Cook 
Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
Tourism: Average share of intraregional tourist flows.  Does not include Oceania. Value for 2011 
assumed to be the same as the previous year.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg; CEIC; Asia Regional Integration Center, 
Asian Development Bank; Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International Monetary 
Fund; Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund; World Economic Outlook 
Database October 2012, International Monetary Fund; United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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Trade Integration
Trade in Goods
The eurozone debt crisis continues to affect 
Asia through the trade channel; although far 
less than the 2008/09 global financial crisis. 
After recovering to a year-high of $80.6 billion in 
July 2011, exports to the European Union (EU) as of 
August 2012 have remained roughly 20% below the 
peak. For the same period, exports to the US were also 
5.3% below its 2011 peak ($68.7 billion). More broadly, 
in the months following the eurozone debt crisis, 
merchandise exports of major Asian economies fell a 
modest 10%. This fall, however, was more modest than 
the nearly 40% drop during the 2008/09 global financial 
crisis (Figure 15). Asia’s merchandise exports were 
climbing back since August 2012, almost reaching their 
pre-eurozone debt crisis peak. 
While Asia’s export growth continues to 
slow—with exports to the EU contracting 
most—exports to Africa, Latin America, and 
the Middle East rose in 2012.
Asia’s total export growth fell to 5.5% in July and August 
2012 from a high of 19.8% in the same period of 2011. 
From its peak in 2010, the region’s export growth in 2012 
also moderated across the board reflecting the broad 
impact of the eurozone debt crisis (Table 3). In contrast, 
exports to the Middle East grew strongly, followed by 
Africa and Latin America.8 As a result, the export share 
to these regions increased from 8.4% in January 2007 to 
11.3% in August 2012 (Figure 16). 
Despite a shift in the direction of Asia’s 
exports, the share of its intraregional 
exports has remained unchanged.
In the first 8 months of 2012, intraregional exports 
accounted for 56% of total Asian exports—equivalent 
to its 2009–2011 average (see Figure 16). Similarly, 
Asia’s intra-subregional trade shares were also quite 
stable—except for East Asia, which moderated slightly 
(Figure 17). The slight easing in East Asia can be 
8S. Hamanaka and A. Tafgar. 2013. Critical Review of East Asia–South America 
Trade. ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration. No. 105. Manila: 
Asian Development Bank.
Table 3: Merchandise Export Growth by Destination—Asia 
(y-o-y, %)
2008 2009 2010 2011 20121
Intraregional 14.6 -15.4 33.2 18.2 -3.7
United States   2.9 -20.1 25.9 11.7  4.1
European Union 17.5 -24.3 25.4 15.4 -13.1
Africa 27.4 -13.8 27.4 25.0  4.2
Latin America 29.0 -26.4 50.5 27.2  2.9
Middle East 36.3 -19.9 22.1 18.9  8.3
Total 15.5 -18.5 30.3 18.0 -3.1
Note: Country groupings for Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East are based on Asian 
Development Outlook 2011: South–South Economic Links, Asian Development Bank. European 
Union (EU) refers to the aggregate of 27 EU members.
1Data up to Aug 2012.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary 
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Figure 16: Merchandise Exports by Destination—Asia (% of total)
LHS = left-hand scale, RHS = right-hand scale.
Note: Country groupings of South economies (Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East) 
based on Asian Development Outlook 2011: South–South Economic Links, Asian Development 
Bank. European Union (EU) refers to the aggregate of 27 EU members.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary 
Fund; and CEIC for Taipei,China.
Figure 15: Merchandise Exports1 During Crisis—Asia2 
(peak month = 100)
13-month moving average. Based on $ values.
2Includes Australia; the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; 
the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; 
Thailand; and Viet Nam.  Only economies with up-to-date data were included.
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explained by slowing trade between the PRC and Hong 
Kong, China—a knock-on effect of weak demand from 
advanced economies on intraregional trade. 
Trade in Services
During the last decade, services trade 
has become an important driver of 
economic growth.9 
The growing importance of services trade can be 
seen from stories of some small countries that have 
successfully exported high-tech services worldwide. 
As a result, service exports of developing countries 
almost tripled between 1997 and 2007.10 Generally, 
the importance of services trade grew with the 
information and technology revolution, which enhanced 
the technology, transportability and tradability of 
services. Traditionally, services exports are mostly 
confined to the production of inputs or the provision 
9This section uses data based on the Balance of Payments Manual Sixth Edition 
(BPM6) (see Box 3 for a comparison of BPM6 and BPM5 data). 
10S. Mishra et al. note the global value of cross-border services exports in 2007 
was $3.3 trillion (20% of total world trade). However, this could be higher. H. 
Escaith (2008) notes that the share of services is almost 50% if transactions 
are measured in terms of direct and indirect value-added content—that is, if 
measured in terms of processing imported components into final products for 
export. If sales of services by foreign affiliates of multinational firms are added, 
then the value of trade in services rises further. Data for 15 OECD countries 
put the value of these sales at around $1.5 trillion in 2007. See S. Mishra, S. 
Lundstrom, and R. Anand. 2011. Service Export Sophistication and Economic 
Growth. Policy Research Working Paper. No. 5606. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank; H. Escaith. 2009. Measuring Trade in Value Added in the New Industrial 
Economy: Statistical Implications. MPRA Paper. 4 April. http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/14454/1/MPRA_paper_14454.pdf; World Trade Organization. 
2009. International Trade Statistics 2009. Geneva; and B. Hoekman and A. Mattoo. 
2008. Services Trade and Growth. Policy Research Working Paper. No. 4461. 
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Figure 17: Intra-subregional Trade Share1—Asia (%)
1Intra-subregional trade share (INTS) of region i is defined as INTSi = Xii/Xi.; where  Xii = exports 
of region i to region i and Xi. = total exports of region i.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary 
Fund; and CEIC for Taipei,China.
of personal services.11 However, with improvements in 
telecommunications and digital technology, a modern 
class of services—limited by neither time nor space—has 
emerged. These services take advantage of information 
and communications technology (ICT), globalization, 
and economies of scale; and benefit from higher 
productivity. They include information technology, 
education, and business processing outsourcing—
transcribing medical records, data services, call centers, 
and entertainment production services, among others.12
Trade in services is increasingly important 
to Asia; though it is growing slower than 
trade in goods.
Since 2005, the value of services trade in Asia doubled 
from $1.1 trillion to $2.2 trillion in 2011 (preliminary 
data)—an annual growth of 11.2%. A large chunk of 
services trade originates from East and Southeast Asia 
(Figure 18). Comparatively, services trade growth 
remains below growth in trade in goods. The value of 
goods trade in Asia more than doubled from $5.2 trillion 
in 2005 to $10.9 trillion in 2011—an annual growth of 
13.1%. As a result, the share of Asia’s services exports 
to total exports fell from 16.5% in 2005 to 15.7% in 2011, 
after reaching a peak of 18.0% in 2009 (Figure 19).13 
11Traditional services include transport; travel; construction; personal, cultural, 
and recreational services; government goods and services; manufacturing 
services on physical inputs owned by others such as processing, assembly, 
labeling or packing; and maintenance and repair services
12This modern class of services includes financial services covering 
financial intermediation and auxiliary services; insurance and pensions; 
telecommunications, computer, and information; charges for the use of 
intellectual property or royalties and license fees; other business including 
research and development, professional and management consulting; and 
technical, trade-related, and other business services.
13The ratio peaked in 2009 as services export growth proved to be more resilient 
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Figure 18: Total Trade in Services1—Asian Subregions2 ($ billion)
1Exports plus imports.
2Central Asia does not include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. South Asia does 
not include Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives. Southeast Asia does not include 
Brunei Darussalam.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund.
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There is a good chance that the preliminary data for 
2011 will be revised (Boxes 2, 3).14
Excluding Asia’s two largest economies, the 
share of services exports for the majority of 
Asian economies is growing.
The decline in the share of services exports is mainly due 
to falling shares in the PRC and Japan (see Figure 19). 
In particular, the falling services export share in the 
PRC—and increasing share of goods exports—reflects 
the PRC’s growing role as global factory and the trade 
14Balance of payment data on services trade are patchy and have limited history, 
with data revisions made even after 2–3 years. Therefore, caution is needed when 
interpreting trends, especially during more recent years.
in parts and components associated with regional 
supply chains, rather than any weakness in services 
trade. Excluding the PRC and Japan, Asia’s services share 
increased from 19.1% in 2005 to 21.3% in 2009, before 
falling back to 19.4% in 2011.
Unlike trade in goods, which generates a 
cumulative surplus for Asia, trade in services 
shows a cumulative deficit. 
For goods trade, Asian economies had an average 
cumulative surplus of $428 billion a year since 2005. This 
is in contrast to trade in services, which generated an 
average cumulative deficit of $34 billion a year.15 Despite 
narrowing slightly from 2005 to 2007, the region’s 
services trade deficit has shown an upward trend since 
2008 (Figure 20). 
Country level data show that the PRC and Japan account 
for most of the services trade deficit in Asia. For the 
PRC, its prime deficit lies with Hong Kong, China; the 
EU-6; and the US.16 In the case of Japan, it has large 
deficits with the US and Hong Kong, China. In contrast, 
Hong Kong, China; India; and the Philippines show 
significant surpluses (Figure 21). For Hong Kong, China, 
most of its surplus is with the PRC, the US, and EU-6—
mostly derived from financial services. The modest 
15These figures refer to the cumulative trade balance of all Asian economies and 
reflect their net trade position with all trading partners, including other Asian 
economies. Unfortunately, bilateral trade data are not available for all Asian 
economies for all years.
16EU-6 includes France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom.
Box 2: Trading Goods and Services—What you can hold and What you cannot
There are important differences when trading goods 
and services—both within and across borders. First and 
foremost, services are intangible. There is no inventory for 
services; immediate consumption is usually required. Direct 
contact between supplier and consumer is needed for some 
services. As a result, trading services internationally is more 
complicated than goods. 
To comprehensively capture how international services 
are traded, they are categorized four ways in computing 
balance of payments: Mode 1 (cross-border trade) where the 
service moves across borders; Mode 2 (consumption abroad) 
where it is the consumer who travels; Mode 3 (trade through 
commercial presence) where an institutional service supplier 
moves across borders; and Mode 4 (movement of natural 
persons) where an individual supplier of the service travels 
across borders. Balance of payments data mainly covers 
Modes 1 and 2, although services can also be transacted 
using a combination of various modes.
While there are some commonalities between goods and 
services trade in terms of explanatory factors (for example, 
a large GDP leads to large trade flows), there are also some 
notable differences: (i) common language between two 
trading countries significantly increases services rather 
than goods trade; and (ii) archipelagoes prove critically 
unfavorable for goods trade, but not for trade in services. 
Figure 19: Share of Services to Total Exports1—Asia2 (%)
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
1Goods and services.
2Asia includes all subregions. Central Asia does not include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. South Asia does not include Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives. Southeast 
Asia does not include Brunei Darussalam.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics and Direction of 
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Box 3: Statistics on Services Trade—Balance of Payments Manuals 5 and 6
Data on services trade is based on the Balance of Payments 
Manual (BPM) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
BPM serves as the standard for statistics on transactions and 
positions between an economy and the rest of the world. 
Since 1948, the BPM has undergone several revisions to 
incorporate new economic and financial developments, 
changes in analytical demand, and better experienced 
compilers. To date, the fifth edition of the manual (BPM5) 
provides the longest historical series for services trade—up 
to 2010 for most countries. However, a new edition (BPM6) 
was released in 2009. BPM6 aims to ensure consistency with 
the updated System of National Accounts and IMF definition 
of foreign direct investment. Data for BPM6, however, are 
only available from 2005 to 2011. 
Although BPM5 remains adequate, BPM6 data are used 
in this section to incorporate the numerous updates and 
improvements. Below is a comparison of some key trends for 
services trade under BPM5 and BPM6 (Box table). The share 
of services exports to total exports in Asia increased up to 
2009, under both BPM5 and BPM6—but declined thereafter. 
More so, services trade showed more resilience relative to 
goods trade (excluding transport and travel) during the 
2008/09 global financial crisis (Box figure).
BMP6 has 12 services sectors: (i) manufacturing services 
on physical inputs owned by others—such as processing, 
assembly, labeling or packing; (ii) maintenance and repair; 
(iii) transport; (iv) travel; (v) construction; (vi) insurance 
and pensions; (vii) financial services covering financial 
Share of Services to Total Exports1—Asia2 (%)
Edition 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Asia BPM6 – – – – – 16.5 16.5 17.0 16.8 18.0 16.8 15.7
BPM5 14.3 15.4 15.5 14.9 15.3 15.1 14.9 15.6 15.7 16.9 16.0 –
Asia excl. PRC and Japan BPM6 – – – – – 19.1 19.1 20.3 20.1 21.3 20.5 19.4
BPM5 11.0 11.9 12.0 11.3 11.5 11.3 11.2 11.8 11.8 12.9 12.1 –
PRC BPM6 – – – – – 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.1 11.4 10.4   9.3
BPM5 10.9 11.1 10.9 9.6   9.5   8.9   8.7   9.1   9.3   9.7   9.8 –
Japan BPM6 – – – – – 15.2 15.0 15.2 15.8 18.1 15.1 14.8
BPM5 13.1 14.4 14.2 14.7 15.3 16.3 16.0 16.0 16.6 19.1 16.2 15.6
– = data unavailable, BPM = Balance of Payments Manual, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
1Goods and services.
2Asia includes all subregions. Central Asia does not include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. East Asia does not include Taipei,China. South Asia does not include Afghanistan, Bhutan, 
and the Maldives. Southeast Asia does not include Brunei Darussalam and Viet Nam.









2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011
Goods (BPM6)
Services excl. transport and travel (BPM6)
Goods (BPM5)
Services (BPM5)
Services excl. transport and travel (BPM5) Services (BPM6)
Total Trade Growth1—Asia2 (%)
BPM = Balance of Payments Manual.
1Exports plus imports.
2Asia includes all subregions. Central Asia does not include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. East Asia does not include Taipei,China. South Asia does not include 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives. Southeast Asia does not include Brunei Darussalam 
and Viet Nam.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund; and CEIC.
intermediation and auxiliary services (except insurance and 
pensions); (viii) charges for the use of intellectual property or 
royalties and license fees; (ix) telecommunications, computer, 
and information; (x) other business services including 
research and development, professional and management 
consulting, and technical, trade-related, and other business 
services; (xi) personal, cultural and recreational services; 
and (xii) government goods and services. Among the 12 
components, travel is different as it does not refer to a single 
product but to the expenses for services incurred by a person 
during his visit to a country other than his own. 
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Figure 21: Services Trade Balance—Selected Asian Economies, 2011 ($ billion)
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
Table 4: Services Trade1—Top Ten Economies 
(%  of world trade)
2011
United States 12.8
Germany   7.1
United Kingdom   5.9
People’s Republic of China   5.3
France   5.0
Japan   3.9
India   3.3
Spain   3.0
Singapore   2.8
Italy   2.8
1Exports plus imports. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments 
Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and CEIC.
Asia should prioritize services exports as a 
new growth channel—particularly exports 
of modern services. 
Services exports hold much promise for the region. 
First, the region has a large pool of highly trained labor 
to support these industries. The capital requirements 
for some of these modern services are not huge. 
These modern services can also be unbundled—their 
production fragmented across the region—thereby 
providing a good opportunity for Asia to create high-
tech services jobs for some of its low- and middle-
income countries. More importantly, exports of these 
types of services are not hampered by trade or other 
physical barriers and could potentially contribute to 
greater regional integration. The only challenge is 
domestic regulation that still limits market access.
surplus in India and the Philippines comes from trade 
in telecommunications, computer, and information 
services (Box 4). 
Asia plays a moderate but increasing role in 
the global services trade.
In 2011, only the PRC, Japan, India, and Singapore made 
it to the top 10 in services trade (Table 4). The PRC 
ranked fourth, with Japan sixth. Interestingly, both the 
PRC and Japan are more dominant in global exports of 
goods—ranking first and fourth, respectively. Despite 
this, the region’s share in global services trade has been 
increasing, with its share of world services trade up 
from 17.6% in 2005 to 20.1% in 2011 (Figure 22). Trends 
for individual economies are mixed, with most Asian 
economies showing rising shares, except for Australia 
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Figure 20: Services Trade Balance—Asia1 ($ billion)
1Asia includes all subregions. Central Asia does not include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. South Asia does not include Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives. Southeast 
Asia does not include Brunei Darussalam.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund; and CEIC.
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Box 4: Services Trade in India and the Philippines
While Asia’s overall trade services deficit reached 
$61.2 billion in 2011, India had a $12.7 billion surplus and 
the Philippines $4.6 billion. Historically, both countries had 
a services trade deficit. But India was able to generate a 
surplus beginning in 2004, while the Philippines joined in 
2005. The two countries today earn large surpluses from 
trade in telecommunication, computer and information 
services (TCIS). These surpluses are offset by deficits in 
transport. For example, in 2011, India had a TCIS surplus 
of $55.8 billion, partially offset by a deficit in transport of 
$39.2 billion. Similarly, the Philippines posted a surplus in 
TCIS of $8.7 billion with a transport deficit of $3.6 billion. 
In terms of data availability, TCIS has two subcategories—
(i) telecommunications services, and (ii) computer and 
information services (CIS). Telecommunications services 
include broadcast or data transmission or other information 
using telephone, mobile, email, satellite, or other means. CIS 
consists of hardware- and software-related services, data 
processing services, news agencies, and database services.  
For India, its strong TCIS surplus comes from 
telecommunications services, which generated a 
$59.6 billion surplus in 2011. This derives from India’s 
huge telecommunications network—the second largest 
in the world—with a telephone subscriber base of 
about 940 million, over 900 million of which are wireless 
connections (as of August 2012). The strong growth of 
India’s telecommunication industry reflects the successful 
liberalization in the early 1990s, which transformed the 
industry from being wholly government-owned to one 
with up to 74% foreign equity participation. Liberalization 
brought with it increased competition from foreign 
investors. Due to intense competition, India has one of the 
lowest call tariffs in the world. 
For the Philippines, its strength mainly lies in providing 
CIS—with a surplus of around $6.7 billion in 2011—
although there is no breakdown to help identify its 
strong subcomponents. A large part of business process 
outsourcing (BPO) services falls within CIS. Based on the 
Philippine government classification, BPO includes the 
provision of information- and technology-enabled services.1
The BPO sector comprises call centers, back office support, 
information technology outsourcing, engineering services 
outsourcing, transcription, and animation. Of these, call 
centers in the Philippines account for 80% of the BPO 
business. Part of the reason for their success is low cost and 
reliable telecommunications; affordable real estate; up to 
100% foreign ownership; a large pool of young, English 
speaking graduates; and some tax incentives.
1Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 2010. Results of the 2010 Survey of Information 
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Figure 23: Trade in Services1—Key Asian Economies 
(% of world trade)
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
1Exports plus imports.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund; and CEIC.
Figure 22: Trade in Services1—Aggregate of Key Asian Economies2 
(% of world trade)
1Exports plus imports.
2Australia; the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; India; Japan; the Republic of 
Korea; and Singapore.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics, International 
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The composition of Asia’s services trade is 
changing toward modern services.  
The region’s trade in modern services has grown faster 
than trade in traditional services (Figure 24). In the 7 
years to 2011, modern services grew an average 13.2% 
per year compared with 9.6% for traditional services. 
Thus, the share of traditional services declined from 
65.4% in 2005 to 60.8% in 2011. During the same period, 
the share of modern services increased from 34.6% 
to 39.2%.
Similar to goods trade, trade in services is 
income elastic; but more resilient than trade 
in goods, thereby cushioning the region 
from global shocks. 
In the aftermath of the 2008/09 global financial crisis, 
services trade in Asia fell 10.9% in 2009 (Figure 25). 
But the decline for modern services trade was even 
smaller (5.4%), well below the decline in goods trade 
(18.4%). Generally, the provision of traditional services—
particularly transport, travel, and services inputs to the 
production of goods—are directly linked to the flow of 
goods and people in the region. They can be sensitive 
to economic shocks, making them volatile. Travel is 
also quite cyclical, largely discretionary, and the first 
to be cut when there is an economic crunch. On the 
other hand, trade in modern services such as insurance, 
communication, and telecommunications, and computer 
and information are more robust and tend to remain 
stable. Studies show that services such as bookkeeping 
are “necessities,” irrespective of the economic situation.17 
Also, services trade/production is generally less reliant 
on external finance than goods. Thus, they continue 
regardless of financial volatility.
Financial Integration
The 2008/09 global financial crisis severely 
affected Asian financial markets; but it also 
accelerated the pace of the region’s financial 
integration.
The 2008/09 global financial crisis and eurozone debt 
crisis in 2011 saw Asia’s stock prices, bond yields, and 
exchange rates fluctuating wildly, usually in tandem 
17 I. Brochert and A. Matoo. 2009. The Crisis-Resilience of Services Trade. Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Network Notes. No. 135. Washington, DC: 
the World Bank.
with global financial developments. This was due to the 
close links between Asia’s financial markets and global 
markets. However, there are also signs that financial 
integration in Asia has been deepening in the aftermath 
of the 2008/09 global financial and eurozone debt crises. 
The progress of financial integration can be measured 
by an assessment of both price and volume indicators. 
When markets are financially integrated, prices for 
similar assets—those with similar expected risk-adjusted 
returns—should converge from capital flows and 
arbitrage; so the greater the financial integration, the 
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Figure 24: Growth of Traditional and Modern Services Trade1—
Asia2 (y-o-y, %)
1Exports plus imports. Modern services include financial services covering financial 
intermediation and auxiliary services; insurance and pensions; telecommunications, computer, 
and information; charges for the use of intellectual property or royalties and license fees; other 
business including research and development, professional and management consulting; and 
technical, trade-related, and other business services. Traditional services include transport; 
travel; construction; personal, cultural, and recreational services; government goods and 
services; manufacturing services on physical inputs owned by others such as processing, 
assembly, labeling or packing; and maintenance and repair services. 
2Asia includes all subregions. Central Asia does not include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. East Asia does not include Taipei,China. South Asia does not include Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, and the Maldives. Southeast Asia does not include Brunei Darussalam and Viet Nam. 










2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
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1Exports plus imports.
2Asia includes all subregions. Central Asia does not include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. East Asia does not include Taipei,China. South Asia does not include Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, and the Maldives . Southeast Asia does not include Brunei Darussalam and Viet Nam. 
3Modern services includes financial services covering financial intermediation and auxiliary 
services; insurance and pensions; telecommunications, computer, and information; charges 
for the use of intellectual property or royalties and license fees; other business including 
research and development, professional and management consulting; and technical, trade-
related, and other business services.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Balance of Payments Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund; and CEIC.
Figure 25: Total Trade Growth1—Asia2 (y-o-y, %)
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typically accompanied by an increase in the share of 
financial assets traded within the region and held by 
regional market participants.
Cross-market dispersions of daily equity returns and 
10-year bond yield spreads relative to US Treasury 
bond yields are used in this analysis as price indicators 
of financial integration. Lower dispersion implies 
that markets are integrating—as risk-adjusted asset 
prices converge. To help identify whether variations 
of asset prices are driven more by global or regional 
shocks, vector autoregressions (VAR) are estimated to 
decompose variances in asset prices (Box 5).
Price co-movements among Asian equities 
increased since the early 2000s, with some 
acceleration in 2009 and 2012, mostly due 
to the global shocks. 
Asian daily stock returns have converged over the past 
few years, with cross-market dispersion of equity returns 
lower in 2012 compared with 2001 throughout the 
region and its subregions (Figure 26). The increase in 
co-movements accelerated (i) following the September 
2008 Lehman Brothers collapse, (ii) as political bickering 
over the US public debt ceiling rattled markets in mid-
2011, and (iii) in 2012, when worries over the eurozone 
debt crisis were at their peak. 
While equity returns are largely driven by local 
conditions, they are increasingly affected by regional 
and global events. The VAR analysis suggests that shocks 
emanating from US markets in 2009 and 2012, when 
global financial markets were rattled, accounted for more 
than 20% of the total variations in Asian stock market 
performance (Figure 27). Shocks from Japan and other 
Asian economies had much less impact. However, the 
rising share of regional shocks in explaining variations 
in equity returns also suggests that the region’s 
financial markets are integrating further. There are some 
differences across Asia’s subregions (Table 5). East Asia’s 
markets have the strongest local bias—given the PRC’s 
stock markets’ unique behavior. Southeast Asia—which 
is integrated heavily in global production networks—is 
least susceptible to local shocks. South Asia’s stock prices 
are largely affected by local events (explaining more 
than 75% of total variations), implying these markets are 
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Figure 27: Annual Average of Originations of  Shocks 
to Stock Market Returns1 
1Variance decomposition of local shocks and external shocks from Asia, Japan, and the United 
States (US) measured using vector autoregression (VAR) (Refer to Box 5). Annual figure is 
computed by averaging the mean of variances of countries within the subregion. Shock from 
local source is the aggregate of country—country variance; shock from Asia is the aggregate of 
Asia—country variance. Developing Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, 
China; India; Indonesia; Kazakhstan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; Pakistan; 
Singapore; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Viet Nam.
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Figure 26: Cross-Market Dispersion of Equity Returns (%)
Note: Cross-market  standard deviation of daily stock market returns, de-trended using 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Asia includes East Asia, South Asia plus Kazakhstan, and Southeast 
Asia. East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Japan; the Republic 
of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China. South Asia includes Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam. Data until 8 January 2013.   
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg.
Co-movements in Asia’s bond yield spreads, 
however, have not changed much since 
2000, indicating that markets may have 
become more risk sensitive to an individual 
economy’s fundamentals.
After converging until mid-2007, Asia’s bond yield 
spreads diverged following the 2008/09 global financial 
crisis (Figure 28). Yet, bond yield spreads converged 
within subregions or among economies holding similar 
macroeconomic fundamentals. For example, yield 
spreads converged among the middle income ASEAN-4 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), 
which possess similar fundamentals. The same was true 
within East Asia and South Asia subregions. East Asia 
economies generally have stable inflation and current 
22 March 2013   |   Asian Economic Integration Monitor
Box 5: Using Vector Autoregression Models to Identify the Origination of Shocks
Assessing capital mobility from price movements is difficult, 
given that price merely skims the surface of complex and 
fungible money flows.1 One of the difficulties of using price 
co-movements is that it does not distinguish between co-
movements driven by either regional or global factors. Co-
movements may increase if there is a strong global shock, 
even without increasing capital mobility within a region. To 
address this limitation, it is necessary to identify the origins 
of shocks to help interpret price co-movement indicators. 
If regional shocks account for a larger share of variations 
(relative to global shocks) in an economy’s asset price 
movements, then that market is likely regionally integrated. 
In contrast, price movements in a market integrated more 
globally will likely respond more to global shocks. Vector 
autoregression (VAR) can help identify the source of shocks.
Variances in asset prices are decomposed by using VAR for 
each economy to identify originations of shocks. The results 
for each economy are aggregated into a regional index 
weighted by market capitalization, and the annual average 
for each source of shocks is then computed. The specification 
of the VAR model for each country is the following: 
where yt is a vector of four variables: the daily returns on 
assets (equity or 10-year government bonds) of (i) the United 
States (US), (ii) Japan, (iii) other Asia (excluding Japan and 
the individual economy), and (iv) the individual economy. 
Ap is a 1 × k vector of coefficients to be estimated, where p 
and k are the number of lags and variables, respectively. The 
US variable is used as a proxy for global prices. The return of 
“other Asia” is calculated by aggregating the daily returns of 
other Asian economies weighted by market capitalization. 
Lags are determined based on several information criteria. 
The order of impulse response functions is set as “US–Japan–
other Asia–individual economy”. 2 The samples were rolled 
from 1 January 2005 to 10 January 2013 within a 364-day 
window to see the time-varying trend of shock origination.
Variance decomposition analysis can show how much of 
the forecast error variance of each economy’s asset prices 
is explained by shocks from the US, Japan, and the rest of 
Asia. The results—before computing the annual average on 
the originations of shocks to Asian equity returns—shows 
that a series of global events closely influenced Asian equity 
prices (Box figure). Shocks originating from the US began 
rising in early 2007 as the subprime loan problem came 
to light, culminating in September 2008 when Lehman 
Brothers collapsed. The second rise appeared in mid-2011, 
when the US debt ceiling grabbed the headlines and the 
eurozone debt crisis intensified. It only declined after the 
fiscal cliff was narrowly averted in January this year. These 
results also suggest that an increase in price co-movements 
of Asian asset prices in 2009 and 2012 were accented by 
strong global shocks.
ε+++++ −−−= tptpttt yAyAyAcy ...2211
1One of the harshest criticisms of using price indicators is the argument that 
price may not have a direct relationship with capital mobility, and hence, 
cannot assess links between economies. However, price at least reflects an 
investor’s belief on how an economy connects to others.
2One of the potential weaknesses of this indicator lies in this ordering. The 
reduced model assumes that a variable in the late order does not affect a vari-
able in the former position. Although it may be natural to assume that the US 
shocks affect Asia but not vice-versa, more research is needed to examine the 
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Comparison of Shocks from Asia, Japan, and the United States 
to Equity Markets in Developing Asia1   
1Variance decomposition of external shocks from developing Asia, Japan, and the United 
States (US) using vector autoregression (VAR). The value is computed by averaging the 
daily variances of each economy in developing Asia (the People’s Republic of China; 
Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Kazakhstan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; 
the Philippines; Pakistan; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Viet Nam).  
Data until 10 January 2013.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg.
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Figure 28: Coefficient of Variation of 10-Year Bond Yield Spreads
Note: Coefficient of variation of 10-year government bond yield spreads over benchmark 
United States Treasuries, de-trended using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Filter. Asia includes East Asia, 
South Asia, and Southeast Asia. East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, 
China; Japan; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China. South Asia includes India, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka. ASEAN-4 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Southeast Asia 
includes ASEAN-4 plus Singapore and Viet Nam. Data until 9 January 2013.
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Figure 29: Annual Average of Originations of Shocks to 10-Year 
Bond Yields1 
1Variance decomposition of local shocks and external shocks from Asia, Japan, and the 
United States measured using vector autoregression (VAR) (Refer to Box 5). Annual figure is 
computed by averaging the mean of variances of countries within the subregion. Shock from 
local source is the aggregate of country—country variance; shock from Asia is the aggregate of 
Asia—country variance. Developing Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, 
China; India; Indonesia; Kazakhstan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; Pakistan; 
Singapore; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Viet Nam. Data for Viet Nam beginning in 
November 2007 and for Sri Lanka in September 2009.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg.
Table 5: Annual Average of Variance Decomposition of Shocks to Stock Market Returns—Asian Subregions1
Local Shock United States Shock
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
East Asia 0.78 0.84 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.61 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.16
Southeast Asia 0.61 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.52 0.41 0.21 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.40
South Asia plus 
   Kazakhstan
0.78 0.74 0.66 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.75 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.13 0.17
1Variance decomposition of local shocks and external shocks in Asia, Japan, and the United States measured using vector autoregression (VAR) (Refer to Box 5). Annual average is computed by taking 
the mean of variances of countries within the subregion. East Asia includes Hong Kong, China; the People’s Republic of China; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China. South Asia includes India, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg.
account surpluses. By contrast, most of South Asia suffers 
from high inflation and high current account and fiscal 
deficits. The difference in fundamentals between these 
subregions drove the price divergence within Asia as 
a whole. As would seem intuitive, relatively healthier 
economies attracted more foreign investment, while 
economies with weak fundamentals received less. For 
example, if Singapore and Viet Nam are added to the 
ASEAN-4 grouping, then yield spreads diverge.
Asian bond yields are mostly affected by 
local events, though US shocks also had 
spillover effects on Asian bond yields.  
In general, domestic shocks drive local bond yields, while 
global shocks have less impact on bond yields than on 
equity returns (Figure 29). However, since mid-2011, 
the impact of US shocks on Asian bond yields was much 
greater across bond markets in all Asian subregions 
(Table 6). This may be due to the severity of global 
risks—the uncertainty over the US recovery and worries 
about the eurozone. Local bond markets have shown 
vulnerability to the ongoing eurozone debt crisis as the 
crisis impact on mature markets is transmitted into Asia’s 
domestic asset markets.18
After the 2008/09 global financial crisis, 
intra-Asian debt holdings grew quickly 
while intra-Asian equity holdings declined, 
due to heightened risk aversion, Asia’s 
robust growth, and aggressive quantitative 
easing in the US and Europe. 
Deepening financial integration can also be measured 
by volume indicators, which track the amount of Asian 
assets held by Asian investors.19 The ratio of Asian assets 
18ADB. 2012. Asia Bond Market Monitor November 2012. Manila.
19Data for equity and debt security holdings are sourced from the IMF’s 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, which covers most Asian economies as 
investment destinations, but does not cover some important investor economies 
such as the PRC and Taipei,China.
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Figure 30: Portfolio Holdings—Asia (% share)
Note: Asia–Asia total refers to the total portfolio holdings (equity and debt securities) in 
Asia divided by the global portfolio holdings of Asia. Asia includes East Asia, Central Asia, 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are excluded as 
source and destination due to differences in the structure of their economies with the rest 
of Asia. Countries included in Asia as recipient differ from that of Asia as source due to data 
unavailability. In particular, data for the People’s Republic of China as source is unavailable. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International 
Monetary Fund. Accessed 19 December 2012.
Table 6: Annual Average of Variance Decomposition of Shocks to 10-Year Bond Yields—Asian Subregions1
Local Shock United States Shock
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
East Asia 0.79 0.80 0.92 0.84 0.93 0.80 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.11
Southeast Asia2 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.81 0.80 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.17
South Asia plus 
   Kazakhstan3
– – 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.75 – – 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.24
– = data unavailable.
1Variance decomposition of local shocks and external shocks from Asia, Japan, and the United States (US) measured using vector autoregression (VAR) (Refer to Box 5). Annual figure is computed by 
averaging the mean of variances of countries within the subregion. East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China. South Asia includes 
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Data availability for Viet Nam beginning in November 2007 and for Sri 
Lanka in September 2009.
2Variance decomposition of local and US shocks in Southeast Asia for 2007 starts November.
3Variance decomposition of local and US shocks in South Asia + Kazakhstan for 2009 starts September.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bloomberg.
to total cross-border assets held by Asian investors 
show that—despite a drop in 2008 due to heightened 
global risk aversion—intra-Asian holdings increased 
steadily (Figure 30). Intra-Asian bond holdings rose to 
9.4% in 2011 from 5.9% in 2007. In contrast, intra-Asian 
equity holdings fell from a 2007 peak of 27.6% to 22.7% 
by 2011—a substantial decline even accounting for 
changes in stock price valuations.20 Excluding Japan 
(with its US investment bias), intra-Asian debt holdings 
jumped from 21.4% in 2007 to 36.8% in 2011. Excluding 
Japan, the level of intra-Asian debt holdings exceeded 
that of intraregional equity holdings in 2011. 
There are two reasons why intraregional asset holdings 
are rising and shifting from equities to bonds. One is the 
heightened global risk aversion following the 2008/09 
global financial crisis—which shifted investments away 
from Asian equities to less riskier bonds. The heightened 
risk also drove investors away from Asia in general, with 
intraregional bond holdings flat in 2008.
Massive monetary easing in the US and Europe—and the 
relatively robust growth of Asian economies despite the 
global slowdown—are key factors behind the increase of 
intra-Asian asset holdings, particularly bonds. The near-
zero US and eurozone policy rates increased relative 
returns on Asian assets compared with US and eurozone 
bonds. Asia’s robust and resilient economic growth also 
made Asian assets increasingly attractive. This created 
expectations among investors of further Asian currency 
appreciation and lower risk premiums. Thus, higher 
returns and further currency appreciation, coupled 
with lower risk premiums, are driving Asian investors to 
purchase Asian assets—particularly bonds—resulting in 
higher intra-Asian asset holdings.
20The difference in equity valuations can change intra-Asian equity ratios even if 
the level of intra-Asian stock holdings remains the same. 
Increased investment in East Asia’s debt was 
a key driver behind the rise in intra-Asian 
bond holdings following the 2008/09 global 
financial crisis.
Rising intra-Asian bond holdings was driven by increased 
intraregional investment to East Asia—particularly to 
the PRC and Japan (Figure 31). It appears that much of 
the investment flow to Japan was considered “flight to 
safety,” as Japan’s bond market is deep and liquid, with 
the yen strong prior to the end of 2012. The increased 
investment in the PRC, in contrast, was more of a “search 
for yield,” driven by expected renminbi appreciation 
and relatively high bond yields. The PRC’s gradual 
internationalization of the renminbi also helped Asian 
investors purchase CNY-denominated assets.21
21ADB. 2012. Macroeconomic and Financial Cooperation. Asian Economic 
Integration Monitor July 2012. Manila.
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The share of Asian economies’ international 
borrowing from Japanese banks increased 
through the third quarter of 2012, largely 
replacing European exposure.
Another volume indicator on international banking 
claims shows developing Asia’s increasing reliance on 
Japanese lending, with Southeast Asia receiving most. 
Japanese claims on Asia’s liabilities to foreign banks 
increased from 11.1% in the first quarter of 2005 to 
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Figure 31: Total Debt Securities—Asia excl. Japan 
(by investment destination, % share)
Note: Asia includes East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Australia 
and New Zealand are excluded due to differences in the structure of their economies with 
the rest of the countries in Asia. Countries included in Asia as recipient differ from that of Asia 
as source due to data unavailability. In particular, data for the People’s Republic of China as 
source is not available. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, 
International Monetary Fund. Accessed 19 December 2012.
Figure 32: Japanese and European1 Banks’ Foreign Claims in Asia2 (% share to total claims3)
LHS = left-hand scale, RHS = right-hand scale. 
1European banks (excluding British banks) based on Bank for International Settlements (BIS) definition.
2Asia excludes Australia, Japan, and New Zealand due to differences in the structure of their economies with the rest of Asia. 
3Total foreign claims of banks from 22 BIS reporting economies. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from Bank for International Settlements (Table 9D). Data accessed on 20 February 2013.
Asia's share of liabilities in Japanese banks' foreign claims (LHS)
European banks' claims in Southeast Asia's total liabilities (RHS)
European banks' claims in Asia's total liabilities (RHS)
Japanese banks' claims in Southeast Asia's total liabilities (RHS)
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in the share of European bank exposure (excluding the 
United Kingdom) over the same period implies that the 
increased Japanese share in effect eased the impact 
of Europe’s deleveraging. The share of Asian loans in 
Japanese bank portfolios increased steadily from 6.3% 
in the first quarter of 2005 to 11.0% in the third quarter 
of 2012. 
Macroeconomic Interdependence
A trend toward greater co-movement of 
consumption across the region’s economies 
is a sign of increased macroeconomic 
interdependence.
There has been a deepening of financial development 
and integration in Asia over the past two decades. 
One of the expected benefits would be to allow more 
efficient risk sharing across countries. When economies 
have the opportunity to invest in each other’s financial 
assets, they can more easily diversify risk. As a result, 
consumption patterns can be smoothed out.
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Economic models predict that in a world without 
trade and financial integration, consumption would 
be highly correlated with domestic output.22 However, 
when markets become integrated, risk sharing 
happens. And this should help countries sever the 
link between movements in domestic output and 
domestic consumption. In a world with perfect risk 
sharing, domestic consumption should be affected 
only by global or regional output shocks—risks that 
cannot be diversified away. As a result, there would be 
little or no link between domestic consumption and 
domestic output. Instead, there would be significant co-
movements of consumption across countries, driven by 
a common regional or global shock. Further, fluctuations 
in consumption would be more highly correlated with 
global or regional output, than with national output. 
This section analyzes the four facets of consumption 
and output behavior that would result from risk sharing. 
Of course, perfect risk sharing in Asia’s economies is 
unlikely. However, given the general trend toward 
greater financial integration in the region, some trends 
toward greater risk sharing should appear. An increase 
in risk sharing would show (i) higher cross-country 
correlations of consumption, (ii) that these cross-country 
consumption correlations are higher than those of cross-
country output correlations, (iii) lower co-movements 
between domestic consumption and domestic output, 
and (iv) domestic consumption that is more highly 
correlated with regional or global output than with 
national output.
The analysis uses a sample of nine economies from 
East Asia and Southeast Asia, covering 1993–2011.23 
The sample is limited to these economies because of 
data requirements (a sufficient length of quarterly data 
on per capita GDP and consumption). The data series 
for per capita output and consumption are seasonally 
adjusted and converted to constant 2005 US dollars 
before deriving the quarter-on-quarter growth rates, 
which form the basis of the analysis. The impact of 
major shocks to the region’s economies is taken into 
account and the sample period is thus divided into four 
sub-periods: 1993Q1–1996Q4 and 2000Q1–2007Q2 are 
“calm” periods without major shocks; while 1997Q1–
1999Q4 and 2007Q3–2011Q4 are “crisis” periods, when 
the region was affected by the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis and 2008/09 global financial crisis, respectively. 
22See S. Kim, S.H. Kim, and Y. Wang. 2006. Financial Integration and Consumption 
Risk Sharing in East Asia. Japan and the World Economy. 18 (2). pp. 143–157.
23The People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; the Republic of 
Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand.
Cross-economy correlation of private 
consumption growth is rising; but cross-
economy correlation of output growth is 
rising faster.
The results also show that cross-economy correlation 
of private consumption growth across the sample 
increased between 1993Q1–1996Q4 and 2007Q3–
2011Q4 (Table 7).24 At first glance, this would seem to 
support greater risk sharing in the region. However, the 
analysis shows that private consumption correlations 
tend to increase during periods of crisis in line with 
the rise in output growth correlations. This suggests 
that the latter is the likely source of rising consumption 
correlation, not risk sharing. Comparing 1993Q1–1996Q4 
with 2000Q1–2007Q2—both non-crisis periods—the 
results are more mixed. Some economies—such as the 
PRC, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand—had an increase in the median of the 
correlation consumption, while others like Hong Kong, 
China and Indonesia saw their cross-country correlations 
of consumption fall. 
One of the factors causing higher consumption 
correlations could be that output correlations have 
been increasing in the region with the increase in trade 
integration (Table 8).25 The results show that there 
has been an increase in correlation in output since the 
start of the sample period. In particular, correlations of 
output tend to be much higher during the crisis periods 
(1997Q1–1999Q4 and 2007Q3–2011Q4). But even 
comparing the two non-crisis periods (1993Q1–1996Q4 
and 2000Q1–2007Q2), there was a significant increase 
in the correlation of output. Therefore, some of the 
observed increases in consumption correlations could 
be due to higher output correlations. Interestingly, the 
increase in correlations in output tends to be higher than 
the correlations in consumption. This suggests there has 
been limited progress in risk sharing (Table 9). Some of 
the rise in output correlations in the last sub-period is 
due to the effects of the 2008/09 global financial crisis, 
which were transmitted worldwide.
24Results for private consumption are presented here to separate out the effect of 
public consumption. 
25The decline in investment rates across many of the region’s economies following 
the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis may also have contributed to the increase in the 
correlations of consumption.
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Rep. of Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taipei,China Thailand
Full sample 0.04 0.32 0.50 0.57 0.53 0.44 0.56 0.45 0.59
1993Q1–1996Q4 -0.12 0.27 0.21 0.08 0.25 -0.12 0.29 0.35 0.25
1997Q1–1999Q4 0.27 0.48 0.73 0.65 0.83 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.66
2000Q1–2007Q2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.38 0.25 0.23 0.43 0.35 0.50
2007Q3–2011Q4 0.18 0.50 0.45 0.64 0.35 0.45 0.62 0.55 0.42
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Figures are the median of the bilateral cross-economy correlations across the sample of nine economies.  
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.





Rep. of Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taipei,China Thailand
Full sample 0.04 0.36 0.56 0.64 0.67 0.54 0.64 0.56 0.65 
1993Q1–1996Q4 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.27 0.30 -0.11 0.11 0.33 0.13
1997Q1–1999Q4 0.25 0.53 0.70 0.68 0.82 0.75 0.78 0.71 0.71
2000Q1–2007Q2 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.37 0.55 0.44 0.59
2007Q3–2011Q4 0.14 0.61 0.63 0.70 0.77 0.55 0.77 0.77 0.63
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Figures are the median of the bilateral cross-economy correlations across the sample of nine economies.
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.
The correlation of domestic output 
growth to domestic consumption growth 
remains high.
Correlations between output growth and consumption 
growth in each economy are examined to show 
the correlation of total consumption and private 
consumption with domestic output for the full sample 
period (Table 10). The correlation for each economy 
was calculated. Then the cross-sectional medians of 
the correlations for each group of economies were 
determined. The result was that the median correlation 
between both total consumption and private 
consumption with domestic output are very high—
close to unity for all economic groups. There is no clear 
trend of an increase in correlations over time for Asian 
economies. However, correlations tend to fall during 
non-crisis periods and increase during crisis periods. 
This effect is stronger for the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis than the 2008/09 global financial crisis. For G7 
economies, there was little change in the correlations. 
To check for the robustness of these results, correlations 
over a 3-year period for each group were calculated to 
check if the results are sensitive to the specific choice of 
time periods. The results are broadly similar.
The correlation of domestic consumption 
growth with Asian output growth was 
driven mainly by co-movements between 
domestic output and Asian output.
The correlations between output and consumption 
growth rates were then examined in each economy with 
respect to the growth rates of an aggregate of Asian 
economies (Table 11).26 Over the entire sample, the 
economies tended to have similar correlations between 
domestic consumption and Asian output, and between 
domestic output and Asian output. This suggests that 
the correlation with regional output is not driven by risk 
sharing, but by the co-movement of domestic output 
with regional output. This is particularly true during 
crisis years, not as much during “calm” years. Further, the 
correlations are much lower than 1.0. All these suggest 
that risk sharing is quite limited within Asia. 
26For each economy, computed as the aggregate of the other Asian economies in 
the sample.
28 March 2013   |   Asian Economic Integration Monitor
Table 11: Correlation of Domestic Output Growth and Consumption Growth with Asian Output Growth
 














Full Sample 0.47 0.34 0.58 0.14 0.48 0.32 0.51 0.12 0.49 0.36 0.57 0.24
1993Q1–1996Q4 -0.15 -0.18 -0.03 -0.35 0.22 0.23 0.21 -0.38 0.36 0.14 0.45 0.20
1997Q1–1999Q4 0.85 0.73 0.85 0.19 0.82 0.71 0.84 0.22 0.66 0.54 0.78 0.32
2000Q1–2007Q2 0.61 0.43 0.64 0.26 0.41 0.34 0.41 0.22 0.35 0.38 0.32 0.53
2007Q3–2011Q4 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.73 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.72 0.33 0.23 0.44 0.50
G7 = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Note: Calculated as median correlation for each regional group. Asia includes East Asia and Southeast Asia. East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic 
of Korea; and Taipei,China. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.
Table 10: Correlation of Domestic Consumption Growth and Domestic Output Growth
 Total Consumption Private Consumption
Asia East Asia Southeast Asia G7 Asia East Asia Southeast Asia G7
Full Sample 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.99 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.98
1993Q1–1996Q4 0.62 0.85 0.33 0.99 0.73 0.86 0.55 0.98
1997Q1–1999Q4 0.98 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.97
2000Q1–2007Q2 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.99 0.85 0.82 0.88 0.98
2007Q3–2011Q4 0.87 0.95 0.82 0.99 0.88 0.96 0.81 0.99
G7 = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Note: Calculated as median correlation for each regional group. Asia includes East Asia and Southeast Asia. East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, 
China; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.





Rep. of Malaysia Philippines Singapore Taipei,China Thailand
Full Sample -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 -0.11 -0.06
1993Q1–1996Q4 -0.11 0.25 0.23 -0.19 -0.05 -0.01 0.17 0.02 0.12
1997Q1–1999Q4 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.04
2000Q1–2007Q2 -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09
2007Q3–2011Q4 0.05 -0.11 -0.18 -0.06 -0.41 -0.10 -0.15 -0.22 -0.20
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Figures are the median of the bilateral cross-economy correlation of consumption growth minus bilateral cross-economy correlation of output growth across the sample of nine economies.
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.
Correlations of domestic consumption 
growth with global output are lower—as 
Asian economic growth is more correlated 
with regional than global growth.
Correlations of consumption growth rates with global 
output were also examined (Table 12).27 The correlation 
27The output of the G7 economies, which accounted for 48% of global output in 
2011, is taken as a proxy for global output.
of domestic consumption growth with world output 
(0.39) is lower than the correlation with Asian output 
(0.48). This may imply that there is more risk sharing 
within Asia than with the rest of the world. However, 
this is not likely the case—as the correlation of domestic 
output growth with global output (0.43) is also lower 
than the correlation with Asian output (0.47). This 
generally tracks the increase in correlation of domestic 
output with global output. The correlations rose 
markedly during the crisis periods, especially during the 
2008/09 global financial crisis. 
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Table 12: Correlation of Domestic Output Growth and Consumption Growth with World Output Growth
 














Full Sample    0.43 0.33 0.44 0.67    0.39 0.36 0.40    0.66    0.34 0.30 0.41 0.68 
1993Q1–1996Q4    0.39 0.23 0.39 0.25    0.34 0.34 0.34    0.25    0.28 0.24 0.31 0.36 
1997Q1–1999Q4    0.35  0.33 0.41 0.70    0.35 0.32 0.36    0.55    0.41 0.52 0.36 0.61 
2000Q1–2007Q2    0.37 0.22 0.43 0.80    0.35 0.21 0.37    0.78    0.37 0.24 0.41 0.76 
2007Q3–2011Q4    0.70 0.68 0.70 0.81    0.61 0.68 0.58    0.82    0.61 0.62 0.60 0.83 
G7 = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Note: Calculated as median correlation for each regional group. Asia includes East Asia and Southeast Asia. East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of 
Korea; and Taipei,China. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.
Another implication of risk sharing is that there would be 
lower correlation between domestic consumption and 
domestic output than between domestic consumption 
and regional or global output. Comparing the results 
for the full sample, the correlations of domestic 
consumption with domestic output (see Table 10) are 
much higher than those of domestic consumption with 
Asian (see Table 11) or global output (see Table 12). 
Based on a regression model, there has been some 
improvement in risk sharing in the region over time, 
although it remains low (Box 6).
These results suggest that there has been 
limited consumption risk sharing in Asia.
While there has been some increase in risk sharing over 
time, it appears to be quite small. While cross-country 
correlations of consumption tend to be quite high, they 
reflect the closer co-movement of Asian economies with 
regional and global output. Some of the increases over 
time of consumption correlations are also attributable 
to greater integration with the global economy. Also, 
cross-country correlations of consumption are about 
the same as cross-country correlations of output. 
Further, domestic consumption is highly correlated with 
domestic output, much higher than the correlation with 
regional or global output. All the above shows little 
evidence of consumption risk sharing in the region.
The results consistently show that risk sharing continues 
to be low in Asia. The region has witnessed a rise in cross-
economy correlations in consumption growth, driven 
more by an increase in correlations of output growth 
across the region. The results also show that correlations 
between domestic consumption and domestic output 
growth remain high, suggesting little diversification of 
risks across the region. In addition, correlations between 
domestic consumption and Asian output seem not to be 
driven by risk sharing, but rather by the co-movement 
of domestic output with regional output. Finally, 
correlations between domestic growth and global 
output growth are generally lower than with regional 
growth, except during the 2008/09 global financial 
crisis. While there are economies—like Singapore and 
Malaysia—that fare better, consumption growth in Asia 
still largely track movements in domestic output growth. 
Progress in financial integration in the region does not 
improve cross-economy smoothing of consumption. 
Nevertheless, the region has made progress in 
cooperative risk sharing—such as the doubling of funds 
in the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), 
which helps pool resources in ASEAN+3 to mitigate the 
impact of crises in individual countries.28
28See footnote 21.
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Box 6: Risk Sharing in Asia
A test was conducted to determine the presence of risk 
sharing—by regressing growth rates of consumption on 
growth rates of output. To isolate the economy-specific 
movements in output and consumption, the common 
growth component corresponding to external factors from 
each variable is taken out. Global growth is subtracted from 
individual economic output and consumption growth to 
obtain the economy-specific growth.
For the panel model, the estimated equation is
 ∆logcit – ∆logCt= α+β(∆logyit – ∆logYt) + εit (1)
while in the time-series model, the equation below is 
estimated
 ∆logcit – ∆logCt= α+βt(∆logyit – ∆logYt) + εit (2)
where cit  and yit denote per capita consumption and  GDP 
of country i in time t; and Ct and Yt are world per capita 
consumption and world GDP.
As countries move toward greater risk sharing, there will be a 
lower coefficient of output growth (β), or conversely, higher 
value of 1-β. The results from estimating the panel model 
(equation 1) show output to be a statistically significant 
determinant of consumption. There is a very high coefficient 
on output, although this has declined after the 2008/09 
global financial crisis (Box table 1). This suggests that the 
power of output in explaining the consumption growth 
rate—although still high—declined from 2007 to 2011. 
Examining the relationship on an annual basis—using 
a 9-year rolling window—shows a steady drop in the 
coefficient of output growth since the start of the 2008/09 
global financial crisis (Box table 2).
To see if there are regional differences in this pattern, results 
between Southeast Asia and East Asia are compared, with 
largely similar results. However, Southeast Asia shows a 
bigger decline in the coefficient of output growth during 
the 2008/09 global financial crisis compared with East 
Asia—risk sharing rose faster in Southeast Asia than East 
Asia during the 2008/09 global financial crisis. This is 
consistent with results of the correlation analysis 
(Box table 3). 
Aside from this regional difference, there are also country 
variations in the level of risk sharing in Asia. The estimated 
risk sharing index (1-β) for each of the country was 
calculated from the time-series model (equation 2) 
(Box table 4). After examining how the figures had 
changed over the years, it is evident that (i) risk sharing 
remains low, but has been rising, particularly in recent 
years; (ii) some economies with more developed financial 
systems—Singapore and Malaysia, for example—have 
relatively higher levels of risk sharing, while in others—
Thailand and the Republic of Korea, for example—they 
remain low.
1: Dependent Variable—Domestic Consumption Growth (Net of G7 Consumption Growth) by period
Full Sample 1993Q1–1996Q4 1997Q1–1999Q4 2000Q1–2007Q2 2007Q3–2011Q4
Output growth 0.974 0.854 1.041 0.972 0.755
Constant -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000
Observations       682       142        108        270        162
Adjusted R2 0.846 0.567 0.961 0.701 0.684
G7 = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Note: Output growth is statistically significant at 1% level.
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.
Continued on next page
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2: Dependent Variable—Domestic Consumption Growth (Net of G7 Consumption Growth), by year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Output growth 1.014 1.016 1.021 1.022 1.023 1.024 0.945 0.929 0.893 0.849 0.817
Constant 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
Observations     322    324    324        324 324         324         324         324         324         324         324
Adjusted R2 0.883 0.893 0.904 0.906 0.915 0.894 0.688 0.699 0.719 0.690 0.681
G7 = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Note: Based on a 9-year rolling window ending the year indicated. Output growth is statistically significant at 1% level.
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.
3: Dependent Variable—Domestic Consumption Growth (Net of G7 Consumption Growth), by region and period
 

















Output growth 0.644 1.035 0.987 0.669 0.930 1.085 0.952 0.836
Constant 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
Observations             78             60          150            90           64           48          120             72
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.961 0.662 0.513 0.927 0.961 0.785 0.870
G7 = Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Note: East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China. Southeast Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Output growth is statistically significant at 1% level.
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.





Rep. of Taipei,China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
2001 0.08 0.23 -0.08 0.25 0.00 -0.10 0.04 0.39 0.07
2002 0.06 0.21 -0.12 0.17 -0.02 -0.17 0.01 0.22 0.02
2003 0.01 0.17 -0.11 0.22 -0.01 -0.15 0.02 0.18 0.01
2004 0.02 0.21 -0.11 0.17 -0.01 -0.20 0.02 0.25 0.00
2005 0.02 0.19 -0.11 0.18 -0.01 -0.21 0.03 0.24 0.00
2006 0.07 0.20 -0.11 0.19 -0.01 -0.24 0.03 0.18 -0.01
2007 0.07 0.22 -0.13 0.21 -0.03 -0.28 0.04 0.21 0.10
2008 0.05 0.23 -0.11 0.21 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.43 0.15
2009 0.05 0.23 -0.02 0.25 -0.01 0.24 0.11 0.32 0.02
2010 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.55 0.11 0.31 -0.06
2011 0.10 0.26 0.02 0.30 0.07 0.21 0.13 0.56 -0.04
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Based on a 9-year rolling window ending the year indicated.
Source: ADB calculations using data from International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; and national sources for Taipei,China.
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Table 13: Top 15 Remittance Sources, 2011
Net Remittance Inflows                     
($ million)
Net Remittance Outflows 
($ million)
Net Remittance Inflows                        
(% of GDP)
Net Remittance Outflows                
(% of GDP)
 India  59,123 United States 46,155 Tajikistan 43.8 Luxembourg 16.2
 People’s Republic of China  57,799 Saudi Arabia 28,231 Lesotho 24.9 Maldives 11.2
 Mexico  23,588 Switzerland 27,473 Kyrgyz Republic 23.4 Oman 9.9
 Philippines  22,986 Russian Federation 17,064 Liberia 23.3 Bahrain 7.9
 Nigeria  20,543 Kuwait 11,770 Nepal 22.0 Kuwait 7.3
 Egypt, Arab Republic of  14,031 Luxembourg 9,643 Moldova 21.6 Solomon Islands 6.9
 Pakistan  12,235 Netherlands 9,031 Samoa 20.5 Bhutan 5.8
 Bangladesh  12,056 Oman 7,176 Haiti 17.7 Saudi Arabia 4.7
 Viet Nam  8,600 Italy 5,992 Honduras 16.5 Macao, China 4.2
 Morocco  7,185 Norway 3,662 El Salvador 16.0 Switzerland 4.2
 Ukraine  6,685 Kazakhstan 3,304 Kosovo 15.0 Papua New Guinea 3.1
 Belgium  6,381 Israel 2,553 Tonga 14.2 Brunei Darussalam 2.7
 Poland  5,660 Japan 2,472 Nicaragua 12.5 Libya 1.8
 United Kingdom  4,824 Germany 2,197 Jamaica 12.2 Kazakhstan 1.8
 France  4,713 Australia 2,175 Armenia 11.1 Bahamas, The 1.6
Source: ADB calculations using World Bank estimates based on Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2011 and World Economic Outlook Database October 2012, International Monetary Fund.
This section examines recent trends in Asia’s labor 
mobility using remittance data. As shown in the 
inaugural AEIM, migrant stock data and remittance 
data provide the most consistent information—even 
if remittances are affected by a variety of economic 
conditions. Also, remittances between Asian economies 
can be the result of—or lead to—greater regional 
cooperation and integration. Some countries, including 
the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, provide 
bilateral remittance data that paints a picture of growing 
intra-Asia labor mobility. 
Asia is home to the world’s major labor 
exporting countries, and receives more than 
40% of global aggregate remittance inflows.
Asia received more than 40% of global aggregate 
remittance inflows in 2011. Globally, the top two net 
remittance recipients are Asian—India and the PRC—
with the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Viet Nam 
also among the top 15 (Table 13). However, with Asia 
home to more than half the world’s population, its labor 
mobility remains below the global average. Remittance-
to-GDP ratios also suggest wide regional differences. 
Labor mobility in Central Asia and South Asia is above 
the world average, while East Asia and Southeast Asia 
is lower. Small landlocked and island countries have 
very high labor mobility and are highly dependent on 
Labor Mobility
Given Asia’s diverse labor market structure, 
easing labor mobility offers economies 
greater efficiency; however, managing 
worker movements is a critical challenge 
facing Asian policymakers. 
The structure of labor varies across Asia’s landscape. 
Some of Asia’s high-income and middle-income 
countries have labor shortages, while others have a large, 
young workforce with a shortage of job opportunities. 
This diversity underpins growing labor flows and will 
benefit both source and recipient economies. Recipient 
economies better fulfill labor needs for production, while 
source economies can enjoy more job opportunities and 
benefit from inward remittances, contributing to higher 
efficiency for the region’s human resource allocation. 
Labor flows within Asia will likely continue to increase 
for the foreseeable future. First, demography changes 
slowly. So Asia will continue with both labor surplus and 
shortage in the decades to come. Second, development 
gaps between economies will also persist. Regional 
approaches are also growing. For example, ASEAN is 
working toward the free movement of skilled labor by 
the 2015 launch of the ASEAN Economic Community.
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Figure 33: Gross Remittance Inflows—Asia
e = estimate, LHS = left-hand scale, RHS = right-hand scale.
Note: 2012 figures are estimates. GDP shares are computed as total remittances for a subregion 
divided by total GDP of a subregion. Asia excludes Oceania. Central Asia includes Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Tajikistan is included starting 2002. 
East Asia excludes Taipei,China. The Pacific includes Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, and Vanuatu. Tonga is included starting 2001. South Asia excludes Afghanistan, while 
Bhutan is included starting 2007. Southeast Asia excludes Brunei Darussalam and Singapore.
Source: ADB calculations using World Bank estimates based on Balance of Payments Statistics
Yearbook 2011, and World Economic Outlook Database October 2012, International 
Monetary Fund.










2009Q2 2009Q4 2010Q2 2010Q4 2011Q2 2011Q4 2012Q3
Russian Federation Saudi Arabia United States
Note: Remittances are defined by the Central Bank of Russia as compensation paid to 
employees, by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency as workers’ remittances, and by the United 
States Bureau of Economic Analysis as private remittances and other transfers.
Source: ADB calculations using data from Haver Analytics.
remittances. In 2011, among Asian economies, Tajikistan 
has the highest remittance-to-GDP ratio (43.8%), 
followed by the Kyrgyz Republic (23.4%), Nepal (22.0%), 
and Samoa (20.5%). As for host economies, the Maldives 
ranks second worldwide with remittance outflows 
equivalent to 11.2% of GDP. Solomon Islands, Bhutan,  
PNG, Brunei Darussalam, and Kazakhstan also rank in 
the top 15. Other countries—Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand, for example—are growing rapidly as host 
countries.
With significant subregional variations, 
remittance inflows to Asia increased 16.3% 
in 2011, with growth estimated at 10.1% last 
year; Asian labor mobility is expanding. 
Remittance inflows to the region recovered from a dip 
in 2009 and continue to grow solidly (Figure 33). They 
surged 16.3% in 2011 and are estimated to have grown 
10.1% in 2012—to $248.5 billion.29 The remittance-to-
GDP ratio grew slightly from 1.17% in 2010 to 1.19% in 
2011 and to an estimated 1.22% in 2012. Growth has 
varied across subregions. Inflows to Central Asia and 
South Asia show robust growth in both nominal values 
and the remittance-to-GDP ratio in 2011 and 2012; while 
the value of remittances to the Pacific fell 7.5% in 2011, 
recovering marginally (0.3%) last year, resulting in an 
overall decline in the remittance-to-GDP ratio. Nominal 
inflows to Southeast Asia and East Asia have increased 
steadily since 2010, while remittance-to-GDP ratios have 
remained stable. 
29World Bank estimate for 2012. 
Differences in remittance flows among 
subregions illustrate migrant destination 
profiles.30
Based on migrant stock data, 62.0% of Central Asia’s 
out-migrants head to the Russian Federation. Remittance 
flows from Russian Federation recovered from a steep 
decline in 2009, growing 16.9% in the first 3 quarters 
of 2012 compared with the same period in 2011—high 
commodity prices helped improve economic conditions. 
Thus, robust growth of remittance inflow to Central 
Asia captures the dominance of Russian Federation 
as destination. Growth in remittance outflows from 
the Middle East—destination for 40.7% of all out-
migrants from South Asia—has slowed, but the decline 
was more modest than the slowdown in remittances 
from the US after the 2008/09 global financial crisis 
(Figure 34). Thus, South Asia did not see remittances 
fall in nominal value during the global financial crisis, 
even if its remittance-to-GDP ratio declined slightly. In 
contrast to Central Asia and South Asia, 35.9% of out-
migrants from East Asia, 33.7% from Southeast Asia, and 
26.7% from the Pacific work in North America. For these 
subregions, US remittances fell dramatically in 2009 and 
have declined modestly since 2011. The countries with 
declining remittances after the crisis appear to have 
large shares of US-bound workers. The US remains the 
world’s largest source of remittances. 
Economic conditions in the host country clearly affect 
remittance flows—and they can be volatile. Inflows to 
Central Asia and South Asia are also subject to conditions 
in the Russian Federation and the Middle East, 
respectively. One way to address these risks is to diversify 
destination profiles. In fact, based on bilateral remittance 
30For further discussion on destination of migrants, see ADB. 2012. International 
and Regional Transmigration. Asian Economic Integration Monitor July 2012. 
Manila. pp. 31–32.
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data, this is beginning to happen. With a limited number 
of economies providing regular bilateral remittance data, 
any conclusions must be qualified and biased toward 
economies with available data. What there is, shows 
that—after the crisis in particular—more Asian migrants 
are destined to other Asian economies. Thus, it appears 
that intra-Asia labor mobility is rising.
Still, the largest portion of Asian migrants continues to 
work outside Asia. For instance, in the Philippines, Asia 
accounted for 13.8% of 2012 remittance receipts, while 
the North America accounted for 52.3%.31 In Sri Lanka, 
remittances in 2011 from Asia were 12.8% of the total, 
while 58.9% came from the Middle East. However, Sri 
Lanka’s Asian share has grown steadily—from 7.6% in 
2003. In contrast, the share of North America—6.4% 
of total remittances in 2003—declined to 3.0% in 2011 
(Figure 35). Some Asian economies are increasingly 
becoming hosts for foreign labor. Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Thailand have grown rapidly as recipient countries, 
significantly contributing to intraregional migration. 
Thailand hosts workers from Myanmar, the Lao PDR, 
and Cambodia. Flows into Malaysia come primarily from 
Indonesia and several South Asian countries. Singapore 
receives migrants from both South Asia and Southeast 
Asia. With economic growth in developing Asia above 
that in advanced economies, the shift to greater 
intraregional migration will likely continue.
31Asia refers to Hong Kong, China; Japan; and Singapore. Data from Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas. http://www.bsp.gov.ph
In Bangladesh, intraregional remittances 
are rising faster than those from the US, 
and have surpassed Europe.
While some 65% of remittances to Bangladesh originate 
in the Middle East, the share from Asia has increased 
dramatically, from roughly 2% in 2005 to almost 10% 
last year (Figure 36). The remittance share from the 
US and Europe have declined from about 17% before 
the 2008/09 global financial crisis to about 10% today. 
This shift contributed to the average 14% growth in 
remittance flows during the past 5 years. Moreover, 
cooperation between governments will help continue 
this trend. A recent memorandum of understanding 
signed between Malaysia and Bangladesh lifts an 
existing ban on recruiting new Bangladeshi workers. 
The first group of 10,000 new workers is expected to be 
recruited early this year. Also, both governments plan to 
take a more direct role in recruitment to avoid the risks 
of fraud by unscrupulous recruiters.
Despite the huge benefits of labor mobility, 
it is often a contentious issue (as in the 
US and Europe); as intraregional labor 
migration grows, better management to 
avoid conflict is an essential.
Movements from labor surplus to deficit economies 
can lead to more efficient use of the region’s human 
resources and contribute to growth in both source and 
recipient economies. Recipient countries benefit by 
increasing their stock of a core factor of production. 
This allows for growth momentum and increases 
international competitiveness. It can even out job 
mismatches in labor markets. At the same time, 
source economies also benefit. Sending labor abroad 
Figure 36: Remittance Shares—Bangladesh¹ 
(by origin, % of total)
¹3-month moving average.
Note: Asia includes Hong Kong, China; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; and Singapore. 
Europe includes Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from CEIC.
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Figure 35: Remittance Shares—Sri Lanka (by origin, % of total)
Note: Asia includes Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; Brunei Darussalam; Hong Kong, 
China; India; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; the Maldives; Myanmar; Pakistan; the 
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; Thailand; and Viet Nam. European Union (EU) includes 
the 27 EU member countries. North America includes Canada and the United States.
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eases population pressure on domestic job markets. 
Remittances boost consumption and investment at 
home, as well as contribute to the current account 
and, in some cases, ease foreign exchange pressure. 
In addition, mobility among skilled workers supports 
technology transfer and can promote the establishment 
of new industries.  
Nonetheless, labor mobility is often a sensitive issue for 
both source and host economies—and can heighten 
social and political tensions. The biggest challenge is 
to better manage and work toward resolving the issue 
of illegal foreign workers and worker protection. The 
combination of the need for cheap labor and migrants 
desperate for jobs often results in illegal workers 
exploited by transfer agents and employers. Poor 
understanding of the benefits of migrant labor to a host 
country’s economy or the belief that migrants “steal” 
jobs help set battle lines over immigration policy.32 If 
conflicts become severe, they often lead to immigration 
bans, which hurt both source and recipient economies. 
Close cooperation is essential to address these issues 
and set a conducive environment for properly managed 
labor flows and ensuring adequate living conditions in 
host countries. 
For Asia, tackling these issues requires 
close cooperation bilaterally and regionally; 
lessons learned from experiences in Asia 
and elsewhere can aid policymakers in 
finding better solutions.
Asia’s policymakers can use their own and others 
experience—such as the EU—to map out ways to 
benefit from greater labor mobility. The Philippines 
is an example of a mature source country. In 1977, 
it established government programs to protect and 
promote the welfare of overseas Filipino workers 
(OFW). The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration 
(OWWA) works on many levels, from negotiating with 
host economies over OFW living conditions to offering 
seminars on language and culture prior to departure—
which lessens the possibility of host country conflicts. 
The agency also works with the central bank and others 
to encourage use of the formal banking system to remit 
funds. For returning workers, OWWA also has a program 
to smoothen reintegration. The Philippine government 
also offers incentives for Filipinos to work abroad—for 
32A famous example is the negative impact on wages in host countries. Various 
empirical research demonstrate that even the (maximum) wage decline in the 
host country (advanced countries in most cases) due to the influx of foreign 
workers is very small or negligible.
instance, exempting OFWs from airport fees and taxes 
on income earned abroad. Over the past decade, several 
South Asian countries—including Bangladesh (2001), 
India (2004) and Pakistan (2008)—have established 
government agencies with similar aims and functions, 
and adopt policies to better protect and motivate 
overseas workers. 
Some labor exporting economies have reached the stage 
of economic development where returnees, especially 
skilled workers, identify opportunities at home to 
develop new industries—India’s IT industry and medical 
tourism in Southeast Asia are two examples. Malaysia 
recently established a government body to attract 
talent—especially skilled Malaysians working abroad—
to further promote national development. Of course, 
some of these economies enticing skilled migrants back 
home continue exporting unskilled labor, while some 
shift to importing labor, including unskilled migrants. 
These new trends demonstrate that there is long-run 
dynamism in international migration; a labor-exporting 
country may evolve into a labor-importing economy—
although great variance exists in reality. Understanding 
these developments will help Asia fully benefit from 
greater labor mobility. A regional approach may help 
Asian countries better learn and adapt from others’ 
experience at lower cost than doing so individually. 
The EU experience shows that managing 
perceptions and attitudes toward 
immigrants in a recipient economy is 
prerequisite to attracting skilled workers or 
professionals.
Europe has much experience in managing skilled labor 
mobility, including the design and implementation of 
Mutual Recognition Agreements. It also deals with the 
issue of unskilled migrants and their welfare. Unskilled 
labor often attracts discriminatory attitudes, and these 
can also be barriers to attracting skilled workers, given 
the greater options they have in choosing destinations.33 
Preventing and managing potential conflicts between 
source and host economies or between overseas workers 
and the host population are critical if Asia is to benefit 
from labor mobility. This is a major challenge. Studies 
discuss attempts to properly manage international labor 
33See M. Kahanec. 2012. Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union. 
IZA Research Report Series. No. 49. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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flows as a “quest for control,” and there is no consensus 
on what proper management is or whether it can be 
achievable or not.34
A cooperative, regional approach is perhaps the best 
option in addressing these issues, given the complexity 
of the migration web within Asia. Regional cooperation 
can help assure the benefits of labor mobility outweigh 
its costs. Economies or regions that have dealt with 
immigration issues can provide useful knowledge 
for others as they confront common challenges—
recruitment practices, worker protection, handling 
illegal migrants, and how to construct a management 
framework of cooperation between source and recipient 
economies.
Infrastructure Connectivity
While regional connectivity is improving, 
demand continues to rise faster than supply, 
widening the infrastructure gap. 
As globalization deepens and Asian economies 
continue to expand, demand for greater information 
and communication technology (ICT), energy, power, 
and transport and logistics is intensifying. Asia’s 
renowned supply chains and production networks—
euphemistically labeled “Factory Asia”—have driven 
growth in intraregional, inter-regional, and global trade. 
Raw materials, intermediate and final goods and services 
require efficient infrastructure to link producers to 
suppliers, suppliers to manufacturers, and manufacturers 
to markets. The services that promote and finance 
this trade also require seamless infrastructure. And 
underlying the entire process is the power needed 
to fuel production. Higher incomes and growing 
populations also increase demand for food and natural 
resources, requiring more efficient infrastructure.
World trade grew at an average annual rate of 9.8% 
between 2000 and 2011—despite the 23% contraction 
during the 2008/09 global financial crisis. It reached a 
historic high of over $36 trillion in 2011 (Figure 37). 
Asia’s total trade surged from $3.5 trillion in 2000 
to $12.2 trillion in 2011—an annual growth rate of 
12.0%. This has increasingly overwhelmed transport 
infrastructure and service in the region. In addition, 
production fragmentation increasingly requires better 
trade efficiency to feed global supply chain networks. 
34See S. Castles and M.J. Miller. 2009. The Age of Migration: International Population 
Movements in the Modern World. 4th ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Today’s industries and firms actively use multimodal 
transport services and apply just-in-time inventory 
management with low overheads and shorter lead 
times. All these require efficient transport infrastructure, 
logistics services, and customs, especially at airports 
and seaports—where more than 90% of international 
trade passes.
The quality of cross-border connectivity 
is improving in Asia, yet more needs to 
be done. 
To satisfy projected demand, new regional infrastructure 
in Asia is estimated to cost $320 billion during 2010–
2020.35 Of this total, about half is needed for regional 
transport and logistics, while the rest covers cross-border 
infrastructure that moves power from surplus to deficit 
economies. This includes building and upgrading the 
Asian Highway Network, Trans-Asian Railway Network, 
and Asian Container Ports programs. It also includes 
regional ICT, transport, and energy projects promoted 
under regional cooperation programs such as ASEAN, 
the Brunei Darussalam–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines 
East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), the Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, 
the Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle 
(IMT-GT), the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), South 
Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) 
program, and Council of Regional Organisations of the 
Pacific (CROP). 
35B. Bhattacharyay. 2010. Estimating Demand for Infrastructure in Energy, 
Transport, Telecommunications, Water and Sanitation in Asia and the Pacific: 
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Figure 37: Merchandise Trade—Asia and the World ($ trillion)
Source: ADB calculations using data from Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary 
Fund; and CEIC for Taipei,China.
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Asia’s economies, together with bilateral and multilateral 
partners, have actively promoted regional cooperation 
on infrastructure connectivity, mobilizing more than 
$40 billion for regional infrastructure during the last 
2 decades. For example, 172 GMS and CAREC regional 
projects were completed by the end of 2011, costing 
$35 billion.36 Regional transport projects absorbed 
77% ($27 billion) of the total. The two programs also 
conducted numerous training sessions, strengthening 
human capital to support regional infrastructure 
management and new trade facilitation and security 
measures, among others. IMT-GT is working on 
connectivity projects worth over $5 billion. About 
$1 billion has been earmarked for regional projects 
under BIMP-EAGA with $22 million in technical support. 
Since the start of SASEC in 2001, 19 subregional projects 
worth over $6 billion have been approved. SASEC has 
gained momentum in the past few years, with $4 billion 
in investments covering transport, energy, security, 
and trade facilitation planned for 2013–2015. In 2012, 
SASEC approved two complementary subregional 
projects—a highway corridor with two cross-border 
facilities in Bangladesh (a strategic intervention after 
SASEC corridor improvements in Nepal and Bhutan) and 
a trade facilitation program. CROP, a committee of the 
heads of eight subregional organizations in the Pacific 
(the oldest dating back to 1947), was established in 1988 
to better coordinate work on regional ICT and aviation 
safety control—reflecting the unique characteristics of 
the subregion. 
Improvements along the GMS East–West Economic 
Corridor (EWEC) have shortened travel time between 
Dong Ha in Viet Nam and Savannakhet in the Lao PDR 
from 12 hours to 3 hours. It also attracted foreign 
direct and domestic investment, creating business 
opportunities in district towns and employment 
opportunities for villagers used to subsistence farming. 
Automotive part suppliers use the Second Mekong 
International Bridge between the Lao PDR and Thailand 
and the upgraded road along EWEC in the Lao PDR to 
transport parts assembled in the Lao PDR to factories 
in Thailand. Wood chips travel the same route to feed 
Thai paper mills. Da Nang port, at the eastern end of 
EWEC, has been upgraded to handle more trade and 
provide new business opportunities. Cambodia and 
Thailand simplified cross-border procedures at the 
Cambodia–Thailand border along the GMS Southern 
Economic Corridor, which runs through southern 
Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet Nam. Automotive suppliers 
are establishing factories in Cambodia near the border 
36Comprises $20 billion under the CAREC Program and $15 billion under the GMS 
Program.
to supply parts to assembly lines in Thailand. A CAREC 
Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring 
system assesses regional transport and trade efficiency 
along CAREC corridors—in 2011, the time taken to cross 
borders by road declined to 6.2 hours on average, a 2% 
decline from 2010.
There are few regional projects on energy. The Nam 
Theun 2 Hydropower project in the Lao PDR supplies 
electricity to Thailand, generating about $2 billion 
for the Lao PDR over the 25-year project period. The 
revenue supports government programs, while the 
electricity offers Thailand a less expensive alternative 
to domestically produced electricity. A $6 billion-
worth ASEAN Power Grid—with nine interconnections 
to be completed by 2015—should save more 
than $600 million at current electricity prices. Five 
interconnections are currently operational with four 
under construction. In 2010, Cambodia imported about 
385 million kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity from 
Thailand and 1,162 million kWh from Viet Nam through 
cross-border electricity trade arrangements. Indonesia 
and Malaysia signed a memorandum of understanding 
for interconnection between Peninsular Malaysia and 
Sumatra and an agreement to begin electricity trade in 
2015 between West  Kalimantan and Sarawak.37 ASEAN 
utilities and power authorities are working to harmonize 
regulatory and technical standards. India is offering to 
sell power to the Bangladesh Power Development Board; 
they are constructing an interconnection line between 
the western power grid of Bangladesh and India’s 
eastern electrical grid.
A gas pipeline between Myanmar and Thailand has 
been completed, with Myanmar exporting about 80% 
of total gas production from the Yadana and Yetagun 
offshore gas fields to Thailand—more than 30% of 
Myanmar’s total export earnings. The Trans-ASEAN Gas 
Pipeline program consists of seven pipelines totaling 
1,659 kilometers (Table 14).
ICT is creating new cross-border 
business opportunities and providing 
greater efficiency. 
Global ICT market liberalization has increased user-
access exponentially. Based on SIM card distribution 
basis, mobile phone users are estimated at about 
six billion, equal to some 86% of the world population. 
This has fed new cross-border business opportunities. 
37See Southeast Asia Infrastructure. 2012. Integrated Prosperity: Cross-Border 
Infrastructure Crucial. http://southeastasiainfra.com/integrated-prosperity/
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It has allowed finance to become more inclusive, even 
in remote Asia. ICT network development also supports 
logistics services and customs operations between 
customs authorities globally. 
The 2015 ASEAN Economic Community includes an 
ICT Master Plan 2015 and the creation of an ASEAN 
Broadband Corridor. It promotes harmonizing radio 
spectrum allocations as services shift from analogue to 
digital—the so-called digital dividend. SASEC began 
building an information highway in 2007 and has 
increased the broadband supply, skilled ICT manpower, 
which has led to more e-government, e-learning, tele-
medicine, e-remittance, and e-commerce services—with 
special focus on the poor. It links SASEC to the global 
information economy. ICT connectivity has helped 
the geographically dispersed Pacific island countries 
by generating new business globally and creating 
employment regionally (Box 7).38
The private sector is increasingly getting 
concerned with transport and trade 
transaction costs, and other non-tariff 
barriers as duties decline globally. 
With the general decline in tariffs levied, the private 
sector has shifted its focus from tariffs to reducing 
transport and transaction costs, along with other non-
tariff barriers such as border procedures. Logistics is 
increasingly important. According to the World Bank’s 
Logistics Performance Index (LPI), logistics performance 
in Asia improved 8% during the last 5 years—notably 
higher than the 5% world average over the same period 
(Table 15). Improvements in infrastructure (11%), 
38See footnote 37.
tracking and tracing (9%), and customs (9%) are partly 
behind these gains. Among subregions, East Asia and 
Southeast Asia are at the top of the LPI list. Governments 
in the Pacific and Central Asia subregions improved their 
LPI scores by 17% and 16%, respectively. Central Asia 
has focused on infrastructure upgrading, improving 
25% over the past 5 years, followed by South Asia (15%), 
and the Pacific (14%). Tracking and tracing, and customs 
procedures have likewise improved.
Developing Asia’s logistics score—2.82 in 2012—is 
comparable with the 2.87 world average, but remains 
far behind North America’s 3.89 and the EU’s 3.51. 
As with other regional indicators, developing Asia’s 
logistics performance is uneven, with East Asia doing 
best, particularly in timeliness, and the Pacific lowest, 
particularly in customs administration. Performance 
by Southeast Asian economies range from 4.13 
(Singapore) to 2.37 (Myanmar), and in East Asia from 
4.12 (Hong Kong, China) to 2.25 (Mongolia). Narrowing 
disparities is a major private sector challenge.
Cross-border procedures need to 
be simplified, harmonized, and use 
international best practices. 
Asia’s relatively low logistics performance and wide 
variations between subregions mean time-consuming 
and cumbersome cross-border procedures. Greater 
cooperation can help. The private sector expects 
cross-border efficiency, while governments want to 
reduce security risks and smuggling. International 
agreements, conventions, and best practices boosts 
efficiency, safety, and security. The plethora of free trade 
agreements (FTAs) created an Asian noodle bowl of FTAs 
(see Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism: Approaches to 
Unraveling the Asian Noodle Bowl, page 49). Multilateral 
conventions can disentangle trade-related issues as 
they define global rules applicable to all participating 
countries. Regional cooperation should work toward 
accession to major international conventions, supported 
by domestic laws and procedures. Despite the benefits 
of membership, accession to these conventions has been 
slow and uneven (Figure 38).
 
For customs, the Harmonized System (HS) 
Convention—a commodity nomenclature classification 
system—has the highest level of accession with 72% of 
United Nations (UN) members (139 contracting parties), 
including 60% of ADB developing member countries 
(DMCs). The Revised Kyoto Convention, the blueprint for 
modern and efficient customs, has 39% of UN members 
(76 contracting parties), including 28% of ADB DMCs. 
Table 14: Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Program
Project Length 
(kilometers)
West Natuna (Indonesia)–Duyong (Malaysia)    100
Malaysia–Thailand (Joint Development Area)    270
Yetagun (Myanmar)–Ratchaburi (Thailand)    340
Yadana (Myanmar)–Ratchaburi (Thailand)    470
Grissik (South Sumatra, Indonesia)–Singapore    470
Two Cross-Border Pipelines between Malaysia 
   and Singapore
       9
Total 1,659
Source: Southeast Asia Infrastructure. 2012. Integrated Prosperity: Cross-Border Infrastructure 
Crucial. http://southeastasiainfra.com/integrated-prosperity/
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ADB has long supported regional cooperation and 
integration among its 14 Pacific developing member 
countries (Pacific DMCs), often with co-financing. 
Contributions include support for regional development 
forums; infrastructure finance; regional projects focused 
on renewable energy, marine and coastal management; 
and strengthening disaster preparedness. ADB’s regional 
technical assistance contributes to strengthening 
capacity for public financial management, statistics, and 
data collection. 
More recently, ADB positioned itself to support improved 
regional Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
connectivity in the Pacific—predicated on the assumption 
that the development potential of improved broadband 
connectivity hinges on three complementary pillars: 
(i) the availability and quality of broadband infrastructure 
(fiber optics, satellites, domestic backbone); (ii) the quality 
of regulatory regimes to ensure competitiveness of the 
telecommunications sector, cost-based wholesale and retail 
pricing, and universal access policies; and (iii) broadband-
based improvements to promote inclusive service delivery in 
key social sectors like health and education, and reduce the 
cost of doing business.
The experience from a range of low and middle-income 
countries suggests that when these pillars come together, 
improved broadband connectivity contributes to more 
inclusive economic growth and wider social impact. In the 
Pacific, ADB and the World Bank have actively supported 
the development of infrastructure and innovative 
broadband-based service delivery, along with strengthening 
regulatory regimes.  
Recent Developments 
Since 2010, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), the Marshall Islands, Samoa, and Fiji 
have been connected by submarine fiber-optic cables. All 
other Pacific DMCs rely on satellite, which is expensive and 
constrained by limited bandwidth.
In response to Pacific Islands Forum’s call for improved 
international connectivity, ADB has been supporting the 
Pacific Regional ICT Connectivity Project (initiated by the 
World Bank), which aims to connect Tonga, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, and Vanuatu by submarine fiber optic cables to the 
existing global submarine cable network. 
 
Under the first phase of the initiative, endorsed in August 
2011, ADB and the World Bank jointly supported Tonga Cable 
Limited in developing a submarine cable system (SCS) that 
includes installation of an 827-kilometer cable link between 
Nuku’alofa (Tonga) and Suva (Fiji). 
Under the second phase—the “Broadband for Development 
Project”—support is provided to the Solomons Oceanic 
Cable Company, in developing a SCS that will link Solomon 
Islands to the existing Pipe Pacific Cable-1 cable that runs 
between Guam and Sydney. In addition to the international 
link (roughly 430-kilometers), SCS will comprise two 
domestic spurs to Malaita and the Western Province (roughly 
400 and 150 kilometer, respectively). An interesting feature 
of this project is that the financing plan comprises a mix of 
sovereign funds (loan and grant) and non-sovereign funds 
(commercial debt and equity). The sovereign financing 
component was approved in September 2012.
Discussions on a possible extension of the Tonga–Fiji 
cable to Samoa, as well as ADB’s possible support for a 
SCS linking Guam with the FSM and Palau are currently 
under discussion.
ADB also supports a regional resource center for ICT 
regulatory reforms (based in Fiji) and initiatives focused 
on improving delivery of public services, mainly in 
e-governance, health and education. The Rural Health 
Services Improvement Program in PNG, for example, is 
piloting the use of mobile data devices in selected remote 
provinces of the country.  
Benefits of Improved Regional ICT Connectivity 
A recent World Bank study indicates that a 10% increase 
in broadband penetration results in a 1.38% increase 
in GDP growth in low- and middle-income countries.1  
These result from (i) reduced transaction costs for 
business, government, and household communications; 
(ii) new business opportunities such as investments in 
e-commerce and business process outsourcing (BPO); and 
(iii) improved public service delivery, in particular through 
the introduction of e-education and e-health services; the 
remote delivery of agricultural extension, policing, judicial, 
employment, disaster management and other public 
services; and mobile banking. Wholesale bandwidth prices 
will likely be halved, leading to a conservatively estimated 
retail price reduction of 20%.
Across the Pacific, lack of access to markets and services, 
combined with high transport and communication costs 
leaves many countries relatively isolated. The regional 
ICT connectivity project in the Pacific supports economic 
and social development and new business opportunities. 
Improved ICT connectivity also supports the development 
of services such as tourism and BPO by increasing the 
frequency and quality of communications, not only among 
the countries in the region but also the rest of the world.
1World Bank. 2009. Information and Communications for Development 2009: 
Extending Reach and Increasing Impact. Washington, DC. 
Source: ADB Pacific Regional Department.
Box 7: Improving ICT Connectivity in the Pacific
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Figure 38: Levels of Accession to Selected International Conventions—Asia and the World1 (%)
ATA = Admission Temporaire/Temporary Admission,  FAL = Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, HS System = International Convention on the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, SOLAS = International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.
1Asia refers to the level of participation of Asia excluding Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. World refers to the level of participation of the 
193 United Nations members.
2One of the eight international conventions with respect to facilitation across international borders that United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) Resolution 48/11 of April 1992 recommends countries in the region to accede to.
Source:  International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Current Lists of Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties. http://www.icao.int/secretariat/
legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%20parties/AllItems.aspx; International Maritime Organization, Status of Conventions. http://www.imo.org/
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx; United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties. http://treaties.un.org/pages/
participationStatus.aspx 
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East Asia  3.54  3.29  3.60  3.44  3.46  3.56  3.90 
Southeast Asia  3.02  2.78  2.82  3.02  2.95  3.11  3.42 
Central Asia  2.51  2.40  2.43  2.45  2.42  2.53  2.86 
South Asia  2.58  2.47  2.38  2.59  2.58  2.48  2.93 
Pacific Islands2  2.40  2.14  2.15  2.40  2.17  2.46  3.06 
Asia  2.90  2.72  2.78  2.85  2.82  2.92  3.28 
Developing Asia3  2.82  2.63  2.68  2.79  2.74  2.83  3.22 
Europe and Central Asia  2.71  2.47  2.60  2.66  2.65  2.75  3.14 
Latin America and the Caribbean  2.71  2.46  2.57  2.70  2.64  2.73  3.12 
East Asia and the Pacific  2.77  2.51  2.58  2.77  2.64  2.85  3.26 
Middle East and North Africa  2.58  2.29  2.40  2.68  2.49  2.56  3.02 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.46  2.27  2.29  2.47  2.43  2.40  2.86 
World Average  2.87  2.66  2.77  2.82  2.82  2.88  3.26 
       
Note: Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are based on ADB regional classification. Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, Middle 
East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa based on World Bank regional classification.
1LPI scores are based on the following dimensions: (i) efficiency of border control and customs process, (ii) transport and trade-related infrastructure, (iii) competitively priced shipments, (iv) ability to 
track and trace consignments, and (v) timeliness of shipments. Countries are rated from 1 to 5, with 1 being the worst performance and 5 being the best.  
2Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands.
3Refers to 44 developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank and Brunei Darussalam, an unclassified regional member. 
Source: ADB calculations using data from Logistics Performance Index, World Bank. 
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About 80% of global trade now follows the provisions of 
this convention.39
In air transport, almost all countries are party to the 
Chicago Convention, which provides for the regulation 
of air navigation and international air transport. The 
Montreal Convention (1999) aims to provide a universal 
system to govern airline liability to passengers and 
shippers. It currently includes 53% of UN members 
(103 countries), including 35% of ADB DMCs. The 
Warsaw Convention (1929), which unifies rules relating 
to international air carriage, has been amended and 
modified by the Hague Convention (1955), Montreal 
Protocol No. 4 (1975), and the Montreal Convention 
(1999). Several countries remain outside the system. 
The Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime 
Traffic (FAL)—designed to help reduce delays in maritime 
traffic and introduce standardized procedures—has 60% 
UN member participation (115 countries) and 40% of 
ADB DMCs. Regarded by the maritime community as the 
most important treaty covering the safety of merchant 
ships, the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS 1974) has 84% of UN members’ signatures 
(162 countries) and 74% of ADB DMCs. SOLAS 1974 
specifies minimum safety standards with respect to the 
construction and operation of ships, and includes the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS 
Code). The ISPS Code was adopted in 2002 after the 9/11 
attacks in the US and includes security requirements for 
governments, port authorities, and shipping companies.
Private sector calls for interagency 
coordination among transport, trade 
and customs authorities and efficient 
multimodal transport are growing. 
Despite substantial transportation investments, many 
Asian economies maintain poor regional transport 
connectivity, constraining international and regional 
trade and transport, and increasing costs of doing 
business. Several initiatives are underway. 
On air transport, an electronic-freight (e-freight) initiative 
introduced by the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) has taken shape. In 2004, IATA carried out an 
industry-wide program—involving airlines, shippers, 
freight forwarders, ground handling agents, and 
customs authorities—to replace paper accompanying 
airfreight shipments with cheaper, more accurate, and 
39World Customs Organization. http://www.wcoomd.org
more reliable electronic messaging. With each shipment 
requiring up to 30 paper documents required by several 
government authorities across different points in the 
supply chain, the benefits of e-freight are obvious, 
particularly the efficiency of one-time data entry. 
Electronic documentation also allows pre-screening and 
real-time tracking. In 2007, e-freight began with six pilot 
locations. As of September 2012, there were 42 countries 
and 437 airports, of which 110 carried out international 
e-freight operations.40 With 42 participating airlines, 
1,569 freight forwarders, 12,558 ready trade lanes, and 
3,004 trade lanes, e-freight is now supporting a monthly 
e-freight volume of 139,412 consignments, or 5.5% 
market penetration.41 While less than 1% of the global 
freight market, e-freight has enormous potential to 
support air cargo, which accounts for about 35% of the 
value of the goods traded globally.
Provision of Regional 
Public Goods 
As countries increasingly collaborate on 
economic issues, they find that regional 
cooperation also allows them to tackle 
collective threats to public welfare—
regional public goods.
Integration can bring with it unintended 
consequences—from the spread of disease (epidemics) 
to cross-border crime (money laundering and human 
trafficking), among others. But it also creates the 
opportunity to cooperate on crisis prevention—
whether through disaster preparedness, environmental 
sustainability, or in pursuing regional financial stability. 
All of these opportunities and issues combine with 
increased cross-border interdependence to build 
demand for regional public goods.
40As defined by IATA, “countries” may also be administrative areas with local 
e-freight Operational Procedures (e-FOP) defined and validated by local customs, 
which accept inbound and outbound shipments performed as e-freight. 
“Airports” are  where stakeholders can operate e-freight to or from another 
participating airport. See International Air Transport Association. http://www.iata 
.org/
41A trade lane between two participating airports is where at least one e-freight 
shipment has been performed, whereas a ready trade lane is a trade lane 
between two participating airports in countries which have ratified the Montreal 
Convention 1999 and/or Montreal Protocol No. 4. Both conventions update the 
Warsaw Convention in relation to a system of liability and liability limits, among 
others. See International Air Transport Association. http://www.iata.org/
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Box 8: ASEAN’s Response to Transboundary Haze
The recurrence of large forest fires and haze have 
important environmental and economic impacts, bringing 
transboundary air pollution, disrupting transportation, 
creating health hazards, and damaging social welfare. ASEAN 
countries—home to 60% of the world’s tropical peatlands—
are prone to forest fires that are the major cause of fire and 
transboundary haze pollution. The blaze of 1997/98 affected 
six ASEAN countries and was among the most damaging in 
recorded history.1
In response to the problem—which began to intensify in 
the 1980s, ASEAN members signed an ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution (ASEAN Haze Agreement) in 
2002 to collectively address the haze problem. 2
The agreement takes a holistic approach and includes 
national, bilateral, subregional, and regional cooperation 
to cover prevention, monitoring, mitigation and fire 
suppression measures. Public awareness is a first step 
through outreach programs down to communities 
and villages. A panel of ASEAN experts was created in 
2005 to provide rapid independent assessments and 
recommendations on how to mobilize resources during 
expected critical periods. An ASEAN website—ASEAN 
Haze Action Online—was created to provide daily updates 
on fire-and-haze conditions and other information. 
Substantial progress has been made in implementing the 
agreement, including the conduct of simulation exercises, 
implementation of the ASEAN Peatland Management 
Strategy, and the use of zero-burning and controlled-
burning practices. The establishment of a regional air quality 
monitoring network and development and refinement of 
the fire danger rating system are planned. 
Funds were mobilized through several channels, including 
ASEAN government funding, the ASEAN Haze Fund 
(with voluntary contributions), and contributions from 
international and regional development partners. A 
broad range of bilateral and multilateral development 
partners participated in the program, including ADB, 
Australian Agency for International Development, 
Canadian International Development Agency, EU, Global 
Environment Facility, GTZ, Hanns Seidel Foundation 
(Germany), International Fund for Agricultural Development, 
Japan International Cooperation Agency, United Nations 
Environment Programme, United States Agency for 
International Development, World Health Organization, 
World Meteorological Organization, and the World Bank.  
ADB provided $1 million in technical assistance to support 
ASEAN capacity building in tackling the haze pollution. 
1Affected countries included Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The fire burned more than 9 million 
hectares of land, 6.5 million of which were forested. Damage was estimated at 
more than $9 billion in economic, social and environmental losses, including 
the release of an estimated 1–2 billion tons of carbon.
2 The agreement recognizes the importance of mitigating the transboundary 
haze pollution through concerted national and international cooperation, 
and comprehensively addresses all aspects of fire and haze including 
prevention, monitoring, and mitigation. An ASEAN Transboundary Haze 
Pollution Control Fund was established to mobilize financial resources, and the 
ASEAN Secretariat was designated to coordinate operational activities under 
the Agreement.
Source: ASEAN HazeOnline. http://haze.asean.org/ and ADB. 2001. Fire, Smoke, 
and Haze: The ASEAN Response Strategy. Manila.
The Importance of Regional Public Goods
Public goods have two fundamental 
characteristics—no one is excluded from 
using them; and consumption of a good 
does not diminish the amount available 
to others. 
As an issue for development economics, regional public 
goods has a relatively short history, although the study 
of public finance and related issues of externalities 
extend back considerably further.42 A regional public 
good is generally defined as a public good that is 
42I. Kaul. 2006. Public Goods: A Positive Analysis. In J-P. Touffut, ed. Advancing 
Public Goods. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
pp. 13-39.
shared by two or more countries in a specified region. 
Public goods vary in terms of  “publicness” depending 
on how they are produced. But in general, they cannot 
be supplied by usual market mechanisms, as potential 
suppliers are deterred by the knowledge that they will 
be unable to reap the full benefit of their efforts. Public 
sector intervention is needed to define the issue, create 
appropriate policies, and ensure adequate supplies 
of public goods. In the context of regional economic 
cooperation, regional public goods correct problems 
that individual countries cannot address on their own. 
For example, the ASEAN response on transboundary 
haze illustrates how regional public goods can help 
members address cross-border challenges (Box 8).
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Climate change and the environment, 
disease and disaster, good governance and 
crime-fighting are all regional public goods.
There are many types of regional public goods. One 
study identifies three essential regional public goods: 
peace and security, knowledge, and communicable 
diseases.43 Another highlights taxation, environment, 
health, criminal activities, and infrastructure.44 Generally, 
these can be classified into the following areas45:
i. Clean energy and energy efficiency—Climate change 
is a global public good, but its regional dimensions 
are just as critical. Rising fossil fuel use is increasing 
CO2 emissions which, in turn, cause global climate 
change. Financing, technology, and knowledge are 
needed to adapt to the impact of climate change 
and to mitigate its acceleration. Emissions-induced 
climate change also requires regional institutions 
for capacity building and knowledge sharing. For 
example, Clean Air Asia—a joint initiative of ADB, 
the World Bank, and the US–Asia Environmental 
Partnership—acts as the region’s air quality network 
to reduce air pollution and greenhouse emissions 
from transport, energy, and other sectors.
ii. Environment—Rapid economic growth has brought 
tremendous benefits to various regions, but the 
environmental damage from urban and industrial 
expansion, and the depletion of natural resources 
have become increasingly obvious. Problems 
include serious air and water pollution, dust and 
sandstorms, marine and coastal management, and 
competition over river resources. One example 
in addressing these issues is the Greater Mekong 
Subregion’s (GMS) Core Environment Program and 
Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Initiative, an 
ADB-administered program that seeks to approach 
economic growth and environmental protection in 
parallel, and in a way that boosts people’s welfare all 
along the Mekong river basin.
iii. Communicable Diseases—The rapid spread and 
emergence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome and avian influenza can 
be exacerbated by greater integration and increased 
cross-border mobility. Regardless, the potential 
for epidemics requires regional frameworks and 
43T. Sandler. 2006. Regional Public Goods and International Organizations. The 
Review of International Organizations. 1 (1). pp. 5–25.
44V. Tanzi. 2005. Social Protection in a Globalizing World. Rivista di Politica 
Economica Policy Paper. 
45ADB. 2010. Institutions for Regional Integration: Toward an Asian Economic 
Community. Manila. 
coordinated policy structures among vulnerable 
countries, as well as between developed and 
developing countries. This could also include 
vaccines and best practices for treating region-
specific diseases. Recently, a new alliance between 
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, UNITEDengue, 
was formed to speed up dengue surveillance and 
control, and hopes to expand to other countries in 
the region that face the same vulnerability.
iv. Disaster Risk Management—Asia is more prone to 
natural disasters than anywhere else in the world. 
Earthquakes, tsunamis, transboundary pollution, and 
rising sea levels highlight the cross-border impact 
of natural (and some man-made) disasters. There 
is need for a high degree of regional coordination 
to respond quickly and efficiently. It also stresses 
the need for regional disaster prevention as well 
as early warning systems. To reduce Central Asia’s 
vulnerability to disasters, for example, the UN 
established the Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster 
Risk Management Initiative, where risk assessments 
are prepared and regional issues and potential areas 
of co-operation addressed, including financing and 
information sharing.
v. Governance—Good governance is a quintessential 
public good. The importance of collective and 
coordinated action for good governance, the 
adoption and monitoring of sound practices, and 
control of transborder crime is becoming increasingly 
important as the region’s economies become more 
integrated through trade facilitation and improved 
infrastructure. In 1999, 30 governments in Asia joined 
to cooperate in the fight against corruption, creating 
an Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific under 
the joint leadership of ADB and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
The program’s Anti-Corruption Action Plan for 
Asia and the Pacific sets out goals and standards 
for sustainable safeguards against economic and 
political corruption.
vi. Human and Drug Trafficking and Money 
Laundering—The problem of human trafficking 
may be increasing as result of differential growth 
rates, rising inequality and improved connectivity. 
Sustained progress in addressing this issue 
requires policy dialogue in appropriate forums. 
The problem of money laundering also requires 
a coordinated regional solution—an objective 
pursued by the 41-member Asia/Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering.
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Throughout its 47-year history, ADB has been active 
in many of these fields. Regional public goods is the 
fourth pillar of ADB’s 2006 Regional Cooperation and 
Integration Strategy.
Challenges in Providing 
Regional Public Goods
While proliferation of regional and 
subregional programs in Asia heightens 
the attention given to regional public 
goods, financing the supply and logistics 
required remains a challenge to regional 
cooperation.
Development banks like ADB have increasingly taken 
up the cause of regional public goods.46 But they are not 
without problems. Conceptually, some studies note that 
regional public goods may be more difficult to provide 
for than global public goods. Some of the problems 
identified include:
i. lack of spillover/benefit for major donors,
ii. lack of lead countries,
iii. political security issues in some regions,
iv. lack of a single beneficiary as borrower, and
v. lack of interest in part due to apathy and the 
perceived lack of influence in international forums 
where different regional public goods are discussed.
Also, the financing and logistics in delivering regional 
public goods differ widely and are heavily dependent 
on how they are produced. For example, finding a cure 
for AIDS is most likely a “best shot” public good, where 
the largest effort determines the level of public good 
that can be achieved. This, however, means that a lead 
nation—most likely an advanced economy—must work 
to coalesce and focus resources. Without such a leader, 
little can actually be achieved.
There has been much discussion on how to tackle 
these difficulties, using innovative financing to produce 
regional public goods. In Asia, several ideas have been 
explored:
46See, for example, A. Estevadeordal et al. 2009. Bridging Regional Trade 
Agreements in the Americas. New York, US: Inter-American Development Bank.
i. tapping private resources from both nonprofit 
sources (philanthropies) and business;
ii. establishing public-private partnerships—especially 
where there is some prospect for the longer-
term private sector profitability, for example, the 
Medicines for Malaria Venture, which concentrates 
resources to achieve best shot public goods (new 
medicines); and
iii. fees for cooperation programs that essentially 
operate as “clubs”—where membership benefits 
and costs are clearly discernible and hence more 
likely to attract collection of  “club fees”. Subregional 
cooperation initiatives within each cooperation 
program could also collect fees—for example, 
regional power grids, waterways, and cross-border 
economic corridors.
Regional Public Goods and 
Institutional Design
Regional public goods pose two major 
challenges to the design of institutions for 
regionalism—new or existing institutions, 
and the standards used to deliver goods 
where they are needed most.
First, is the public good to be provided by new or 
existing institutions? On balance, there is much to favor 
existing institutions as it takes advantage of hard-
earned trust and minimizes the risk and marginal costs 
of addressing a new area. For example, the 20-year 
old GMS could extend cooperation into disaster risk 
management. A potential problem with using existing 
institutions would be lack of interest by a significant 
number of members or the need to cooperate with areas 
outside the cooperation program.
Second, how should a group establish subsidiary 
standards to bring institutional responses as close as 
possible to the area affected by the goods spillover? 
There will be those who get no benefits being asked to 
contribute, or some who receive benefits remain out 
of the group of participants. The subsidiary principle 
also leads to a decrease in transaction costs derived 
from negotiating and supervising regional public 
goods—it reduces the number of participants and 
allows great homogeneity in the interests of those 
involved. This argues against the need for a pan-Asian 
institution to deliver regional public goods. The strict 
application of the subsidiary principle may actually 
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be counterproductive when goods have important 
economies of scale in their production or distribution, 
such as in the procurement of pharmaceuticals or 
transactions in the international carbon market, 
particularly for small economies. In that case, it may 
prove more efficient to search for institutions, which 
have a large jurisdiction. Similarly, if goods have broad 
economies of scope, the subsidiary approach will have to 
be modified. In this case, it might be better to integrate 
different activities under the same institutional structure 
to take advantage of existing links.47
Regional public goods can play a key role in 
addressing many global issues as well.
Increasing interdependence among countries may also 
make regional public goods imperative. The increase in 
regional cooperation programs in Asia greatly facilitates 
the production of regional public goods. Although 
financing and production of regional public goods is not 
without problems, large regional development banks 
like ADB maintain regional public goods programs 
effectively covering a wide spectrum of issues. The 
subsidiary principle should play a key role in designing 
regional institutions, but factors such as economies of 
scale and scope, how specific regional public goods are 
produced, as well as the goods themselves, also must be 
carefully considered in designing institutions for regional 
cooperation.
Macroeconomic and Financial 
Cooperation
While advanced economies continue 
to struggle with debt and fiscal issues, 
Asia is moving forward with initiatives 
and exploring ways to enhance regional 
collaboration and coordination.
The global economic outlook remains uncertain as 
authorities continue to grapple with how to restructure 
and reignite growth. For Asia, it accents the need for 
deeper cooperation to ensure macroeconomic and 
financial stability. Further monetary and financial 
cooperation is also needed to promote trade and 
integrate production further—key to rebalancing Asia’s 
47R. Kanbur. 2001. Cross-Border Externalities, International Public Goods and their 
Implications for Aid Agencies. Cornell University Department of Applied Economics 
and Management Working Paper Series. No. 127364. New York: Cornell University.
sources of growth from overreliance on exports to more 
domestic and regional demand. Initiatives are underway 
to further develop and broaden regional financial 
markets. In September 2012, ASEAN Exchanges—a 
collaboration of seven ASEAN stock exchanges—
announced the rollout of the much-awaited ASEAN 
Trading Link, initially connecting Bursa Malaysia and the 
Singapore Exchange. In October, the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand joined, creating a $1.4 trillion virtual market. 
ASEAN+3 has also begun exploring ways to enhance 
the role of the region’s currencies for trade settlement in 
East  Asia.
The Group of 20 (G20) is also pursuing 
greater economic policy coordination and 
cooperation to address lackluster growth 
and job creation, along with the financial 
and sovereign debt crisis in advanced 
economies.
In 2012, the G20—the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation—concentrated on immediate 
risks to the global economy, including the eurozone 
debt crisis. It made progress on policy coordination 
through its Los Cabos Growth and Jobs Action Plan 
and Accountability Assessment Framework—to 
establish procedures for reporting progress on policy 
commitments. To strengthen the global financial 
firewall and enhance the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) role in crisis prevention and resolution, 
the G20 agreed last year to increase IMF resources and 
total commitments to about $461 billion. Moreover, 
it expanded policy coordination and cooperation on 
numerous agendas—such as open trade and investment 
(to resist protectionism), financial regulation and reform, 
financial inclusion, food security, commodity price 
volatility, the development challenge, and inclusive 
green growth.    
    
In early January this year, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision agreed 
to loosen restrictions on which assets can 
be used for the liquidity coverage ratio, 
postponing full implementation until 2019.
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) was developed to 
increase short-term resilience of banks’ liquidity risk 
profile—an essential component of the Basel III reforms. 
The LCR standard forces banks to have an adequate 
stock of unencumbered high quality liquid assets 
(HQLA)—cash or assets that can be converted into cash 
without losing much value in private markets—to meet 
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their liquidity needs for a 30-calendar day liquidity 
stress scenario. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision amended the HQLA definition and the 
timetable for phasing in the standard. Given ongoing 
market and economic pressures, the introduction of the 
LCR standard was made more pragmatic and gradual.48 
This gradual approach is designed to ensure the least 
disruption to banking systems and real economies.
Various regional groupings and policy 
forums remain the main venue for policy 
cooperation and coordination, particularly 
when working toward financial stability 
regionally and globally.
The Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks 
(EMEAP)—a cooperative organization of central banks 
and monetary authorities in East Asia and the Pacific—
met in July 2012 to discuss progress on bank supervision, 
financial markets, payment and settlement systems, and 
information technology, among others. The governors 
also examined progress on enhancing surveillance and 
creating a regional crisis management framework. The 
South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Meeting of the 
Board of Governors and High Level Seminar in November 
2012 explored ways to bolster financial stability through 
enhanced regional collaboration and coordination. 
Also in November, ministry of finance and central bank 
deputies from ASEAN+3 met to review progress of 
ASEAN+3 financial cooperation initiatives and conduct 
economic review and policy dialogue.
Inter-regional policy forums promote 
dialogue across regions, contribute to 
global cooperation in addressing economic 
crises, and support inter-regional trade 
and investment.
At the 2012 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Finance Ministerial Meeting held in Moscow, Russia at 
the end of August last year, ministers highlighted the 
need to promote growth and stability amid uncertainty 
and significant downside risks to the global economy. 
The discussions also stressed the importance of financial 
literacy and financial policies in tackling the impact of 
natural disasters. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) of 
Finance Ministers in Thailand last October discussed how 
regional financial arrangements in Asia and Europe could 
48Specifically, the LCR will start as planned on 1 January 2015, but the minimum 
requirement will begin at 60%, rising gradually to full implementation on 1 
January 2019.
help secure financial stability. Ministers also reaffirmed 
Asia and Europe’s partnership for enhancing inter-
regional investment and trade. The IMF and World Bank 
annual meeting—in effect a global policy forum—was 
held in Japan in October 2012 with the eurozone debt 
crisis and US recovery topping its agenda.
Currency swap arrangements have been 
used widely since the 2008/09 global 
financial crisis and have become a major 
form of central bank coordination.
A currency swap is a financial transaction in which 
two counterparties exchange specific amounts of two 
different currencies and repay at a future date based on 
a predetermined rule reflecting both interest payments 
and principal amortization.49 A simpler form of currency 
swaps has been used much more frequently—where 
only principal amounts are exchanged on the initial and 
maturity dates at agreed exchange rates. The primary 
purpose of currency swaps between central banks is to 
provide ample liquidity, manage international reserves, 
and help stabilize financial markets. The 2008/09 
global financial crisis, particularly after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in late-2008, led to unprecedented 
use of bilateral currency swaps between central banks. 
To offer dollar liquidity to financial institutions and 
thus relieve financial stress, the US Federal Reserve 
(the Fed) extended swap lines initially to the central 
banks of Canada, eurozone, Japan, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom, and then to those in other advanced 
economies. For the first time, the Fed granted similar 
arrangements with four emerging economies: Brazil, the 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Singapore ($30 billion 
each). The European Central Bank also established 
swap agreements with some European economies—
helping calm global financial markets, including those in 
emerging economies.
Central banks in Asia have expanded 
multilateral and bilateral currency swap 
agreements to guard against financial crises 
in the region and to ease trade settlement in 
local currencies.
In addition to accumulating large stocks of foreign 
exchange reserves to insure against future crises, 
ASEAN+3 also set up a regional reserve pooling 
49S.Y. Cross et al. 1986. Recent Innovations in International Banking (Cross Report). 
Committee on the Global Financial System Publications. No. 1. Basel: Bank for 
International Settlements.
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Table 16:  Swap Arrangements—India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea
Counterparties Date Amount Swap Term Note
Republic of Korea–Japan Jun-10 $3 billion 3 years Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the Bank of Korea (BoK) bilateral won–yen 
swap arrangement extended until 3 July 2013.  Originally signed in 
May 2005, it was expanded to $20 billion from Dec 2008 to Apr 2010 
and $30 billion from Oct 2011 to Oct 2012.
Republic of Korea–PRC Oct-11 KRW64 trillion 
(CNY360 billion)
3 years The BoK and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) doubled its bilateral 
won–renminbi swap arrangement. Originally signed on  Dec 2008, 
it was on top of the existing arrangement under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative. On Dec 2012, the swap was expanded to finance trade 
settlement facility.
Japan–India Dec-12 $15 billion 3 years The BoJ and the Reserve Bank of India signed a yen–rupee Bilateral 
Swap Arrangement (BSA). Expanded from $3 billion, the BSA was 
originally signed in Jun 2008. 
India–SAARC May-12 $2 billion The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Swap 
Facility will be offered in US dollar, Euro or Indian Rupee against the 
domestic currency or domestic currency denominated government 
securities of the requesting country. The corpus of $2 billion is 
contributed entirely by India. SAARC members are Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Bank of Japan, Reserve Bank of India, and The Bank of Korea.
arrangement—Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
(CMIM), a multilateral currency swap agreement 
governed by a single contract—to provide emergency 
liquidity support and supplement existing financial 
facilities.50 A similar swap arrangement is emerging 
in South Asia with the Reserve Bank of India offering 
a $2 billion facility to members of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Major 
Asian economies, including the PRC, India, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea, also established bilateral swap 
lines among themselves or with other trading partners 
to provide short-term liquidity support. Those facilities 
are mostly in US dollars and mitigate the spillovers from 
financial turmoil (Table 16). However, the currency 
swaps offered by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) are 
mostly in the local currencies of signatories.  
Beyond promoting financial cooperation 
and financial stability, PBOC’s swap 
lines aim to expand trade settlement in 
local currencies—thus promoting trade 
and investment between the PRC and 
its partners.
Since December 2008, the PRC signed local-currency 
swap agreements with 18 central banks within and 
outside of Asia, including some advanced economies 
(Table 17). The swap lines total about CNY1.7 trillion. It is 
unclear whether any have been activated, except briefly 
50For a detailed introduction of CMIM, see ADB. 2012. Asian Economic Integration 
Monitor July 2012. Manila. p. 49.
to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, which activated 
its swap line in 2010 when it faced a renminbi shortage.
PBOC’s swap arrangements are effective for an initial 
period of 3–4 years and can be extended, as opposed 
to the usual validity of 1 year or less. The swaps can 
be activated by either party to provide local currency 
liquidity—critical when global financial stress heightens 
and major settlement currencies such as the US dollar 
are in short supply. By using local currencies, economies 
are better able to stabilize bilateral trade flows even 
when trade finance collapses and exchange rates 
fluctuate wildly. This also reduces the US dollar reliance, 
currency risks, and possibly trade transaction costs. One 
of the key lessons from the 2008/09 global financial crisis 
was how the global credit crunch froze US dollar-based 
trade finance, which led to a sudden halt in trade flows. 
Beyond short-term liquidity support, renminbi swaps 
have a clear long-term objective of supporting bilateral 
trade and investment in local currencies. In December 
2012, the Bank of Korea, Korean Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance, and PBOC introduced a trade-settlement 
facility—financed by the PRC–Republic of Korea currency 
swap arrangement (with an amount of CNY360 billion or 
KRW64 trillion). The facility will be used to support trade 
settlement in renminbi by Korean firms and in won by 
Chinese firms. An active use of both countries’ currencies 
in bilateral trade and investment will open the renminbi-
won foreign exchange markets and make the swap 
facility permanent, thus deepening financial integration 
between the two economies. The PRC–Republic of Korea 
swap-financed trade settlement facility could become 
a model for other countries. While improving renminbi 
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Mar-09 Belarus 20.0 3 
Mar-09 Indonesia 100.0 3 
Mar-09 Argentina 70.0 3 
Jun-10 Iceland 3.5 3 
Jul-10 Singapore 150.0 3 
Apr-11 New Zealand 25.0 3 
Apr-11 Uzbekistan 0.7 3 
Jun-11 Kazakhstan 7.0 3 
Oct-11 Republic of Korea 360.0 3 Swap amount increased from CNY180 billion in Dec-08
Nov-11 Hong Kong, China 400.0 3 Swap amount increased from CNY200 billion in Jan-09
Dec-11 Pakistan 10.0 3 
Dec-11 Thailand 70.0 3 
Jan-12 UAE 35.0 3 
Feb-12 Malaysia 180.0 3 Swap amount increased from CNY80 billion in Feb-09
Feb-12 Turkey 10.0 3 
Mar-12 Mongolia 10.0 4 Swap amount increased from CNY5 billion in May-11
Mar-12 Australia 200.0 3 
Jun-12 Ukraine 15.0 3 
Total 1,666.2
Source: People’s Bank of China.
settlement facilities in Hong Kong, China, the PBOC 
and its counterpart are also setting up similar platforms 
in Taipei,China and Singapore. These bilateral local 
currency trade settlement facilities will pave the way for 
a regional local currency trade settlement infrastructure.
Renminbi bilateral swaps are one key 
element in boosting international use of 
renminbi and ensure its convertibility.
Establishing swap agreements is a significant step in 
internationalizing the renminbi. In 2009, to cope with 
the global financial crisis, the PRC introduced pilot 
schemes to encourage renminbi use in cross-border 
trade settlement—later expanded to cover all current 
account transactions. Renminbi swaps provide easy and 
low-cost access to renminbi liquidity in other countries, 
and thus, increases the use of renminbi internationally. 
As the world’s biggest exporter, the PRC could easily 
boost renminbi use in trade settlement. Building on its 
use in current account transactions, the renminbi could 
gradually be used in capital account transactions as the 
PRC gradually removes controls.
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multilateralizing asian regionalism: approaches 
to unraveling the asian noodle bowl  
Introduction
Asia is a relative latecomer to free trade 
agreements (FTAs); but over the past 
decade, the number of FTAs involving 
at least one country from the region has 
increased dramatically—creating the so-
called “Asian noodle bowl.”51 
By January 2013, ratified FTAs had more than 
tripled—109 from 36 in 2002. There are another 148 FTAs 
at various stages of development, bringing the total to 
257. Today, global FTA activity involves Asia more than 
any other region.52 
Clearly, the delay in concluding the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) of multilateral negotiations drove FTA activity. 
This section does not question choices made by Asian 
policymakers, or revisit arguments on the first- versus 
second-best ways to liberalize trade. Instead, it examines 
the current situation and asks “where do we go from 
here, and how do we do it?” One could argue that 
there are limited short-run options given this current 
environment. However, there is increasing recognition—
even from FTA proponents—that FTA proliferation 
has become convoluted—the so-called “noodle 
bowl” effect.53 
51There is no generally accepted definition of Asia. But one used here is the ADB 
definition (Table 2).
52The parties to Asia’s 101st FTA, the Republic of Korea and the United States 
(US), have a total of 47 FTAs, 23 of which are in force. This FTA came just 2 weeks 
after the 100th FTA was ratified, between Japan and Peru. Even the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), a relatively poor, landlocked nation of only six 
million people, is involved in 13 FTAs, 8 of which are currently in effect, despite 
having struggled for more than a decade to meet the requirements for accession 
to the World Trade Organization. 
53Contributing to the administrative complexity of the sheer number of FTAs are 
the varying rules of origin (ROOs), different commencement dates, completion 
dates, tariff reduction schedules, exclusion lists (temporary and general), and any 
other item that is up for negotiated liberalization.
The proliferation of FTAs has been greatest 
in Asia; the global multilateral impasse has 
helped create an Asian noodle bowl, with 
more than 100 ratified FTAs involving at 
least one Asian economy.
So where do we go from here? The number of FTAs 
will increase, given the pipeline of would-be FTAs at 
differing levels of completion, with new proposals still 
the fastest growing component (see FTAs in Asia: State 
of Play, p. 50). A speedy and successful conclusion of 
global multilateral negotiations would likely remove 
much of the motivation to pursue new FTAs. It may also 
dilute the preferences in many existing FTAs, thereby 
reducing their impact on trade and other flows. But the 
question remains as to whether a successful conclusion 
is even likely, let alone when. There is also renewed 
discussion of sectoral agreements on trade facilitation 
and other issues, which may substitute for such a more 
comprehensive multilateral round. The so-called cherry 
picking approach of sectoral agreements appears 
the most likely way to break the deadlock in moving 
away from the DDA’s demanding all-or-nothing “single 
undertaking” option. 
In any case, the current state of FTAs suggests that 
the DDA alone or some variant may be insufficient 
to neutralize today’s highly complex and distorted 
trading environment, and complementary efforts will 
be required. So, how do we do it? Several proposals 
have been advanced to deal with the noodle bowl. 
These can be broadly grouped into two categories: 
consolidation and multilateralization of preferences. 
Consolidation involves compressing bilateral FTAs 
into a broader region-wide FTA where intraregional 
bilateral FTAs become redundant. Multilateralization of 
preferences, or multilateralization for short, grants non-
discriminatory preferences to nonmembers, eliminating 
any margin of preference (MoP). Of the two approaches, 
multilateralization would be ideal. However, as we have 
seen in the DDA discussions, there are some very difficult 
issues that will take time to resolve. Yet, there are several 
interim steps that can prepare the groundwork for taking 
this approach, such as harmonized reduction of external 
tariffs and dilution of rules of origin (ROOs). 54  
54 These are discussed in further detail in Baldwin (2006, 2008) and Menon (2009).
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Two key proposals have been advanced 
to disentangle the Asian noodle bowl: 
consolidation—which creates a regional 
FTA to harmonize bilateral FTAs; and 
multilateralization—which grants 
nondiscriminatory preferences to 
nonmembers, eliminating preference 
discrepancies.
The remainder of this article is in seven parts. In Part 2, 
the current state of play of FTAs in the region is outlined, 
as well as examining why FTAs have been so popular, 
especially bilateral. In Part 3, issues related to the DDA 
are assessed in terms of both the likelihood and the 
form in which it might be concluded—including the 
possibility of one or more multilateral sectoral deals. 
Parts 4 and 5 examine the pros and cons of the two 
main approaches being proposed in dealing with the 
noodle bowl, consolidation and multilateralization, 
respectively. Part 6 examines the interim steps that can 
be taken to prepare the groundwork for moving closer 
to the remedies proposed. Part 7 looks at the different 
welfare effects, in stylized form, of consolidation, 
multilateralization, and interim steps discussed, 
and catalogues the benefits and challenges of each 





Signed but not yet in eect
(9.0%)
Signed and in eect
(42.4%)
Figure 39: FTAs by Status—Asia, 2013
FTA= free trade agreement. 
Notes: Proposed = the parties consider an FTA; governments or relevant ministries 
issue a joint statement on its desirability or establish a joint study group/joint task 
force to conduct feasibility studies. Under negotiation = the parties, through relevant 
ministries, negotiate the contents of a framework agreement that serves as a framework 
for future negotiations, or declare the official launch of negotiations, or start the first 
round of negotiations. Signed but not yet in effect = the parties sign the agreement 
after negotiations have been completed, but the agreement has yet to become effective. 
Signed and in effect = FTA provisions become effective, after legislative or executive 
ratification. Data as of January 2013.
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center  FTA database, ADB.
FTAs in Asia: The State of Play
Over the past decade, the number of FTAs involving at 
least one Asian country has more than tripled—from 
70 in 2002 to 257 as of January 2013 (Table 18). This 
surge in FTAs has been driven by a significant increase 
in the number of proposed or under negotiation FTAs. 
In 2002, a quarter of the FTAs in the region were in 
proposed or negotiation stages. By early 2013, that share 
had increased to almost half the total. Of the 257 FTAs 
announced as of January 2013, 132 have been signed, 
with 109 already in effect; 75 are being negotiated, and 
50 have been proposed (Figure 39).  
Close to three-quarters or 189 of the total were bilateral 
FTAs (involving two countries) as of January 2013; only 
68 were plurilateral FTAs (involving more than two 
countries) (Figure 40). 
 
Within Asia, FTAs involving the ASEAN+6 countries—the 
10 ASEAN members plus Australia, the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and 
New Zealand—have increased at an even faster rate than 
Asia’s FTAs as a whole, growing more than six-fold from 
27 in 2002 to 179 in January 2013. To date, ASEAN+6 
countries account for 70% of the total FTAs in Asia (see 
Table 18, Figure 41).  
Of the 179 FTAs involving ASEAN+6 countries, the vast 
majority (130) are bilateral FTAs. Only a third (42) of 
these bilateral FTAs involves two ASEAN+6 countries; 
the rest are with countries outside of the group; 67 of 
these involve an ASEAN+6 country and a trading partner 
outside Asia (Table 19). The growing importance of non-
Figure 40: FTAs by Scope—Asia (cumulative, selected years)
FTA= free trade agreement. 
Notes: Bilateral refers to a preferential trading arrangement involving only two parties. 
Plurilateral refers to a preferential trading arrangement involving more than two parties.  
Data as of January 2013.
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Signed but not 
yet in effect
Signed and in 
effect Total
Framework  




Asia ASEAN+6 Asia ASEAN+6 Asia ASEAN+6 Asia ASEAN+6 Asia ASEAN+6 Asia ASEAN+6
1975 0 0 0 0   0   0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1976 0 0 0 0   0   0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1980 0 0 0 0   0   0 1 1 1 1 2 2
1981 0 0 0 0   0   0 0 0 2 2 2 2
1982 0 0 0 0   0   0 1 0 2 2 3 2
1983 0 0 0 0   0   0 1 0 3 3 4 3
1989 1 1 0 0   0   0 1 0 3 3 5 4
1991 1 1 0 0   0   0 2 1 5 5 8 7
1992 1 1 0 0   0   0 6 2 5 5 12 8
1993 1 1 0 0   0   0 2 1 14 6 17 8
1994 1 1 0 0   0   0 5 1 16 6 22 8
1995 1 1 0 0   0   0 12 1 19 6 32 8
1996 1 1 0 0   0   0 15 1 24 6 40 8
1997 2 2 0 0   0   0 17 1 25 6 44 9
1998 2 2 0 0   0   0 16 2 28 6 46 10
1999 4 3 0 0   1   1 16 2 29 6 50 12
2000 3 3 0 0   6   5 16 3 30 6 55 17
2001 2 2 0 0   8   8 15 1 33 8 58 19
2002 8 6 2 2   8   8 16 1 36 10 70 27
2003 18 14 4 3   9   8 22 4 41 14 94 43
2004 31 26 14 9 15 13 24 7 48 18 132 73
2005 43 35 18 13 28 24 24 7 56 25 169 104
2006 48 41 18 13 37 31 20 6 69 33 192 124
2007 46 39 18 13 42 38 23 7 75 38 204 135
2008 46 39 16 11 42 38 22 9 85 44 211 141
2009 53 43 16 11 45 41 22 9 91 50 227 154
2010 57 47 17 12 47 41 23 10 97 56 241 166
2011 60 49 17 12 47 42 23 8 104 63 251 174
2012 50 41 14 9 61 54 24 9 108 66 257 179
2013 50 41 14 9 61 54 23 8 109 67 257 179
ASEAN+6 = ASEAN plus Australia, the People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand; FTA = free trade agreement. 
Note: Proposed = the parties consider an FTA; governments or relevant ministries issue a joint statement on its desirability or establish a joint study group/joint task force to conduct feasibility 
studies. Framework agreement signed = the parties, through relevant ministries, negotiate the contents of a framework agreement that serves as a framework for future negotiations. 
Negotiations launched = the parties, through relevant ministries,  declare the official launch of negotiations, or start the first round of negotiations. Signed but not yet in effect = the parties 
sign the agreement after negotiations have been completed, but the agreement has yet to become effective. Signed and in effect = FTA provisions become effective, after legislative or executive 
ratification. Data as of January 2013.
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center FTA database, ADB.
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Asian trading partners is mirrored in the membership of 
plurilateral FTAs (Table 20). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the rapid increase in FTAs in 
Asia has been led by Singapore, India, and the large 
economies of East Asia—the PRC, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea (Figure 42). As of January 2013, 
Singapore had the most with 37, of which 18 are 
currently in effect. India came in second with a total of 
34 FTAs, 13 in effect. The Republic of Korea had a total 
of 32 FTAs, while the PRC and Japan had 27 and 26 FTAs, 
respectively. Pakistan also has 27 FTAs, 6 in effect. Within 
ASEAN, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are not far 
behind with 26, 26, and 21 FTAs, respectively. 
Why are FTAs so popular, especially 
bilateral?55 An important reason is 
disenchantment with the  WTO.
The difficulties associated with concluding the DDA 
have simply reinforced this view. Many have pursued 
FTAs as a means of pressing ahead with their trade and 
liberalization agendas regardless.
FTAs are generally welfare enhancing, with respect 
to their members at least. The extent of the welfare 
improvement depends on the amount of trade created 
versus trade diverted, which in turn depends on a host 
of factors—including the extent, breadth and speed of 













































Figure 41: FTAs—Asia and ASEAN+6 (cumulative, selected years)
ASEAN+6 = ASEAN plus Australia, the People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand; FTA= free trade 
agreement. 
Note: Data as of January 2013.
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center  FTA database , ADB.
Table 19: Bilateral FTAs—ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, 2013
Region Number
Within sub-region
     ASEAN+3   19
     ASEAN+6   42
Across sub-region (within Asia)
     ASEAN+3 + Non-ASEAN+3   34
     ASEAN+6 + Non-ASEAN+6   21
With Non-Asian Countries
     ASEAN+3 + Non-Asia  51
     ASEAN+6 + Non-Asia   67
TOTAL: ASEAN+3 104
TOTAL: ASEAN+6 130
ASEAN+3 = ASEAN plus the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic 
of Korea; ASEAN+6 = ASEAN plus Australia, the People’s Republic of China, India, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand; FTA = free trade agreement. 
Notes: Within subregion means both countries are ASEAN+3 (ASEAN+6) 
members. Across subregion means one is an ASEAN+3 (ASEAN+6) member 
with its partner an Asian country but not an ASEAN+3 (ASEAN+6) member. Data 
as of January 2013.
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center  FTA database, ADB.
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the preferential liberalization. There are also longer-term 
dynamic effects that could accrue members through 
competitive and related effects, which are possible but 
difficult to quantify. FTAs have the potential for deeper 
agreements to be reached more rapidly on a range of 
areas, especially non-tariff issues, when there are only 
two or a few negotiating partners involved. Preferential 
accords involving some non-tariff measures—such as 
in services for instance—can be more easily achieved 
regionally or bilaterally, compared with the large 
numbers at the multilateral level. Reforms in these 
difficult sectors and the more difficult non-tariff barriers 
have stalled at the multilateral level, and some FTAs 
have been successful in moving these agendas forward. 
The deep integration provisions in the (Republic of ) 
Korea–EU (European Union) FTA and the Singapore–
US FTA are cases in point. The (Republic of ) Korea–US 
FTA, which includes provisions to promote and protect 
investment, also contains an Investor-to-State Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism. Although the majority of FTAs 
involving at least one Asian economy have remained 
relatively shallow, the potential for deepening over time 
exists, and increases as the delay at the multilateral level 
continues. These welfare effects are a clear economic 
motivation to pursue FTAs, and arguably their key 
economic benefit.
There are also non-economic benefits to FTAs. There is 
no doubt that political economy considerations also 
come into play, as FTAs can promote international ties 
Table 20: Plurilateral FTAs—Asia and ASEAN+6, 2013
Plurilateral FTAs Number
Asian Plurilateral 12
      ASEAN+6 Plurilateral 5
Asian Plurilateral + Asian Country 7
      ASEAN+6 Plurilateral + ASEAN+6 Country 5
Non-Asian Plurilateral + Asian Country 33
      Non-ASEAN+6 Plurilateral + ASEAN+6 Country 28
Asian Plurilateral + Non-Asian Plurilateral 2
      ASEAN+6 Plurilateral + Non-ASEAN+6 Plurilateral 1
Asian Plurilateral + Non-Asian Country 0
      ASEAN+6 Plurilateral + Non-ASEAN+6 Country 1
Cross-regional Plurilateral (Asia) 11
      Cross-regional Plurilateral (ASEAN+6) 10
Cross-regional Plurilateral + Asian Country 2
      Cross-regional Plurilateral + ASEAN+6 Country 2
Cross-regional Plurilateral + Non-Asian Plurilateral 1
      Cross-regional Plurilateral + Non-ASEAN+6 Plurilateral 1
TOTAL ASIA 68
      TOTAL ASEAN+6 53
ASEAN+6 = ASEAN plus Australia, the People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, and New Zealand; FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes: Asian (ASEAN+6) plurilateral refers to groupings of more than two economies with 
all members Asian (ASEAN+6) economies. Non-Asian (Non-ASEAN+6) plurilateral refers 
to a plurilateral FTA with no Asian (ASEAN+6) member. Cross-regional plurilateral refers to 
groupings of more than two economies with members a combination of Asian (ASEAN+6) and 
non-Asian (non-ASEAN+6) economies. Data as of January 2013.











Proposed Under negotiation Signed but not yet in eect Signed and in eect
Figure 42: FTAs by Country—Asia, 2013
FSM = Federated States of Micronesia ; FTA = free trade agreement.
Notes: Proposed = the parties consider an FTA; governments or relevant ministries issue a joint statement on its desirability or establish a joint 
study group/joint task force to conduct feasibility studies. Under negotiation = the parties, through relevant ministries, negotiate the contents of 
a framework agreement that serves as a framework for future negotiations, or declare the official launch of negotiations, or start the first round of 
negotiations. Signed but not yet in effect = the parties sign the agreement after negotiations have been completed, but the agreement has yet to 
become effective. Signed and in effect = FTA provisions become effective, after legislative or executive ratification. Data as of January 2013.
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center  FTA database, ADB.
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beyond pure economics between a pair or group of 
countries. Indeed, it is often claimed that most—if not 
all—FTAs have political or strategic motivation. The 
fact that the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2012 is a recent and clear recognition of how a regional 
cooperation agreement can be more than just an 
economic imperative. Similarly, ASEAN’s success has 
been on non-economic as well as economic fronts. All 
these suggest that the value of an FTA goes well beyond 
its direct economic impact.
FTAs may also be more politically feasible, as they tend 
to attract less attention, including from the media. So the 
pressure from the political opposition at home (such as 
the anti-free trade lobby or particular “sensitive” industry 
groups) or from abroad (like traditional trade partners 
or other regional group members) will likely be low. This 
would quicken the speed of negotiation, and thus the 
number of FTAs concluded.
A snowballing or domino effect has also been driving 
FTA growth. There is clearly momentum driving some 
of the growth in FTAs with countries not wanting to 
be left behind. There are costs of doing nothing in an 
environment where FTAs are proliferating, when access 
to traditional markets may be affected. More than 5 years 
ago, one study (Baldwin 2008, p. 474) predicted such an 
effect could continue to play a role in the proliferation of 
FTAs in the region: 
If history is any guide, the domino effect in 
East Asia will spread to many, many more 
countries in the neighborhood. In Europe, 
for example, the playing out of several 
waves of domino effects has left the EU 
with preferential trade deals with every 
WTO member except nine. It is therefore 
conceivable that the 13 members of the 
ASEAN+3 group will end up signing a 
very large number of bilaterals in the 
coming years.
These predictions appear to have been confirmed.
The final reason, which favors bilateral over plurilateral 
FTAs, relates to pure possibilities (or the maximum 
number) that are technically feasible. In theory, it is 
possible to have thousands of bilateral FTAs—many 
more than plurilateral or one multilateral deal—because 
only two entities are involved. There are no geographical 
(regional) restrictions on membership. Indeed, any two 
countries, in any part of the world, for any reason, can 
come together to form a bilateral FTA. If  n represents 
the number of countries in the world (a number 
approaching 200), it is technically possible to have up to 
(n x n–1)/2 bilateral FTAs, or more than 18,000 of them. 
Of course, this does not explain why bilateral FTAs are so 
popular. But they do suggest that, if they are, then they 
can proliferate dramatically and almost uncontrollably.
Despite their immense popularity, and 
the significant benefits they confer to 
members—both economic and non-
economic—FTA negotiations and 
implementation come at a cost. 
The costs of FTAs are increasingly shown through data 
on utilization rates of preferences that show many FTAs 
have yet to significantly impact actual trade and other 
flows. Although there is variation across studies on the 
utilization rates of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia, it is not 
uncommon to find utilization rates as low as 10%–20%; 
rarely are they above 30%. However, the most recent 
enterprise surveys conducted by Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) 
in seven countries suggest that utilization rates could be 
improving, as firms become more aware of and familiar 
with FTAs—32% of firms in the sample reported that 
they used FTA preferences for exporting their goods 
(Kawai and Wignaraja 2012). Despite these recent 
increases, utilization rates of one-third or less are low by 
any standard—including comparisons with Europe or 
North America.56 
How do we explain these low utilization rates? 
The ADB and ADBI surveys show that, while lack of 
information on FTAs was cited as the most significant 
reason, low margins of preference (MoPs) and delays 
or administrative costs associated with rules of origin 
(ROOs) are also significant barriers to the wider use 
of preferences (Kawai and Wignaraja 2011a, 2011b). 
Because the cost of complying with ROOs and other 
requirements are perceived to be higher than the 
benefits accrued, importers choose to ignore the 
preferential tariffs and use most favored nation (MFN) 
rates. One study (Pomfret 2007) claims that much 
world trade continues using MFN rates, despite the 
proliferation of FTAs. Needless to say, this dilutes the 
potential benefits of FTAs. Previous assessments of FTAs 
have assumed complete utilization of preferences, and 
when more realistic utilization rates are employed, the 
positive impacts on economic welfare are almost equally 
diminished (Menon 2013a).
56To put this in a comparative perspective, utilization rates of below 50% are 
considered low in European preferential trading agreements (see, for instance, 
Augier, Gasiorek, and Lai-Tong [2005]).
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Apart from the underutilization of costly FTAs, another 
potential economic cost is greater trade diversion. This 
is well-known. But perhaps the biggest cost of FTA 
proliferation is its impact on the global trading system. 
While FTAs can produce significant benefits for members, 
there are harmful spillover effects that cannot be 
ignored. While major trading partners that are excluded 
may be individually hurt, raising the risk of retaliation, 
the overall trade landscape affecting all countries 
can be hampered as well and more so if the fallacy of 
composition applies. One study (Bhagwati 2008) argues 
that the system of preferences embedded in bilateral 
or even plurilateral FTAs is destroying the principle 
of nondiscrimination in trade, with FTAs serving as 
stumbling rather than building blocks. While this remains 
an open question, a key issue facing policymakers in the 
short- to medium-term is “what else can be done?”   
The Doha Development Agenda: 
Compromise or Coma?
The difficulty of agreeing on the Doha 
Development Agenda’s (DDA) ambitious 
program is clear; attention has shifted 
recently toward a compromise involving 
sectoral deals, including one that addresses 
trade facilitation. 
The heads of all the multilateral development banks 
recently signed a petition promoting such a deal.57 
Enthused by this prospect, The Economist (2012a) has 
dubbed it the Global Recovery Round.
Concluding sectoral agreements may be one way 
to break the deadlock and relieve the DDA’s long-
standing coma. But one concern is that it may actually 
reduce the incentive to conclude a comprehensive 
multilateral deal. This may well be warranted, as sectoral 
agreements dilute the strength of available trade-offs, 
and therefore reduce the ability to strike a bargain 
among countries with disparate interests. Although 
the multilateral framework remains the best forum to 
deal with liberalizing sensitive sectors or difficult issues, 
this advantage rests on one key factor: the ability to 
trade concessions across a wide range of countries 
with divergent interests. That is the ability to offset the 
costs to countries of conceding protection in sensitive 
sectors—such as agriculture, for example—against the 
57See Modern Ghana (2012). 
benefits from increased market access in areas where 
they hold comparative advantage: for example, changing 
rules on investment, intellectual property, or services.58 A 
sectoral agreement may constrain negotiating positions 
and options within the WTO. In the same vein, each time 
an FTA allows a country to bypass this trade-off—simply 
through its choice of partner—and secure benefits 
without incurring costs, the task of liberalizing sensitive 
sectors is more difficult. The recent announcement 
to pursue a US–EU FTA highlights how a common 
interest—limiting the liberalization of the agricultural 
sector—can assist in facilitating an agreement second 
in size only to that of the DDA, while simultaneously 
diminishing prospects of addressing the most distorted 
sector in world trade. The problem, however, is that 
reaching a bilateral agreement is easier and more 
practical—with unquantifiable gains from a political 
economy perspective—in comparison with concluding a 
sectoral agreement involving several countries, let alone 
a multi-country, multi-sector agreement.
Yet, with the likelihood of striking a single deal like the 
DDA already low, the benefits derived from successfully 
concluding a sectoral deal on trade facilitation should 
not be underestimated. Indeed, the benefits would 
be quite significant, and the prospect of concluding 
one by the time of the WTO Bali Ministerial Meeting 
in December 2013 is a further plus. On average, trade-
weighted tariffs account for about 5% of trade costs, 
while logistical and other trade facilitation costs are 
about 10%. The WTO-based trade negotiations aim 
to bring these logistics costs down by half, or to an 
average of 5%—equivalent of removing all tariffs. These 
potential gains are substantial enough to warrant serious 
consideration, and perhaps counter concerns over 
the reduced incentives to conclude the more elusive, 
comprehensive deal.
Depending on timing and the form a multilateral 
deal eventually takes, both the need and urgency 
for other remedies could be reduced, although not 
removed. The longer it takes to conclude a multilateral 
deal and the weaker any eventual deal is, the greater 
will be the need and urgency for other remedies. If 
all that can be salvaged from the DDA is a sectoral 
deal, or a few sectoral agreements, then restoring 
order to the multilateral trading system will require a 
different approach. 
58A potent example was in the lead-up to the WTO meeting in Hong Kong, China 
in December 2005. Brazil and India, representing the apparent position of a 
majority of developing countries, proposed opening their markets further to 
industrial goods and services in exchange for the EU and the US dismantling the 
elaborate system of agricultural support. In the end, this did not happen, but for a 
host of mostly unrelated reasons (see Menon 2007b).
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Consolidation 
Given the problems posed by FTA 
proliferation, consolidation involves 
compressing intraregional agreements 
into a broader regional FTA, making those 
between members of the broader region 
unnecessary or redundant. 
The consolidation approach has gained ground as a 
way to disentangle the noodle bowl (see Brummer 
2007, Kawai 2007, and Park and Park 2009). Indeed, 
there are examples of defunct bilateral FTAs after the 
EU was created that lend credence to this approach. For 
example, the creation of the Central European Free Trade 
Area (CEFTA) in 2006 successfully subsumed and nullified 
32 bilateral FTAs involving CEFTA members. Also, the 
US–Canada FTA was superseded by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). If successful, 
consolidation could be considered multilateralizing 
bilateral accords at the regional level, or “regional 
multilateralization.” In Asia, the ASEAN-led Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) could pave 
the way for consolidating ASEAN FTAs under a single 
regional agreement.59 The RCEP will initially include all 
ASEAN+6 members. 
What are the likely welfare impacts of the RCEP? It 
remains too early to say, given that implementation and 
other pertinent details remain unclear—for instance, 
will the RCEP address existing FTAs between members 
or serve purely as a template for future negotiations? 
Nevertheless, the analytical framework for assessing 
FTAs and their expansion offers some useful pointers. An 
expanded region-wide FTA would be welfare-improving 
if it results in substantial terms of trade gains, where 
size matters. If the FTA is large enough, it could lead to 
improving the FTA’s collective terms of trade by reducing 
imports from and export supply to the rest of the world. 
This implies a substantial amount of trade diversion. In 
this scenario, the welfare gains from improving terms 
of trade is large enough to offset the welfare losses 
associated with increased trade diversion (Menon 2000).  
59The ASEAN Framework on the RCEP was formally endorsed at the 19th ASEAN 
Summit held in November 2011, and negotiations kicked off on 20 November 
2012, on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
The ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership could pave the way 
for consolidating ASEAN FTAs under a single 
regional agreement, although it is still too 
early to tell.
While this holds for the expanded FTA as a whole, the 
distribution of gains (or even losses for some) among 
group members may vary significantly. Given that ASEAN 
centrality is often emphasized—and with the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) the only plurilateral FTA involving 
a subset of RCEP members—the distribution issue could 
be assessed by examining how an expansion could affect 
AFTA. In other words, could an AFTA expansion to the 
RCEP result in a welfare outcome superior compared 
with the original AFTA? If the AFTA expansion results in 
a substantial amount of trade creation, then this could 
lead to some deterioration in the terms of trade, because 
part of the resultant increase in real incomes is likely 
to spill over into greater demand for imports from the 
rest of the world. Under this scenario, the welfare loss 
associated with deteriorating terms of trade would have 
to be smaller than the welfare gains from increased trade 
creation. In the end, the question on welfare impacts will 
be determined empirically.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the other major 
preferential initiative that involves several RCEP 
members. However, the TPP does not strictly fit as 
consolidation. Whereas RCEP will initially involve 
countries already with existing bilateral FTAs, the 
network of bilateral FTAs between potential members 
of the TPP is far from complete. Instead, the TPP follows 
an expansion approach—it has an accession clause, and 
countries not involved in the networks of bilateral FTAs 
among potential members can also join the initiative 
(Hamanaka 2012, Drysdale 2013). The TPP agenda is 
wide-ranging and demanding, much more so than most 
other high-quality FTAs, let alone DDA requirements. It 
is unclear if many TPP members will be able to comply 
with these stringent requirements. Another challenge 
involves its current limited membership, which excludes 
the “plus 3” countries—the PRC, Japan, and the Republic 
of Korea. Although Japan and the Republic of Korea 
are contemplating joining TPP negotiations, as are 
other Asian economies, a significant increase in Asian 
membership is needed before it can be a serious 
alternative to the RCEP. Should many Asian economies 
join, and the program comes to fruition without 
too many exemptions, the welfare effects could be 
significant. But as with the RCEP, the likely impact can 
only be empirically determined—and thus, too early 
to tell.
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Despite this, consolidating existing FTAs through the 
RCEP or TPP expansion will likely continue in light of the 
challenges faced in concluding multilateral negotiations. 
However, consolidation comes with its own set of 
challenges. FTAs are a highly heterogeneous group of 
agreements. They invariably have different tariff rates, 
treatment of quantitative restrictions, sector exemptions 
(and often different “phase-in” rates for each), ROOs 
that vary by product, and a host of other arrangements 
ranging from some service sector liberalization rules to 
labor and standards provisions. If consolidation moves 
ahead, the more likely outcome is a “race to the bottom” 
to reach consensus, with the result determined by 
the lowest common denominator, which would likely 
achieve very little, and could even set back reforms in 
some cases. The recent trend attempting to link regional 
blocs globally could increase these difficulties, as these 
tie-ups increase both the number of members and 
total diversity, as well as the degree of heterogeneity of 
accords that need to be harmonized.
Even if it were possible to implement a consolidated 
or expanded regional FTA, it would be critical to 
examine the incentives for policymakers to lobby 
their governments to join. If the provisions in bilateral 
FTAs are superior to those of a regional FTA, then the 
regional utilization will likely be low. One example is 
the case of trade involving Sri Lanka and India. The 
South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) came into effect 
in 2006, after a number of intraregional bilateral FTAs 
had been ratified, including an India–Sri Lanka FTA. 
Like most bilateral FTAs, the India–Sri Lanka agreement 
had better provisions compared to SAFTA’s in almost 
all respects. As a result, 93% of Sri Lanka’s exports to 
India currently enter duty free under the bilateral FTA 
(Weerakoon 2008). Thus, rather than consolidating and 
neutralizing the India-Sri Lanka or other bilateral FTAs, it 
appears the use of SAFTA has been quite limited given 
the existing bilateral FTAs. The results of one study 
(Rodríguez-Delgado 2007) seem to bear this out. Using 
a modified gravity equation, the effects of SAFTA’s Trade 
Liberalization Programme (TLP), which started in 2006, 
were examined. The results showed that SAFTA would 
have a minor effect on regional trade flows. SAFTA’s TLP 
would affect regional trade flows mainly by increasing 
India’s exports and imports from Bangladesh and Nepal. 
Of course, it could be argued that this may be a timing 
issue, since full implementation of SAFTA is scheduled 
for 2016. 
Proponents generally argue that deeper agreements can 
be achieved more rapidly on a range of areas when there 
are only two, or a few, negotiating partners involved. 
But many of the same proponents also promote FTA 
consolidation, without saying how these wider accords 
can be agreed upon among a much larger group of 
countries. In fact, bilateral FTA consolidation—to create a 
regional agreement—may be more difficult than starting 
from scratch, particularly where potential members do 
not have any, or only a few FTAs between themselves. 
While the RCEP holds promise, it is interesting to note 
that most Asian bilateral FTAs are with countries outside 
the region (see Table 19). Hence, the RCEP will likely 
address roughly a third of all bilateral FTAs, leaving a 
significant majority of FTAs unaffected (Menon 2013b). 
There is also a systemic concern associated with 
consolidating bilateral FTAs.  Regional blocs may be seen 
as fragmenting the world trade system. While RCEP may 
rightly be Asia’s response to the EU and NAFTA—more 
so now with the proposed EU–US FTA—a consolidated 
Asia-centered FTA may be viewed as another major bloc. 
It is therefore critical to coordinate South–South as well 
as North–South to ensure that regional blocs do not 
become trade fortresses. This was heightened recently 
with the announcement of EU–US FTA negotiations.
If a consolidated FTA is perceived as 
isolating or discriminatory in any way, 
it could provide fresh impetus for a new 
wave of bilateral FTAs, as traditional trade 
partners outside the region seek to retain 
trade access with the newly-formed FTA. 
Perception and reality can vary, but in this context, 
perceptions may matter more in the end. It is quite likely 
that a new, large, consolidated bloc could be seen as 
threatening traditional nonmember trading partners, 
however open the consolidated FTA is designed to be. 
If this perception holds—with more countries outside 
the region than inside—it is possible that total bilateral 
FTAs could actually increase. This could happen if the 
reduction in the number of intraregional bilateral FTAs 
through a consolidated FTA is more than offset by the 
number of inter-regional market-restoring bilateral FTAs 
that it indirectly induces. This is hardly a remedy to the 
problems facing Asian economies or the world trading 
system. On the contrary, it could spin more noodles.  
However, like the proliferation of FTAs, consolidation 
then is a recent reality that must be addressed. So 
consolidation should not be seen as an end to itself, 
but rather as a means of preparing the groundwork 
for greater liberalization in some non-tariff areas, if it is 
viewed as part of the journey rather than the destination. 
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Multilateralization of Preferences
In remedying the noodle bowl and its 
distortions, multilateralization can be 
pursued in two ways—moving forward after 
consolidation or proceeding unilaterally. 
The first follows from the consolidation approach, 
whereby the harmonized accords of the consolidated 
FTA are offered to nonmembers on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. This would realize the full gains from consolidation, 
removing the potential for trade diversion and the costs 
associated with implementing ROOs, while reducing 
the risk of a new wave of market-restoring FTAs. So once 
a country has concluded FTAs with most, if not all, of 
its major trading partners, it may then make sense to 
(i) equalize preferences across these FTAs, and (ii) offer 
them to non-FTA countries on an MFN basis. Instead 
of limiting the harmonized procedures to members, 
as pursued in regional blocs, this approach goes one 
critical step further in multilateralizing them. There 
are several proponents of this approach (for example, 
Baldwin 2006, 2008; Feridhanusetyawan 2005; and 
Menon 2007a, 2009).
In the discussion on the practicality of consolidating 
FTAs, the difficulties associated with folding multiple, 
disparate FTAs into one big harmonized FTA were 
highlighted. But consolidation is not a prerequisite 
for multilateralization. Even without consolidation, 
or even if an attempt to consolidate fails to work, 
multilateralization can still be pursued unilaterally. 
Indeed, the need in this situation becomes more 
pressing from a welfare perspective. 
Multilateralization can proceed from a consolidated 
regional FTA, or economies can seek multilateralization 
independently; but they both must overcome 
competing interests that lose from the dilution of 
preferences.
Although all this may be appealing in theory, how 
realistic is it in practice? There are precedents to the 
voluntary multilateralization of preferential accords. 
ASEAN’s FTA is a case in point—and the actions of its 
original members confirm this (see Feridhanusetyawan 
2005, Menon 2007a). When multilateralization is pursued 
in conjunction with aggressive preferential liberalization 
such as with AFTA, the goal of free, nondiscriminatory 
trade can be reached sooner. To illustrate, trade 
liberalization outcomes under AFTA—with and without 
multilateralization—can be portrayed in stylized 
form (Figure 43). The outcome under a WTO-based 
multilateral deal is also depicted, as a reference point, to 
identify the goal of free and open trade (defined here as 
0%–5% average tariff rates). 
How can AFTA be used to move its members toward 
this ultimate goal? If AFTA is implemented on a purely 
minimalist basis (refer to AFTA only curve in Figure 43), or 
without any multilateralization of tariff preferences, then 
the time taken to reach its goal is unchanged. Average 
tariff rates do fall more rapidly however, particularly up 
to AFTA’s 2003 deadline for 0%–5% internal tariff rates, 
but this gain could be offset by the trade diversion that 
it would also induce.60 If AFTA expands its membership 
(Expanded AFTA in Figure 43)—or participates in 
a consolidation exercise such as proposed by the 
RCEP—then the pace of reduction increases but the 
end-point remains unchanged. If, however, members 
choose to multilateralize their preferences soon after 
AFTA becomes effective (AFTA with multilateralization 
in Figure 43), then the deadline for free and open trade 
moves closer to AFTA’s deadline of 2003. In reality, 
the preferences for a majority of tariff lines were fully 
multilateralized before the AFTA deadline. For instance, 
preferences were fully multilateralized—or the MoP was 
zero—for more than half of the tariff lines for the original 
ASEAN members by 2002, while more than two-thirds 
had MoPs of less than 10% (Feridhanusetyawan 2005). 
This share continues to increase yearly (Calvo-Pardo, 
Freund, and Ornelas 2011), although admittedly the 
MoPs for a range of sensitive products remain high. If 
these remaining tariff lines are dealt with relatively soon, 
then the deadline will fall somewhere between 2003 
and possibly before a multilateral deal is concluded. In 
any case, AFTA has already served as a building block 
enabling its original members to achieve their goal much 
faster, because of the multilateralization of the majority 
of preferences.
At the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Leaders’ Summit in Subic Bay in 1996, President 
Fidel Ramos of the Philippines raised the option of 
multilateralizing the AFTA accords within APEC. At that 
time, Indonesia had already begun providing its AFTA 
accords to other APEC members. Although this proposal 
was never formally adopted by AFTA members, the 
original members have been pursuing multilateralization 
of their accords as well, not just within APEC, but on an 
MFN basis on a wide range of products. As most trade 
liberalization worldwide has stemmed from unilateral 
actions, there is a strong basis for optimism in promoting 
this approach. For instance, the World Bank (2005) 
60This deadline applies to the original ASEAN members, while the newer member 
countries have been given more time. 












Figure 43: The Speed of Tariff Liberalization Outcomes with and without Multilateralization—AFTA and WTO
AFTA = ASEAN Free Trade Agreement; WTO = World Trade Organization.
Source: Adapted from Menon (2007a).
estimates that—between 1983 and 2003—unilateral 
actions comprised the bulk of liberalization, or 65% 
of developing country tariff reductions (see also ADB 
2012). In particular, with respect to the original ASEAN 
members, a highly liberalizing competitive unilateralism 
took place in the 1980s and 1990s to attract FDI from 
Japan into regional production networks (Vézina 2010).
As mentioned, preferential accords in non-tariff 
areas—such as in services—can be more easily reached 
regionally or bilaterally when a smaller number of 
participants are involved. If these breakthroughs can 
be achieved, and if they can be harmonized within a 
consolidated FTA, then implementing multilateralization 
would be easier, and the potential gains much 
greater. The accords in these areas are quite easily 
multilateralized once they have been negotiated (see 
Hoekman and Winters 2007, Lloyd 2002). This is because 
the instrument of protection in many services, for 
example, is regulation of one form or the other—such 
as rules related to foreign investment, competition 
policy, or government procurement. The same applies 
to the myriad measures relating to trade facilitation 
(see Hamanaka, Tafgar, and Lazaro [2010] for examples 
of how trade facilitation measures in FTAs can be 
multilateralized), as well as sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical product standards, certification 
procedures and processes, and mutual recognition 
arrangements relating to professional qualifications. 
These regulations are quite naturally applied in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion, treating domestic and 
foreign firms equally. This is quite different from tariffs 
affecting trade in goods, where domestic/foreign and 
intra-foreign discrimination is the objective. 
Unlike tariff liberalization, it is often difficult or costly to 
remove non-tariff barriers or measures (NTBs or NTMs) 
preferentially. It is usually impractical for these types 
of concessions to be exchanged in a discriminatory 
fashion—once a NTB or NTM is removed, the cost 
of excluding nonmembers is likely to be high, if not 
prohibitive, as with most public goods. This difficulty 
and associated cost varies by type of measure. While 
export subsidies or export licensing, for example, could 
be offered or applied preferentially, production subsidies 
cannot be reduced in the same way. With reducing 
production subsidies arguably the biggest barrier to 
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reforming agricultural trade, this is a major problem 
(Bhagwati 2013).61
In terms of supporting global trade liberalization, 
the multilateralization process fares well. Because 
preferential tariff reduction schedules are generally quite 
ambitious and rapidly paced, this approach can also 
accelerate multilateral trade liberalization. 
What then stands in the way of pursuing this approach? 
Clearly the desire to secure more reciprocal concessions 
or market access is a key factor. While the benefits from 
reciprocal liberalization outweigh unilateral actions, the 
more relevant question currently is how much longer 
should countries wait for reciprocity from countries 
outside any existing FTA, while foregoing the gains from 
multilateralization. Furthermore, the low utilization rates 
of FTAs in Asia also suggest that the benefits expected 
from reciprocity may be seriously overestimated. The 
potential for trade deflection further erodes expected 
benefits. Given the difficulties of linking mega-blocs 
together, as noted in a recent editorial (The Economist 
2012c), the risk is very real. Taken together, there is little 
basis for holding off on multilateralization to try and gain 
reciprocity in a residual set of countries not covered by 
existing FTAs. There is, however, a greater need to make 
the case for multilateralization more strongly, especially 
when resistance from vested interests and other lobbies 
can stand in the way (Menon 2013b).
61 Even if it were possible to exclude third parties, this could seriously derail the 
reform program. A recent study by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2011) notes that preferential treatment 
negotiated with selected trading partners typically involves additional 
documentation. The study presents evidence of significant delays associated with 
such requirements, as FTAs have adopted different approaches to the rules on 
substantive measures relating to trade facilitation. Moreover, differences in scope, 
depth, and level of detail often translate into varying degrees of administrative 
inefficiency, through a maze of different procedures applied to respective trading 
partners under different FTAs.
Interim Steps to 
Multilateralization: Harmonized 
Reduction of MFN Tariffs and 
Dilution of Rules of Origin 
There are two interim steps that can be used 
on the way toward multilateralization—
harmonizing reduction of MFN tariffs and 
diluting rules of origin (ROOs).
 As attempts to multilateralize face resistance, what 
are the interim steps that can be taken to prepare 
the groundwork for multilateralization? While “pure” 
unilateral actions are commonplace and account for the 
vast majority of trade liberalization observed worldwide, 
the multilateralization of FTA-based preferences is so far 
much less commonplace. One way forward is to reduce 
the MoP and the distortions it creates by bringing down 
MFN tariffs themselves. When brought down gradually, 
the MoP is not zero in the interim or at the end, but 
much smaller. This approach may be more realistic 
when members feel committed to the preferential 
arrangement and therefore prefer a measured approach 
that retains some integrity of the arrangement, 
especially in the interim. When employing this method, 
an aggressive stance would involve a coordinated 
approach—such as harmonizing MFN tariffs, as with 
a Customs Union—to the lowest rate applied in the 
region. This does not require an established Customs 
Union, however in the case of Latin American FTAs 
(Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas 2007). This 
aggressive approach is preferred, if practicable, in 
harmonizing MFN tariffs through coordinated reduction. 
To some extent, this approach can be considered a 
mirror to multilateralization, only more pragmatic 
in its gradualism, and with an eventual result that 
is less ambitious (non-zero MoP). It also differs from 
multilateralization in that it applies only to tariffs but not 
non-tariff measures.
The second possible interim step is the dilution of ROOs 
through liberalization. If FTA members are not yet ready 
to give up reciprocal preferences, then this approach 
could be seen as preparing the groundwork for that 
process. It could be done through harmonization, 
and expanding rules of cumulation. If the ROOs 
are sufficiently liberalized and rules of cumulation 
adequately expanded, it can remove distortions 
associated with artificial sourcing of inputs simply 
to meet regional accumulation requirements. This 
will reduce the incentive for the spoke or peripheral 
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countries to pursue FTAs with either the hub or other 
spokes in order to prevent (non-preferential) spoke-
spoke trade being diverted to (preferential) hub-spoke 
trade. The Pan-European Cumulation System (PECs) is a 
good model for how this can work (see Gasiorek 2007). 
If rules of cumulation are sufficiently expanded and 
then harmonized across different agreements, complete 
multilateralization of tariff accords is no longer needed. 
In this sense, liberalizing ROOs, like harmonized 
reduction of MFN tariffs, can be thought of as an 
alternative means to the same end. Like the harmonized 
reduction approach, it would apply mainly to tariff 
measures. It should be noted, however, that the high 
share of product fragmentation trade—as a result of the 
vertical specialization spread across this region—is likely 
to limit the extent to which a system like PECs could 
be successfully introduced. Multilateralization, when 
pursued by all members of the consolidated bloc, also 
delivers reciprocity the same way that a consolidated 
FTA does. This was, after all, the idea behind the “open 
regionalism” approach in the original conception of 
APEC (Drysdale and Patrick 1979, Garnaut and Drysdale 
1994). But with multilateralization, the possibility of 
addressing non-tariff barriers and regulatory reforms is 
enhanced, as they are naturally non-excludable once 
achieved and therefore easier to reach when pursued 
without the constraint of requisite excludability. 
Therefore, in East Asia in particular, dilution of ROOs 
may still serve mainly as a sequential complement that 
prepares the groundwork—rather than a substitute—for 
multilateralization.
Neither multilateralization nor consolidation—or 
interim measures—can directly result in any change 
in barriers existing in nonmember countries. Barriers 
facing members in export markets outside the region 
remain an important issue preventing the realization 
of further welfare gains to all parties. A multilateral 
deal would do this, but, as mentioned, reaching a deal 
appears increasingly remote. In the quest for reciprocity, 
members of a consolidated bloc may wish to pursue tie-
ups with other blocs—and this is becoming increasingly 
popular (see The Economist 2012c). The recent decision 
to create the world’s largest FTA between the EU and 
the US will increase pressure to pursue such tie-ups, 
either with this mega-FTA or with others around the 
world.62 Although such tie-ups may be inevitable, adding 
to the benefits members receive, does it become an end 
point in and of itself? 
62In fact the EU has been aggressively pursuing FTAs with countries globally, and 
tie-ups with other FTAs. So has the US, although to a lesser extent.
As with a consolidated regional FTA, an expanded 
inter-regional one should be viewed as a means rather 
than an end. Issues relating to trade diversion will 
remain, although they could begin to diminish as the 
mega-bloc grows, but the risk of trade deflection could 
increase. Concerns over incomplete utilization would 
also remain and significantly erode potential benefits 
expected on the assumption of full utilization. Any 
expanded FTA would only realize its full potential—
while removing these risks and the need to implement 
ROOs—when preferences are multilateralized. In fact, 
such tie-ups between large blocs should make eventual 
multilateralization easier, as members would have 
secured preferential access with a larger number of 
trading partners. In the absence of a multilateral deal, 
multilateralization should still remain the end game.
Comparing the Relative 
Merits of Consolidation, 
Multilateralization, and 
the Interim Steps to 
Multilateralization
The assessment and likely impact from consolidation, 
multilateralization, and the two interim steps to 
multilateralization—harmonized reduction of tariffs 
and dilution of ROOs—in disentangling the noodle 
bowl and promoting liberalization more generally 
can be summarized. Again, in stylized form, the likely 
welfare effects of each remedy on a single country 
relating to its own (import) barriers can be portrayed, 
before considering the benefits and challenges of each 
(Figure 44, Table 21). The stylized framework captures 
only imports and only tariffs, but it is broadly applicable 
to non-tariff parameters as well.
Two points about Figure 44 are worth highlighting. First 
is the fact that multilateralization produces the most 
significant reduction in distortions and does so in the 
shortest time. It can eliminate not only MoPs, but also 
some distortions associated with discriminatory non-
trade restrictions, especially in services. It can achieve 
this in the shortest time because it involves a one-off 
decision, as opposed to staggered (harmonization) or 
gradual (dilution) changes. 
If multilateralization is the most preferred approach, the 
least preferred is consolidation. Although distortions 
fall initially, as (some) intraregional FTAs are neutralized, 
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they can rise again if (i) a “lowest common denominator” 
outcome prevails, whereby the average level of 
distortions actually increases; and/or (ii) they induce new 
extra-regional FTAs. If the consolidated FTA is perceived 
as being relatively closed, then it is likely that distortions 
could increase substantially. Even if the consolidated 
FTA is “open” and is perceived to be so, the reduction in 
distortions is lowest among the four approaches because 
most FTAs involving an Asian country are inter-regional, 
and these are not addressed using consolidation alone. 
If the share of intraregional trade involving final goods 
is high, however, consolidation does offer benefits to 
exporters through increased access to each other’s 
markets. Reciprocal access would offset the welfare 
losses associated with the distortions described above.
These stylized impacts can be better understood by 
cataloguing the benefits and challenges of the different 
approaches, considering unilateral liberalization for 
completeness (Table 21). Table 21 is largely self-
explanatory—it is clear that each has its own strengths 
and weaknesses, with the severity of each varying by 
approach. Furthermore, the most beneficial may not be 
politically feasible, however, so trade-offs must be struck.
Concluding Remarks
The proliferation of FTAs has been greatest in Asia. 
The noodle bowl—with more than 100 ratified 
FTAs involving at least one Asian economy—is an 
understandable response to the global multilateral 
impasse. Yet its sheer complexity and diversity requires 
reform. Reviving the Doha Developing Agenda (DDA) 
alone may be insufficient, and the prospects for 
doing so are not high. It is more likely the DDA will be 
sliced into a host of sectoral agreements. Against this 
backdrop, two key proposals have been advanced to 
disentangle the Asian noodle bowl—consolidation and 
multilateralization. Consolidation builds a regional FTA 
to harmonize bilateral FTAs—such as the RCEP—while 
multilateralization grants nondiscriminatory preferences 
to nonmembers, eliminating preference discrepancies. 
These two approaches, however, need not be mutually 
exclusive. Should the consolidation approach result in 
a regional FTA, it does not preclude multilateralization. 
The preferences of a regional FTA could still be offered 
to outsiders on a nondiscriminatory basis. Indeed, 
consolidation, if possible, should be viewed as a means 
toward an end. However, several questions on the 
consolidation approach remain, such as (i) how multiple 
bilateral agreements—each with its own defining 

















Figure 44:  Stylized Welfare Effects of Different Remedies
FTA = free trade agreement.
A: Distortions (Trade Barriers) 
B: Distortions (Trade and Non-Trade Barriers) 
Source: Menon (2009).
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agreement without resorting to the lowest common 
denominator to reach consensus; and (ii) how to address 
inter-regional bilateral agreements, which constitute 
the majority of Asia’s FTAs—including RCEP members. 
The recent trend favoring tie-ups between regional 
blocs could address part of the problem associated 
with (ii), but may exacerbate the difficulties involved 
with (i), as tie-ups increase both the number and 
likely diversity of members. Both issues are addressed 
by multilateralization however, whether applied 
independently or jointly with consolidation. Although 
Table 21: The Trade Journey—Benefits and Challenges of Trade Liberalization
Steps in the sequence 
of trade reforms
Benefits Challenges
Unilateral Liberalization ●  Maximizes trade creation without trade diversion
●  No need for coordination (Note: 65% of 
developing tariff reductions from 1983–2003 were 
unilateral) 
●  Lack of reciprocity is politically costly
Consolidation ●  Political capital for governments and policymakers
●  Higher welfare generally assured for members
●  Potential for long-term dynamic partnerships, 
by opening up markets, providing growth  
opportunities, and promoting competition, 
among others
●  Potential to achieve deeper reforms, because 
of the smaller number of economies involved, 
compared with the WTO, for instance
●  Trade diversion (although FTAs also create new 
trade) and deflection
●  Complexity of dealing with different rules of origin 
(ROOs)
●  Low utilization rates may limit benefits, especially 
given high transaction costs in drafting and 
negotiating FTAs; consolidated FTA may 
not negate the use of bilateral FTAs if the 
commitments of the latter are superior
●  Could tax consumers and producers if a lower 
cost supplier lies outside the region and if trade is 
diverted as a result of high margins of preference 
(MoPs)
●  Possible retaliatory actions by non-members if 
significantly harmed
Harmonized Reduction of External 
Barriers
●  More practical with flexible pace of 
implementation
●  MoP reduction secured indirectly and therefore 
more feasible 
●  More easily applied to tariff than non-tariff 
measures
Dilution of ROOs ●  Practical if members are unwilling to give up 
reciprocal preferences
●  Reduces trade diversion and the “export of 
protection”
●  Applies only to tariffs and any domestic content 
requirements of investment provisions
●  Less effective in Asia (particularly East Asia) given 
the high share of production network trade and 
low value-added involved
Multilateralization of Preferences ●  Flexible as it can be pursued unilaterally, but 
coordinated form delivers reciprocity to all parties 
involved
●  Realizes the full gains from consolidation
●  Amenable to building block approach, 
although consolidation is not a prerequisite for 
multilateralization 
●  Removes potential for trade diversion or 
deflection 
●  Eliminates costs associated with implementing 
ROOs 
●  Reduces/eliminates the risk of a new wave of 
market-restoring FTAs
●  Time-consuming and fraught with political 
difficulties if concessions/preferences are 
extended to all
●  A key stumbling block is securing reciprocity 
from—and/or market access to—third parties
●  Liberalizing non-tariff barriers is complex, and 
vested interests (such as agriculture) prevent 
extending preferences to nonmembers 
FTA = free trade agreement; WTO = World Trade Organization.
Source: Office of Regional Economic Integration, ADB.
consolidation requires multilateralization, the reverse is 
not true. Countries are free to pursue multilateralization 
independently. But they must overcome competing 
interests that lose from the dilution of preferences—
usually the same interests that favored the FTAs to 
begin with. 
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Although consolidation and 
multilateralization are not mutually 
exclusive—consolidation is a means; 
multilateralization is the end—history 
shows that unilateral actions (of which 
multilateralization is a special case) are not 
only feasible but account for most trade 
liberalization to date.
Because most trade liberalization to date has been 
unilateral, there is much to support this approach. 
The argument that unilateral actions such as 
multilateralization lack the proper incentives and are 
therefore, impracticable, ignores the lessons of history. 
Nonetheless, policymakers handling trade in Asia and in 
other regions continue to face considerable challenges. 
The arguments presented in this special section, which 
favor multilateralization—or consolidation as an interim 
step—should not be construed as underestimating 
these problems. But the case for multilateralization 
should be made stronger, and pursued more strongly, as 
the welfare gains will likely be larger. 
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